13 June 2025 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Sydney Morning Herald on 12 June 2025 Image: Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, the Hon Richard Marles MP, meets with United States Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, at the 22nd Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore from 30 May to 1 June 2025. Defence Images News that the US Department of Defence has launched an AUKUS review has Canberra’s defence circles in overdrive, with familiar critics already proclaiming the pact is “sinking” . Yet this outbreak of anxiety poses a bigger danger than the review itself. Washington’s routine stocktake changes nothing fundamental: the risks are unchanged and the safeguards Australia has put in place remain fit for purpose. Although the Pentagon has yet to confirm the review, reputable reporting – and Canberra’s evident lack of surprise – makes its existence clear. Commentators have blamed everything from tariff spats to Australia’s sanctions on Israeli ministers and Washington’s call for higher defence spending. Far likelier, the new Trump administration has folded AUKUS into its accelerated National Defence Strategy rewrite , scheduled for release in August – the first since the partnership’s AUKUS “optimal pathway” was outlined in 2023. Notably, the US Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, Elbridge Colby, is steering both the AUKUS review and the National Defence Strategy rewrite. Australia’s Defence Minister, Richard Marles, has indicated publicly that he has known of it for weeks – US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth likely told him during the Shangri-La dialogue. The leak itself appears timed to squeeze Canberra ahead of a likely G7 meeting between Donald Trump and Anthony Albanese, following Australia’s public refusal to lift defence spending simply because Washington asked. Despite domination of the AUKUS discussion, the review heralds no fundamental shift for AUKUS. Defence projects are never “run-of-the-mill”, and this, Australia’s most ambitious and expensive, carries a significant degree of risk. Risk that requires vigilance rather than complacency. Even so, the partnership’s underlying risk profile remains unchanged. The challenges of workforce, timeframes and the low US submarine production rate remain the same as they were when the deal was announced in 2021 and Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine “optimal pathway” was agreed in 2023. So, what will the review likely conclude? Congress already locked the key AUKUS provisions into law via the 2023 National Defence Authorisation Act , and bipartisan backing remains solid. Senior officials keep reinforcing that support: Secretary of State Marco Rubio calls AUKUS a “blueprint” for allied co-operation; Hegseth says the president is “fully behind it”. Even Elbridge Colby – now leading the review – told Congress in March: “We should do everything possible to make this work.”  Despite the glaring absence of AUKUS in Hegseth’s Shangri-La speech , the political framing, in short, is favourable. Why wouldn’t the review be favourable? AUKUS delivers plenty for Washington. Australia is injecting $5 billion into America’s submarine yards and will host US boats for maintenance, cutting transit and refit times. Beyond the deal itself, Canberra has deepened force-posture support : rotating marines through Darwin, rotating US bombers and expanding logistics hubs. All this sits atop Australia’s indispensable intelligence and communications infrastructure – Pine Gap and the Harold E. Holt station – that lets the US talk to its nuclear-powered submarines across the Indo-Pacific. The benefits, for America, only multiply from there. Australia sits at the core of America’s ability to respond to any China-related crisis in the Indo-Pacific – and preparing for that contingency is reportedly a pillar of the US interim National Defence Strategy. It was front and centre in Hegseth’s Shangri-La speech, in which he warned of an “imminent” regional threat from Beijing. Across South-East and North-East Asia, Australia is viewed as Washington’s closest ally. If the US back-pedalled on – or seriously weakened – AUKUS, regional capitals would notice immediately, eroding US credibility and its strategy aimed at deterring China. None of this suggests AUKUS is risk-free, or that the review couldn’t tweak key details – but a wholesale rewrite remains improbable. Australia’s response will depend on what, if anything, changes. The real danger is any delay – or cancellation – of the promised Virginia-class boats. The Collins fleet, commissioned between 1993 and 2003, is already living on extensions ; even on today’s timeline, we face a submarine gap, and slippage on the Virginias would stretch it wider. Those boats are the “walk” step before the joint SSN-AUKUS build of the nuclear-powered attack submarines with Britain: losing them would be painful, but still manageable with the right mitigations. Calls for a “plan B” overlook a blunt reality: AUKUS is already Plan C. Decades of delays and changes on ship and submarine replacements put us in this bind, and no credible Plan D can now prevent a capability gap. Bottom line: a Pentagon review of AUKUS is routine, not a harbinger of collapse. AUKUS has already survived changes of government in Canberra and London; it will survive this too. The pact is complex and risky, but Washington stands to gain too much to abandon it, and early signals from the new administration remain positive. Australia will have to lift defence spending – always inevitable, now simply said aloud. AUKUS isn’t “sinking”; the real danger is Australia losing its nerve. Stay the course, absorb the bumps, and the capability will follow.

