The Chinese warships Australians never got to debate
- Jennifer Parker
- Feb 22
- 4 min read
Jennifer Parker | 19 February 2026
The silence around a second Chinese naval deployment near Australia cost the public a chance to understand the risks.
Image: A People’s Liberation Army-Navy Jiangkai-class frigate of the type that accompanied an amphibious ship (ADF/Defence Imagery)
In parliamentary hearings earlier this month, Australia’s Chief of Defence Force confirmed for the first time that a Chinese navy amphibious ship had operated weeks beforehand in Australia’s near region. The deployment formed part of a second Chinese naval task group that operated close to Australia in 2025, following the circumnavigation of the continent by three Chinese warships in February and March last year.
The earlier voyage drew attention. This one did not. That does not make it less significant. It represents a further demonstration of China’s growing capacity to project naval power toward Australia.
Why does this matter? Because China is a major power in the region with which Australia’s national security interests are not aligned, and it now possesses the maritime capability to operate in ways that expose Australia’s greatest structural vulnerability, dependence on the sea.
At Senate Estimates hearings on 11 February, the Chief of Defence Force confirmed that the December 2025 task group, comprising a Yushen class amphibious assault ship, a Renhai class cruiser, a Jiangkai class frigate and a Fuchi class replenishment vessel, transited into the Pacific, operating through the southwest Pacific near Noumea and north through the island chains and Papua New Guinea. It then approached Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone, coming within five or seven nautical miles before heading north.
Chinese naval vessels are entitled under international law to enter Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone and may conduct exercises there, including gunnery activities. But Australia’s northeastern Exclusive Economic Zone is not a transit corridor. It is not analogous to the Taiwan Strait en route to Japan or the Exclusive Economic Zones of Southeast Asian states. This doesn’t mean China should not operate there, but it does mean Australia should pay explicit attention to why it would want to operate there.
Few countries have historically possessed both the capability and the intent to operate naval forces in proximity to Australia. China is now demonstrating both.
China’s two task group deployments near Australia in 2025 underscore how fundamentally Australia’s strategic environment has changed. Each demonstration of capability was intended to send a signal to Australia and the neighbourhood: that China now possesses a modern and comprehensive maritime capability able to reach and sustain operations in Australia’s near region. These specific task groups were not a threat. But they were not trivial. They are a reminder that Australia should weigh this evolving capability carefully when making decisions that may run counter to China’s interests.
The issue is not whether Chinese ships should operate in or near Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Under international law they can. To argue China should not do so would undermine Australia’s long-standing support for freedom of navigation, the very principle that underpins Australian naval deployments.
The issue is what this development means for Australia’s security as the regional balance shifts. The ability to reach and operate near Australia is historically significant. Distance from major theatres of conflict has long been seen as a strength. Yet Australia’s geography has also created vulnerability because of a deep dependence on maritime trade and secure sea lines. Few countries have historically possessed both the capability and the intent to operate naval forces in proximity to Australia. China is now demonstrating both.
This is unfolding in a world that has changed markedly from the relative stability many assumed in the 1990s, early 2000s and even the pre-Covid period. The erosion of post-Cold War restraint on the use of force, the weakening of multilateral institutions and increasingly transactional politics point to a more contested era. As Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney described it, this is a rupture – a view echoed by European leaders at last weekend’s Munich Security Conference.
In this environment, Australia must adjust. There is work to be done in strengthening military capability, and defence spending remains underwhelming. But the most significant shift required is in national resilience and psychological preparedness. That means strengthening supply chains, improving civil preparedness and ensuring Australians understand the risks inherent in a more contested region. These elements of preparedness have received far less attention than platforms and budgets.
There are many practical steps that Australia can take to strengthen resilience and psychological preparedness. But it begins with honesty about the challenge. Australians should not be learning only through Senate Estimates hearings – and weeks after the fact – that a foreign naval task group intentionally operated close to the country’s waters as a demonstration of capability.
This event could have been an opportunity to build public understanding of how the region is changing, using a concrete example people can grasp. Not to provoke alarm or overreaction, as occurred during the first transit, but to explain clearly what it signifies.
The phrase deployed by Australian politicians that the country faces “the most challenging strategic circumstances since the Second World War” risks becoming abstract. Events like the Chinese naval deployment give it meaning. If