29 May 25 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in Lowy's The Interpreter on 29 May 25 The naval relationship between the two nations has plateaued, but there’s a way to regain momentum. Image : Republic of Korea Navy destroyer ROKS Wang Geon prepares to come alongside Fleet Base East in Sydney for a port visit ahead of Exercise PACIFIC VANGUARD 2021. (Defence Imagery) When HMAS  Toowoomba manoeuvred alongside ROKS Gang Gam-chan during Exercise Haidoli Wallaby in November 2023, the image crystallised a decade of quiet progress in Australia-Republic of Korea (ROK) naval relations. Ship visits are now routine and the biennial foreign and defence minister’s 2 + 2 dialogue nominates maritime security as a top priority. Yet despite being well-placed to achieve greater interoperability , especially technical interoperability (that is, the ability of hardware and software systems to communicate and work together), the naval relationship has in some ways plateaued.  The establishment of a working group on naval interoperability could help address this, and reap the benefits of parallel naval modernisation efforts and increasing strategic alignment. A decade ago, the RAN’s relationships with both the ROKN and Japan’s Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) stood at roughly the same embryonic stage; each featured only a handful of bilateral exercises and broad aspirations for closer ties. Since then, a commitment to interoperability has propelled the RAN–JMSDF partnership far ahead, generating frequent joint exercises and increasing operational and technical familiarity. But progress with the ROKN has largely plateaued. Three factors make deeper Australia–ROK naval integration pressing. First, both governments now frame maritime security as existential. ROK’s 2023 National Security Strategy elevates the safeguarding of sea-lines of communication (Korea's primary maritime routes used for trade, logistics, and naval operations) to equal footing with deterring North Korea. Meanwhile, Australia’s 2024 National Defence Strategy re-oriented the Australian Defence Force towards a maritime posture.  The Australia–South Korea naval partnership is important to each country’s broader Indo-Pacific objectives. To offer a genuine capability edge, it needs a naval interoperability framework. Second, each navy is modernising at pace. The ROKN’s Navy Vision 2045 promises Aegis destroyers , uncrewed vehicle command ships and an artificial-intelligence-enabled “ Smart Fleet ”. The RAN is preparing to operate Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS , expand its surface combatant force and restore continuous shipbuilding .  Third, almost every tonne of Korean and Australian trade transits the increasingly contested maritime domain. Any severe interruption to maritime trade would jolt both economies within days. Rising ROKN–RAN activity over the last decade has lifted procedural, human and informational interoperability from its embryonic stages. This has occurred through the anti-submarine exercise Exercise Haidoli Wallaby, joint participation in the Pacific Vanguard integrated air-and-missile-defence exercise, and the Talisman Sabre series. These activities are supported by Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) on both science and technology , and logistics . All of this is complemented by the 2023 signing of an MoU between the RAN and ROKN .  The bilateral naval relationship should be generating much greater strategic value. However, a targeted approach could deliver quicker, more concrete gains in interoperability. Procedural, human and informational links have advanced, but technical interoperability still lags, an area ripe for both navies to exploit. With both South Korea and Australia now prioritising continuous shipbuilding and the defence of sea lanes, the bilateral naval relationship should be generating much greater strategic value. The two fleets already share baseline capabilities. Each fields US-derived combat-systems – that is, the ship’s “brain” that integrates sensor data with its weapons systems. Aegis combat systems operate on both Korean destroyers and Australia’s Hobart class. Upcoming fleet expansions present a rare opportunity to “design in” further technical interoperability. Bridging the gap means treating interoperability as a strategic objective of the two navies, not just a by-product of goodwill. The establishment of a RAN-ROKN working group resourced to develop and maintain an interoperability roadmap and reporting biennially to ministers would generate a more structured pathway to interoperability between the two navies.  Capability development should be another priority. South Korea's robotics prowess and Australia's emphasis on undersea capabilities under Pillar II of AUKUS create an obvious pathway to co-fund uncrewed surface and uncrewed underwater vehicles. New industrial developments can reinforce the effort. Hanwha’s recent 9.9% stake in Austal highlights South Korea’s appetite for deeper collaboration. Co-producing mine-warfare or fleet-auxiliary vessels in Korean shipyards would swiftly plug key RAN capability gaps. Australia and South Korea have already elevated bilateral ties through a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership . The next defence ministers’ meeting should unveil a phased naval interoperability blueprint with measurable milestones. The opportunity exists and the strategic rationale is compelling. The Australia–South Korea naval partnership is important to each country’s broader Indo-Pacific objectives. To offer a genuine capability edge, it needs a naval interoperability framework to institutionalise the ability to operate together. Australia and Japan have shown what is possible. Australia will need to continue to broaden its naval relationships and interoperability to counter the increasingly contested maritime domain. The ROKN–RAN relationship offers significant potential. Now is the time to develop a naval interoperability working group that can translate strategic aims into operational outcomes.

28 May 25 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Conversation on 28 May Image: China China Coast Guard vessel water canons Philippines Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources vessels in the area of the Pag-Asa Cays on 21 May. From Philippine's Coast Guard Spokesperson Commodore Jay Tarriela ( https://x.com/jaytaryela/status/1925464381116363119 ) Last week, Chinese coast guard vessels rammed and shot water cannon at Philippine ships in the South China Sea. The incident was well within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone and was completely unprovoked. It is the latest example of a sustained pattern of Chinese maritime coercion that has intensified over the past three years. Despite the growing frequency and sheer aggression of these tactics, international attention and official rebukes have noticeably waned in the past 12 months. For Australia, a nation whose prosperity and security relies on maritime trade, there can be no room for complacency or desensitisation. China’s maritime aggression puts Australia at risk. Why freedom of navigation matters Australia’s lifeblood flows through the oceans. Roughly 99% of our trade by volume moves by sea. And two-thirds of Australia’s maritime trade travels through the South China Sea. In a crisis or conflict, Australia would rely on these maritime supply chains to continue delivering fuel, food, fertiliser, ammunition and other critical supplies to sustain our economy and defence forces. Any disruption to Australia’s seaborne supplies – whether by state-sanctioned harassment or outright force – threatens our national resilience at a fundamental level. Given this, Australia’s economy benefits significantly from the rules set forth in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea , or UNCLOS. Australia should be deeply concerned by images of Chinese coast guard vessels ramming and firing water cannon at Philippine fisheries vessels. China’s coast guard and maritime militia have weaponised “ grey zone ” tactics such as these. Such actions are aimed at intimidation and coercion. They purposely fall short of actual conflict, which would trigger the collective defence guarantee between the Philippines and United States, or other strong international action. Each collision, each burst of water cannon, reinforces a new normal: that Beijing can coerce its neighbours in peacetime without bearing a strategic cost. Muted responses are hurting us The lack of response from the international community plays into this. International reporting of these incidents has declined compared to early last year. The once-robust chorus of diplomatic protests also appears more muted. The Australian ambassador to the Philippines expressed deep concerns about last week’s incident on social media, but there was no ministerial statement or response from Australia’s maritime agencies or Department of Defence. When a Chinese fighter pilot released flares near an Australian maritime patrol aircraft over the South China Sea in February, the defence department called the action “unsafe and unprofessional”. Formal complaints were lodged, but this was the end of it. While we must carefully manage our relationship with China as an important trading partner, the continuation of these incidents requires a stronger rebuke. Australia cannot allow a drift towards quiet acquiescence of these actions by our political leaders or the public. If coercive actions go unanswered, China will grow ever more confident that it can rewrite the norms of conduct at sea. Over time, a contested maritime environment would inflict real costs on Australian exporters, our digital connectivity and the ability of our Navy to operate freely and safely in regional waters. So, what must Australia do? First, we should step up our diplomatic efforts to spotlight every act of aggression in the South China Sea and the broader Indo-Pacific region. This could mean supporting the Philippines in a joint ministerial statement or other collective diplomatic condemnations. Second, Australia must continue to deepen practical cooperation with regional partners. This includes joint naval training exercises, information-sharing arrangements and coordinated patrols with partners such as the Philippines. This will send a clear signal: we stand shoulder to shoulder with those who champion freedom of navigation and respect for exclusive economic zones. Third, our strategic communications must be unambiguous. At home, Australians should understand that maritime security underpins our everyday prosperity, from the iPhones in our hands to the fuel in our cars and our internet banking. Lastly, Australia must back rhetoric with resources. We must accelerate the strengthening of our maritime and naval capabilities. Australia’s plans for new submarines and surface combatants will see delivery in the 2030s and 2040s. Timeframes of this nature do not meet our present strategic reality. Even with these new ships and submarines, glaring gaps remain and must be urgently closed. This includes acquiring mine-warfare vessels and establishing a coast guard, to name but a few. These efforts require more resourcing through increased defence spending and a genuine commitment to structural reform. History teaches that once coercion goes unchecked, it tends to escalate. The incident last week is not an isolated provocation, but part of a continued deterioration of security in the waters around us. Australia has both the right and the responsibility to challenge the normalisation of this kind of maritime aggression. We can push back by calling out each incident, continuing to deepen our regional partnerships, accelerating the development of our naval capabilities, and reinforcing international maritime law. Our future prosperity, and the security of generations to come, depends on it.

8 May 2025 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in Leading Britain's Conversation on 8 May 2025 Image: Defence Minister Richard Marles will meet again with his British counterpart Grant Shapps Mar 24. Defence Images The September 2021 launch of the AUKUS partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States did more than pave the way for Australia to obtain nuclear-powered submarines. It signalled a turning point: the three longstanding partners see deeper collaboration on cutting-edge military capabilities as essential preparation for an increasingly contested global order. The reasons are obvious. Long before the current US administration’s position on Ukraine, rhetoric in support of Russia, and the opening salvos of what could become a global trade war, two broader trends had already put both the United Kingdom and Australia on the back foot. First, an increasing number of states are willing to use armed force to settle disputes. Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine is the clearest example, but conflict is also flaring across the Middle East, tensions have spiked recently in South Asia, and China is exerting growing military pressure on Taiwan while harassing Philippine government and fishing vessels inside the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone in the South China Sea. Secondly, while war’s brutality endures, its conduct is changing fast: drones now roam land, sea and sky, artificial intelligence speeds decision-making, and ballistic and hypersonic missiles dominate the battlespace. Together, these trends require Australia, the United Kingdom and other like-minded partners to be ready to defend their vital interests with force—and to accelerate technological upgrades to stay battlefield-relevant. These dynamics gave rise to AUKUS. Pillar I will deliver nuclear-powered submarines for Australia while expanding United Kingdom and United States shipbuilding capacity; Pillar II binds the three nations to develop the next wave of capability—hypersonics, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence and other battlefield enablers. Yet AUKUS alone is no panacea. Elements of Washington’s change in approach to Ukraine, Russia and NATO show why Canberra and London should also strengthen complementary partnerships and widen the circle of technical defence cooperation. Their shared history, industrial synergies and broadly aligned strategic outlook make Australia and the United Kingdom natural partners for deeper collaboration beyond the formal alliance with the United States. With both the United Kingdom and Australia boosting defence spending, the scope for deeper technical collaboration is expanding. April’s deal between their defence science and technology agencies on future weapons systems is a promising start, but the partnership can—and should—go much further to strengthen each nation’s capabilities and defence industries. It must be ambitious, to meet the deteriorating strategic circumstances at pace. How do we achieve this between Australia and the United Kingdom? Make it a priority. Strip away red tape, share risk and start building together beyond submarines. Joint production lines for uncrewed underwater vehicles, uncrewed aerial vehicles, shared test ranges for hypersonics, and a security framework that protects intellectual property without throttling collaboration would give both nations sharper teeth at lower cost and create jobs at home. Bilateral collaboration of this degree will only help to underwrite AUKUS collaboration and mitigate some of its risks. If Canberra and London can turn good will and intent into actual capability before the decade ends, they will prove that determined middle powers need not wait for Washington’s lead to safeguard their interests—and Europe and the Indo-Pacific will be safer for it.

24 April 2025 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Conversation Image: United States Navy Virginia-class submarine USS Minnesota alongside Fleet Base West in Western Australia. Defence Images Australian strategic thinking has long struggled to move beyond a narrow view of defence that focuses solely on protecting our shores . However, in today’s world, our economy could be crippled without an enemy boot stepping foot on Australian soil. Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines through AUKUS marks a shift in this mindset. It is not a strategy in itself, but a structural pivot: a recognition that our vital interests lie far beyond the coastline, and that defending them requires Australia to project its maritime power. Protecting our vital sea lanes Over a century ago, US naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan observed that “wars are won by the economic strangulation of the enemy from the sea”. While not universally true, this maxim is directly relevant to an island nation like Australia – 99% of our international trade moves by sea. But not just any trade – our critical supplies of fuel, fertiliser and ammunition all come by sea. Australia’s economy and defences would be crippled if these things were stopped at sea. These vulnerabilities are compounded by our growing dependence on undersea cables for communications. Strategic concepts that rely on making Australia’s territory a hard target, such as the “ strategic defensive ”, fail to grapple with this reality, perpetuating a flawed understanding of how to defend Australia. Viewing Australia’s interests solely through the lens of avoiding or defeating a territorial attack overlooks the reality that an adversary could cripple the nation far more easily through the maritime, space or cyber domains. The ability to project power in the seas and oceans far from Australia’s shores is critical to protecting these seaborne supply lines and sustaining the national economy. This is where AUKUS comes in – the endurance and range of nuclear-powered submarines are a key element. Developing a future maritime strategy Australia’s future nuclear-powered submarines would make adversary naval task groups vulnerable if they threatened our maritime trade routes. Much more is needed, however, to deliver a coherent maritime strategy. This includes: expanding our surface combatant fleet addressing the vulnerability of Australia’s limited number of resupply, mine warfare and hydrographic vessels and resolving longstanding issues around our strategic fleet (commercial ships that could be requisitioned in a time of crisis). We must also expand our flagged merchant shipping fleet by reforming the Australian International Shipping Register . And we must strengthen our domestic maritime security through the establishment of a national coastguard . But AUKUS, as the centrepiece of our future undersea capability, is a good start. AUKUS’ critics AUKUS has attracted plenty of criticism — particularly following the new Trump administration’s moves away from the US’ traditional allies in Europe. Yet, despite claims the three-phase AUKUS submarine plan is failing, it remains remarkably on track . Like any complex defence acquisition, it carries risks. These risks include the continued political will to keep the deal on track, as well as the workforce, delivery schedule and cost pressures that come with building the submarines. But the relevant question is not whether risks exist — if that were the test, most defence programs wouldn’t proceed. The question is whether the risks around AUKUS are being effectively mitigated. And as the three phases of the AUKUS deal progress, these risks will continue to evolve. Australia must remain focussed on addressing them. Political will is firm The political risk has been most salient recently, given the Trump administration’s actions on Europe, Ukraine, foreign aid and tariffs. But while these disruptions are significant, they were largely foreshadowed. By contrast, the political signals coming out of Washington around AUKUS have been overwhelmingly positive . This is because AUKUS is in the US’ strategic interests as much as it is in Australia’s interests. Importantly, the political commitment to AUKUS in Canberra, Washington and London has already been demonstrated. The “ optimal pathway ” to guide the agreement into the 2030s was signed within 18 months of AUKUS’ launch in September 2021. And the AUKUS treaty that enables the US and UK to transfer nuclear submarine technology and equipment to Australia has since been signed and entered into force among all three partners. In Australia, bipartisan support has held for over three years, with no sign of weakening. Australia’s importance to the US Many critics have also focused on the risks posed by the US submarine industrial base and its ability to build nuclear-powered submarines quickly enough. The US would need to increase its production rate to two Virginia-class submarines per year by 2028 – and subsequently to 2.33 submarines per year – in order to reach the target US fleet of 66 submarines by 2054 . But this does not preclude the sale of three Virginia-class submarines to Australia in the early 2030s. Australia is not just a recipient of submarines from the US — it will help enable the US’ undersea operations in the region. Our role as a rotational hub for US submarines and the longstanding support we can offer the US fleet through facilities such as the Harold E. Holt submarine communications station makes our contribution far more valuable than the notional loss of three submarines on paper. Could this change in the future? Like all international arrangements, of course it could. But there is no indication at present that it will. The defence of Australia is not simply about protecting our continent from attack — it is about safeguarding vital national interests. For an island nation, that means securing maritime trade routes and undersea infrastructure. Even for those concerned about the extremely unlikely prospect of invasion, a robust maritime strategy also enables threats to be defeated well before they reach our shores. Through its emphasis on maritime power projection, AUKUS reflects a fundamental shift in how we think about defending Australia in the decades ahead.

22 April 2025 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review on 22 April 2025 as part of their election 'Policy Pitch' series 'The Australian Financial Review asked prominent people to propose one policy initiative they believe political parties should pledge to do, should they win the election ' . Here's my pitch. Image: Originally published in the Australian Financial Review What’s the pitch? Talk on Defence in the last term and into the election has focused on capability, workforce and spending . While an important issue, absent from the discussion, has been the structure of Defence. Whoever forms the next government will face the formidable task of reshaping the structure of the Australian Defence Force and the Department of Defence to ensure readiness for any potential crisis or conflict in our region. The ADF – the army, navy and airforce – and the Department of Defence were formed in 1976 following the influential Tange reviews. The structure of the ADF has developed over time, with the forming of the Joint Operations Command in 2004 to manage ADF operations across the three services, and the Joint Capabilities Group in 2017. The Department of Defence has undergone several structural changes since its inception Subsequent reviews have expanded the Defence bureaucracy to meet peacetime requirements, most notably through the 2015 First Principles Review. While that review aimed to streamline Defence and ensure it was fit for purpose, it instead entrenched a cumbersome committee system and reduced accountability among key decision-makers. A decade on, the department’s structure has further morphed, now comprising 14 groups, and the roles of the army, navy, and air force chiefs have been diminished. Although these measures may reduce peacetime risk, they risk paralysing decision-making in a crisis or conflict. Why is it needed? Military strategists have long warned that prolonged peace can breed excessive bureaucracy, as illustrated by the Royal Navy’s challenges at the Battle of Jutland during World War I – sparking the famous rat-catchers or regulators debate [leaders who are willing to break conventions to achieve a goal, versus those who are cautious and rule-bound]. Although Australia has participated in conflicts over the past 80 years, they were distant engagements of choice. A conflict in the Indo-Pacific, however, would demand a far more agile Defence structure, with whole-of-nation and whole-of-government co-ordination. To prepare, we must streamline the Defence portfolio: reduce unnecessary hierarchy, empower the service chiefs, limit committee influence, increase spending ceilings of key leaders and delegate authority down. A concise, focused review should ensure clear accountability, a solid chain of command, greater agility in decision-making at lower levels, with decision-making geared toward the needs of any future crisis or conflict. This will develop a more resilient and self-reliant Defence structure. How much would it cost? Optimising our Defence structure to match current strategic circumstances is far less expensive than acquiring major new military hardware. In 2018, for example, the Department of Defence informed a parliamentary inquiry that it had spent approximately $245 million on consultancies to implement reforms from the First Principles Review. While that figure doesn’t necessarily indicate the cost of a new structural review today – and outsourcing is not ideal – it gives an order of magnitude cost. What would you scrap to pay for it? In this instance, Defence itself is best placed to determine how it should be organised for future crises or conflicts rather than another external review. Ultimately, the benefits of streamlining our Defence structure would likely far outweigh the costs. Importantly, business as usual activities – particularly acquisitions – must continue throughout the review, so we don’t lose critical preparation time for potential crises. Naturally, such a review will consume valuable decision-making capacity, potentially posing a greater cost than mere dollars. Still, to realise its benefits, it must be prioritised over other initiatives – possibly including some workforce measures. If done correctly, however, it should ultimately generate greater workforce capacity, but it will also ensure the organisation is better prepared for potential crises or conflicts – a lesson we don’t want to learn the hard way once a crisis hits.

15 April 2025 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian on 15 April 2025 Image: Image of RAAF  Corporal Samantha Mead (center) with the aviators she mentored on the Top Chicks program: Melina Young/Department of Defence . The Ukraine war has been called the bloodiest conflict since World War II. As of July 2024, 10,000 women were serving in frontline combat roles. Try telling them – from the safety of an Australian lounge room – they don’t belong there. But that’s exactly what the now disendorsed Liberal candidate for Whitlam, Benjamin Britton , did last week when he doubled down on his claim that women didn’t belong in combat. The idea of women in combat is not new – it dates back centuries. That this topic has re-entered mainstream political debate is dangerous and damaging. It risks undermining the morale of our defence force and stoking a culture war at precisely the moment when we should be focused on enhancing capability. National security is a bipartisan priority, with both sides acknowledging the strategic uncertainty Australia faces – war in Europe , instability in the Middle East and China’s assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific. Y et instead of strengthening our defence capability, recent political discourse risks undermining it. The resurfacing of comments from Britton – calling for the removal of women from combat roles to “fix the military” – and a 2018 interview in which opposition defence spokesman Andrew Hastie claimed the “fighting DNA” of close combat units was “best preserved when exclusively male” do exactly that. It’s important to clarify what combat roles actually entail. These are positions that engage directly with enemy forces – traditionally found on warships, in fighter aircraft and on the battlefield. But as the character of war has evolved across the five domains – land, sea, air, cyber and space – so too has the nature of combat. The lines are increasingly blurred, exemplified by growing recognition of drone operators as combat roles. Today, defining a combat role is far less clear-cut than it once was. Which only reinforces how ludicrous it is to exclude 50 per cent of the Australian population from these roles. Australia’s journey towards fully integrating women has been a long one. Women have proudly supported Australian military operations since the Boer War in 1899. In 1990, the chief of navy lifted restrictions on women serving at sea, with Royal Australian Navy women deploying in frontline roles during the Gulf War aboard HMAS Westralia. By 1998, the navy allowed women to serve on submarines. In 1992, most Australian Defence Force roles were opened to women, with only a few exceptions remaining – clearance divers, combat engineers, infantry, artillery, airfield defence and special forces. In 1992 the Royal Australian Air Force opened fighter pilot roles to women, though uptake has been slow because of cultural barriers rather than capability. Yet even before that, in 1990, female RAAF pilots were already flying C-130s in combat-related roles, and by 2000 women were serving as navigators in Australia’s F-111 strike aircraft. While admittedly the nature of conflict across the domains is different, these are combat roles where women’s lives are on the line and the sacrifices are just as real. The journey towards the inclusion of women in land combat roles in Australia has been slower. While ADF women have made key contributions to peacekeeping missions since the 1990s, it wasn’t until 2011 that the formal ban on women serving in land combat roles was lifted – extended to special forces roles in 2014. This was despite the first woman earning her commando green beret as early as 1981 and women serving as combat medics alongside special forces in Afghanistan before the policy change. But what of Britton’s specific comments? Setting aside his apparent misunderstanding of the broad range of combat roles, he expressed concern about “women’s hips”. It’s true that studies in Australia and Britain have found that body armour designed for men can have adverse physical impacts on women. But these same studies conclude that such issues can be resolved through improved design. It’s not a reduction in protection, just a redesign to fit the body it’s intended for. And what about the success rates of women in these physically arduous roles? In 2018, the director of workforce strategy for the army told a parliamentary committee that attrition rates for women in combat roles were broadly the same as those for men. Likewise, the proportion of applicants, male and female, who fail to meet the physical employment standards for these roles shows no significant gender difference. As for the so-called fighting DNA of close combat units – I’ve never served in land combat – it’s an experience that deserves the respect of a grateful nation. But based on my operational experience, from service at sea during the second Gulf War to chasing armed drug smugglers in the Caribbean, I can say this: the fighting DNA of a warship is strengthened, not weakened, by diversity of all kinds – including gender. Australia faces the real prospect of conflict in our region. Faux culture wars such as this serve only to distract from the serious task of preparing our defence force for the challenges ahead.

2 April 2025 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review on 2 April 2025 Rather than repeatedly reassessing the program, we should concentrate our political and intellectual capital on ensuring it stays the course. Image: Image of US navy Virginia-class USS  Minnesota arriving in Guam: Justin Wolpert/United States Navy . Former prime minister Malcolm Turnbull has called for an “urgent assessment of the state of the AUKUS submarine project.” So, where are we? Over the past three and a half years, a significant amount has been achieved. Of course, the endeavour is risky – like all national endeavours – but that doesn’t mean we should abandon a complex undertaking such as AUKUS. Instead, we need to manage and mitigate the risk. Since the announcement in September 2021 that Australia intended to acquire nuclear-powered submarines in partnership with the United Kingdom and the United States, the plan has received significant media attention, scepticism and criticism. In a healthy democracy, any sudden decision made without a competitive evaluation process will inevitably face scrutiny. There are four major risks to the AUKUS national enterprise: the political will of all partners; delivery schedule; the cost of acquiring and sustaining the capability (including its impact on Australia’s broader Defence budget ); and workforce challenges, both for uniformed personnel and within the submarine-building industry. While these risks remain significant, the progress so far demonstrates a commitment to proactive mitigation. On the political front, the partnership demands considerable backing from the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia amid global upheaval. Yet despite changes in government across all three nations since AUKUS was first announced, the initiative has retained bipartisan support, a point reinforced by the US Congress supporting it through the passing of the National Defence Authorisation Act in December 2023, including the sale of three Virginia-class submarines to Australia. The political will was further reinforced by the agreement of all three partners on the optimal pathway for Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines within 18 months of its announcement and the signing of the trilateral AUKUS treaty in August last year, which came into effect in January. Although the treaty was finalised before President Donald Trump’s election, the new US administration has since shown strong support, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio calling AUKUS “something that I think you’re going to find very strong support for in this administration” and a “blueprint” for co-operation. The new US secretary of defence stated in February that “the president is very aware, supportive of AUKUS, recognises the importance of the defence industrial base”. Regarding the cost risk, while it is undeniably substantial , it is not orders of magnitude higher than the ill-fated conventional Attack-class submarine project. Senate estimates from October 2021 put that project’s acquisition and sustainment costs at almost $235 billion through to 2080. In last year’s budget, the Australian government allocated funding within the defence to cover the expected costs of acquiring nuclear-powered submarines over the next decade. While the overall defence budget remains a significant concern, this measure has been an important step in mitigating the cost risks of AUKUS. Australia has been steadily increasing nuclear-submariner training in the United States and the United Kingdom, and since mid-2024, shipbuilders from South Australia and Western Australia have been training on nuclear-powered submarines in Hawaii. Whether these measures will prove sufficient remains to be seen, but it is a promising start. Schedule risks remain a key concern, particularly for the phase two sale of three Virginia-class submarines set to begin in 2032. The Collins-class vessels are already beyond their intended service life, meaning the entire plan hinges on the Virginias arriving on time – or at least only slightly delayed. The 2023 National Defence Authorisation Act, which lies at the heart of Turnbull’s concerns, mandates that in 2031 – 270 days before the sale of the first Virginia-class submarine – the US president certifies that certain conditions are met. Notably, the transfer of the submarines will not degrade US undersea capabilities . “Undersea warfare effectiveness hinges on more than raw submarine numbers; it depends on having the right submarines in the right place at the right time.” As Turnbull correctly notes, the US submarine industrial base is already struggling to meet its planned production rate of two Virginia-class submarines per year and is unlikely to reach its goal of 66 attack submarines by 2054. However, this does not mean that the US president in 2031 would seek to undermine Australia’s submarine program by refusing to sell three submarines. Undersea warfare effectiveness hinges on more than raw submarine numbers; it depends on having the right submarines in the right place at the right time. This is where access to Australia’s western naval base, HMAS Stirling – and the maintenance facilities it will provide for US nuclear submarines – becomes crucial. It will help ensure US submarines can be deployed effectively when and where they are needed. Australia’s broader contributions, including the continued support of the Harold E. Holt Communications Station north of Exmouth, further bolster US undersea warfare capabilities by facilitating secure communications with nuclear-powered submarines in the region. It is imperative for Australia to make clear to the US just how vital submarines are to our national security, and to emphasise that the extensive support we provide, including access to Australia’s strategically important geography, is part of the deal. This is especially important given the more transactional nature of the current US administration and alliance framework. In response to Turnbull’s call for an “urgent assessment”, the answer is that Australia’s plan to acquire nuclear-powered submarines remains on track. Yes, it carries significant risks – as any major national endeavour does – but the challenges have been identified, and mitigation measures are in place. The progress made over the last three and a half years is substantial. Rather than repeatedly reassessing the program, we should concentrate our political and intellectual capital on ensuring it stays the course.

24 March 2025 | Jennifer Parker Image: Royal Australian Navy Minehunter Coastal HMAS Diamantina anchors in the Derwent River in support of the 186th Royal Hobart Regatta. (Defence Images) The Australian government has said, and frequently reiterated that we are facing our most ‘ complex and challenging  strategic environment since World War II—diplomatic language for a region where conflict is increasingly likely, though not inevitable. That means Australia could soon need the women and men in its Defence Force to defend our vital interests. The real question isn’t whether defence spending is 2 or 3 per cent of GDP but whether our personnel have the capabilities they need. Right now, the answer is no—and we must act accordingly. Many challenges hinder Defence’s ability to respond quickly—from structural issues to slow acquisition processes, committee structures designed for another time and absence of reserve reform. However, inadequate spending remains a significant constraint. It's a common misconception in Australia that defence spending is at record highs . While that may be true in nominal terms, it isn’t when measured relative to GDP, or when you consider the amount of military equipment it can purchase. The cost of military equipment is known to inflate at a higher rate  than the broader economy. A 2006 RAND Corporation study  found that the cost of surface combatant ship costs rose by 10% annually between 1950 and 2000—twice the average inflation rate in the broader economy. Though Australian Defence spending has outpaced broader inflation, it can no longer buy as much military equipment for the same funds as it once did. For the financial year to June 2025, the government has planned to spend $55.7 billion on Defence , covering the Department of Defence, the Australian Signals Directorate and the Australian Submarine Agency. Of that total, $52.6 billion was allocated directly to Defence—nominally the largest allocation in our history. When the 2024–25 budget was announced, the government said it expected the money would represent around 2 percent  of GDP. The plan was for this to grow to 2.4 percent by 2033–34.  If this occurs, it will be a significant investment, but it is unlikely to be enough as most of it will be spent on ships and submarines, leaving little room for anything else. Although assessing defence spending as a share of GDP is imperfect, it remains useful for historical analysis and international comparison. The exact figure for Australia in 2024–25 is 2.01 percent —lower than at any point in the Cold War  era except maybe 1949–50, when the ratio rounded to 2.0 percent. On average, during the Cold War, Australia spent 2.7 percent of GDP on defence. In the 1950s, when regional concerns were high, the average was 3.37 percent. It’s clear that in relative terms Australia isn’t spending at record levels even by Cold War standards on Defence—a reality that sits uneasily with bipartisan statements on the gravity of our strategic situation. After the Cold War, Australia took a peace dividend, dropping defence spending significantly. From 1990 to 2023, it averaged 1.9 percent of GDP  and dipped as low as 1.6 percent in 2013–14. In 2016, when spending reached 2.1 percent of GDP, the government committed to annual increases of 5.0 to 5.5 percent,  but inflation has been high since 2021, strongly eroding  these gains. Despite perceptions of record-high spending, Defence remains largely  on the path set by the 2016 White Paper  nearly a decade ago. This is despite the 2020 Defence Strategic Update  dropping the rolling presumption that conflict would not occur within 10 years, despite the eruption of conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, and despite rising Chinese aggression. According to the 2024–25 Defence budget, the spending trajectory won’t materially change until 2027–28. Although the budget added $5.7 billion  for the period 2024–25 to 2027–28, $3.8 billion  of that won’t arrive until 2027–28 under the current plan. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review  said the ‘ADF’s current force structure is not fit for purpose for our current strategic circumstances’, a point with which the government agreed in its National Defence Strategy statement. Because there’s been no increase in the Defence budget’s purchasing power of military equipment, the only way to improve the immediate force structure has been to cut some capabilities to fund others. The full extent of the 2024 ‘re-prioritisation’ of the Integrated Investment Program  remains unclear. Yet publicly disclosed cuts include cancelling the formerly proposed Joint Support Ship (affecting replenishment and sealift), axing replacement mine warfare vessels (leaving no dedicated mine warfare ship at a time when such threats are expanding), reducing the number of planned infantry fighting vehicles and deferring plans to buy a fourth squadron of F35 fighter aircraft. While it’s wise to ensure the defence capability budget is properly prioritised, it’s difficult to imagine a maritime concept of operations to defend Australia’s vital interests that doesn’t include enhanced replenishment and coastal mine-clearing capabilities. Both examples show these capabilities weren’t cut for having little value but because the budget hadn’t grown to meet the threat outlined in the National Defence Strategy. Meanwhile, other gaps remain across the portfolio—from insufficient counter-drone capabilities and a lack of land-based ballistic missile defence to inadequate guided weapons stocks. This underlines how a constrained budget has left Australia without many defence essentials. While Defence spending is increasing, it isn’t at a historic high when measured in relative terms or the amount of military equipment it can buy, and it certainly isn’t calibrated to our most serious circumstances since World War II. Any debate about whether to spend 2 or 3 per cent of GDP is a distraction; we need to define the capabilities required to safeguard our vital interests, then secure the funding—fast. If we don’t seize this moment, we risk leaving our women and men in uniform without the tools they need when it matters most.

March 13 2024 | Jennifer Parker Image: Department of Defence. Today marks 12 months since the release of the ‘optimal pathway’ Australia needed to follow to acquire a force of nuclear-powered and conventionally-armed attack submarines (SSNs) under the AUKUS agreement with the United States and the UK. The milestone has been marked by claims that domestic budget wrangling in the United States is a profound threat to Australia’s submarine plan with the Biden administration proposing to fund only one Virginia class submarine in fiscal year 2025. Whilst Australia must be alert to US domestic issues that may affect AUKUS, including the looming presidential elections, to boil the agreement down to simple submarine numbers largely misses the point of the agreement and what’s been achieved so far. Although the provision of SSNs to Australia is about capability, it is also about signaling to China that deep-seated US relationships in the region matter and should cause Beijing to think twice about its aggressive activities. AUKUS is just one strand of this network, but it is important to US Indo-Pacific strategy . To renege on the transfer of SSNs to Australia would undermine US credibility and influence in a region with many Southeast Asian states already hedging their bets. There is, of course, an issue with the US submarine industrial base and much of the US wrangling on AUKUS is geared towards gaining more funding for its own industry. Australia is providing $4.5 billion to help the US step up construction. The US Navy currently plans to have a fleet of 355 surface ships and at least 66 SSNs. It currently has 50 SSNs and, as the Los Angeles class submarines are gradually decommissioned, this may dip to 46 in 2030. The US is now building, on average, 1.2 to 1.3 submarines per year. To build up its submarine fleet, it needs to increase that rate to an average two Virginia class submarines a year. This increases to 2.33 boats per year if the US is to provide three SSNs to Australia in the 2030s. Reaching and maintaining that rate will be further complicated by the need to prioritise the building of its seaborne nuclear-deterrent replacement, the Columbia class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), and addressing the increasing SSN maintenance backlog. But assuming that the US would automatically renege on the deal to sell Virginias to Australia in the 2030s because it may not meet its target of 66 attack submarines in 2053, fundamentally misunderstands the US strategy supporting AUKUS. The US submarine industrial base is a risk, but it is not the sole consideration. Putting US domestic issues aside, there’s much to like about what the AUKUS optimal submarine pathway has achieved in its first year. When the AUKUS plan was announced in September 2021, the lack of detail and consultation on Australia’s intent to acquire SSNs was apparent. Whilst the project has many critics, greater regional acceptance has been signaled by Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s willingness to have Australian SSNs visit his country . When AUKUS was announced, the three partners undertook to outline a detailed plan for Australia to acquire SSNs within 18 months. A year ago the nuclear-powered submarine optimal pathway was announced and set out an effective ‘crawl, walk run’ approach. Phase 1 established submarine rotation force West (SRF-W) with US and UK submarines rotating through HMAS Stirling from 2027. This ‘crawl’ phase would allow Australia to develop the infrastructure, maintenance and stewardship capabilities and skillsets to support nuclear-powered submarines. Australia will acquire three to five Virginia class submarines in the 2030s. This ‘walk’ phase is intended to see Australia operate its capability at a smaller scale before proceeding to the ‘run’ phase and sharing the building of a new SSN with the UK. There’s no denying that this ambitious plan has high degrees of risk—including tumultuous US politics and its lagging submarine industrial base. If it all goes wrong, the age of Australia’s Collins class submarines would expose it to a capability gap. But despite a sparse flow of information, particularly for Australian defence industry, the AUKUS SSN optimal pathway appears to be on track. Having three countries reach agreement on the optimal pathway was no mean feat. Another significant achievement was the establishment of the Australian Submarine Agency. And Australia has focused heavily on training both its naval personnel and the wider defence industry workforce in submarine operations and maintenance. Australian officers are graduating from the US nuclear-powered submarine school, and maintainers are in Guam learning how to maintain SSNs. Perhaps the most significant achievement was US Congress passing the National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA) in December 2023 authorising the transfer of the three promised Virginias to Australia in the 2030s, the maintenance of US submarines in Australia by Australians, and the training of Australian contractors in US shipyards. It’s not all rosy. Defence agreements of this magnitude never are. The NDAA authorisation of the transfer of course came with caveats, including the requirement for the US president of the day to certify to Congress prior to any transfer that the ‘submarines would be used for joint security interests’ and ‘Australia is ready to support their operations and nuclear power procedures’. This endorsement is not a given. Australia will need to meet an ambitious infrastructure and governance plan to convince the US that it is able to safely operate and maintain the capability. The strategic importance of this agreement is much larger than the issue of the number of attack submarines in the US order of battle, and Australia should not be constantly distracted by US domestic debates over its submarine industrial base. Despite the plan’s risks, a lot has been achieved in 12 months.

14 March 2025 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Sydney Morning Herald on 14 March 2025 I mage: Virginia-class submarine USS Minnesota to come alongside Fleet Base West in Western Australia. Defence Images The world is in a difficult stage of its recent history, and the new United States administration’s change of tack is undeniably jarring. President Trump has re-litigated America’s relationship with Europe through NATO, applied maximum pressure on Ukraine to push it towards negotiations, and said precious little about Russia. Meanwhile, a trade war has kicked off, and Australia’s now facing tariffs on steel and aluminium and maybe more from our closest ally. Does any of this put our alliance with the United States under threat? Absolutely not. Does it change Australia’s plans to acquire nuclear-powered submarines? Again, no. Here’s why. Australia’s defence strategy since World War II has been anchored in its alliance with the United States, formalised in the 1951 ANZUS Treaty . This treaty obliges both nations to “act to meet the common danger” if either is attacked, and it has weathered many tests over the decades – we are, after all, very different countries. Like all critical defence frameworks, it’s rightly attracted public debate about its precise scope. Alliances are built on relationships, history, reliability and trust – not just treaties. Reassessing our strategic underpinnings is healthy, but any review should rest on facts. At this point, there’s no sign the US is an unreliable ally of Australia. In the first 50 days of Trump’s term, senior officials – from the secretary of state to the president himself – have repeatedly underscored Australia’s importance to US security. While the current administration does not necessarily have a consistent view across key players, the endorsement should be comforting to Australia. Some have pointed to diverging US-Europe relations as a red flag, but the US has long urged Europeans to invest more in their own defence – this is hardly new. We may dislike the tone of the current demands, yet they don’t signal unreliability when it comes to the Indo-Pacific. In fact, US officials openly acknowledge that encouraging Europe to handle its own conventional defence allows the US to refocus on deterring conflict with China. That’s where Australia comes in. A century of mateship is a lovely phrase – but that’s not why countries work together. Throughout our alliance, we haven’t agreed on everything, but it’s been rooted in shared strategic interests rather than purely shared values. Those interests are more aligned now than at any time since World War II, given China’s increasingly assertive stance. As for tariffs on Australian steel and aluminium, they’re unwelcome – even unreasonable – but they affect only a small fraction of our exports. This disagreement doesn’t equate to a shaky foundation in our overall defence relationship. The Australia-US alliance extends far beyond economic tiffs or even AUKUS – our plan to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. It supports vital intelligence-sharing and extended nuclear deterrence, critical as China rapidly expands its nuclear arsenal. North Korea has already demonstrated nuclear capabilities. When it comes to AUKUS, calls for a “Plan B” seem off-base. Contingency planning is prudent, of course, but there’s no evidence that AUKUS is going off track. Like any major defence acquisition, it’s complex, and the nuclear dimension adds to the challenge. It will not always go to plan. But the pertinent question isn’t “is it risky?” but “are we managing the risks effectively?” Critics highlight the US submarine industrial base as a weak link. True, America has struggled to meet production targets for Virginia-class subs, and broader shipbuilding delays persist. Yet Australia’s recent $800 million contribution aims to help strengthen that base. The US administration has also proposed an overhaul of maritime industries. Even if progress is slower than planned, there’s little indication that Australia won’t receive three Virginia-class submarines from 2032. All the attention on building two US attack submarines a year is really about meeting the goal of 59 submarines by 2054, not the rate itself . Access to Australian bases outside the range of many Chinese missiles may be the more critical determinant in any Indo-Pacific conflict. Additionally, there’s plenty in AUKUS for the US. Beyond funding and industrial support, having a robust ally in Australia and the geographical access that affords is pivotal to Washington’s strategic aims in the Pacific. If the current US administration is seen as more transactional, it only underscores Australia’s growing strategic value. We should affirm our importance in every discussion with Washington, ensuring mutual benefit remains clear. A final point often overlooked in “Plan B” debates is Australia’s own reliability as a defence partner. We’ve cancelled or scaled back several major projects in recent years – scrapping the French attack sub deal in 2021, reducing Hunter-class frigates, and halving the Arafura Offshore Patrol Vessel program . If we were to walk away from our most important defence project with our most important security partner – absent a major project failure – it would send a strong message that Australia can’t be counted on. That reputation would harm our ability to secure advanced capabilities in our most serious strategic circumstances since World War II. Continuously questioning our strategic foundations is wise, and planning for contingencies is part of good governance. But none of that implies the alliance is unstable or that AUKUS is doomed. So far, the evidence suggests both remain strong. As global stability erodes, a measure of stoicism will serve us better than alarmism. Healthy scepticism is prudent, but catastrophising every US move only casts doubt on our own reliability as an ally and capability partner.

27 February | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Sydney Morning Herald on 27 February 2025 Image: People’s Liberation Army-Navy cruiser Renhai in the Coral Sea. Defence Images. The Chinese naval task group’s deployment in our region is clearly aimed at sending a message and testing Australia’s responses – not only on the military front, but socially and politically. The worst misstep would be to overreact and hand China a propaganda win that could undermine Australia’s legitimate military activities in the South China Sea and North-East Asia. Australia has long thrived on the freedom and prosperity we’ve enjoyed since World War II. Our distance from Europe’s and the Middle East’s flashpoints made conflict seem remote. We’ve ingrained the notion that while our people fight in distant conflicts, the threat never reaches home. Yet the deployment of a Chinese naval task group off our east coast has exposed our vulnerabilities as a maritime nation reliant on trade. While this reality is felt acutely, our proper response is to invest in the ships, aircraft and submarines needed to safeguard our maritime interests – not to manufacture a crisis that undermines our societal resilience and political capacity to respond to genuine challenges. Australia isn’t on a major trade route or a transit point. Naval task groups rarely operate in our region – unless they’re visiting Australia – so a Chinese task group is especially notable. Deployed more than 8000 kilometres from China’s coast, this three-ship task group – including one of the world’s most advanced warships –  was clearly meant to send a message .   Under international law, China’s warships can operate on the high seas (beyond 200 nautical miles from our coast). They can also conduct exercises within Australia’s exclusive economic zone (up to 200 nautical miles from our coast). They can even operate in our territorial sea (within 12 nautical miles of our coast), provided their transit is continuous, expeditious and does not disrupt Australia’s good order. This isn’t legal semantics – it’s a fundamental aspect of the freedom of the seas that Australia regularly exercises through our naval deployments. While it may be surprising to see naval task groups conducting live-fire exercises in our region, warships – including Australia’s – regularly do so on long deployments for training, maintaining skills or myriad other reasons. This is simply what warships do. China’s gunnery firing took place on the high seas, about 640 kilometres (340 nautical miles) from our coast – the distance from Canberra to Melbourne. China is well within its rights to conduct such exercises without informing Australia or New Zealand. While no international law requires it, best practice from having undertaken many gunnery firings at sea is that warships maintain at least 18 kilometres (10 nautical miles) from known civilian air routes during live-fire exercises. Air Services Australia reported that 49 aircraft had to be diverted because of the Chinese warships’ firing exercise. Clearly, these warships were too close to these flight paths. This diversion is a nuisance, but aircraft are routinely diverted for various reasons, and there’s no evidence they were at risk. The Chinese warships’ radars would have continuously tracked the aircraft, ensuring they stopped the gunnery serial if the aircraft approached their safety zone – just as any responsible warship would. Warships should also issue warnings to civilian aircraft and vessels several hours in advance – and at regular intervals – during the exercise. It remains unclear how early Chinese warships issued this warning, but we know from Senate estimates that it was first heard by a Virgin Airlines aircraft 30 minutes after the warships began their drills. The Chinese warships’ close proximity to civilian air routes – and their apparent failure to provide timely warnings – deserves diplomatic rebuke. However, their presence and live-fire exercise on the high seas do not. The freedom of the seas is fundamental to our security as a maritime trading nation. Claims that China’s warships shouldn’t be operating in our exclusive economic zone or conducting live-fire exercises on the high seas undermines this principle, giving China a propaganda win to challenge our necessary deployments to North-East Asia and the South China Sea – routes that carry two-thirds of our maritime trade. This is not a crisis. Treating it as one – with over-the-top indignation – diminishes our capacity to tackle real crises as the region deteriorates. Moreover, since this deployment was meant to test us, it signals to China that we lack societal resilience and a genuine perspective on what is a threat. If the Chinese naval task group deployment is meant to signal that they can operate in our region, sustain a presence and threaten our critical sea supply lines, how should we respond to the vulnerability we’ve felt these past two weeks? We must respond by heeding the message – mitigating our vulnerabilities and investing in our maritime capability. At our most challenging strategic moment since World War II, our current  surface combatant  fleet is the smallest and oldest we’ve had since 1950.   Our warships have limited endurance at sea due to inadequate numbers of replenishment ships, and our ability to protect sea lanes from mines is also limited – to name but a few of our  challenges . We must address this and swiftly, and that means having a hard look at our defence spending.   At only 2 per cent of GDP, defence spending falls well short of our Cold War average of 2.7 per cent. It’s also time to ramp up our industrial capacity and engage in genuine discussions about societal and industrial mobilisation. That means, if we were to be in a conflict, how would we mobilise the civilian population to support our forces and home defence, and how would we mobilise industries to produce what we need to sustain the conflict? We must respond by enhancing our preparedness and military capability, not by handing China a propaganda victory that undermines our ability to tackle real crises and the fundamental principle of freedom of the seas. While conflict in our region isn’t inevitable, the threat is real and demands a measured response underpinned by preparedness, investment and partnerships. Warships have the right to freedom of navigation. Live gunnery firings are common. Overreaction and panic will only undermine our efforts.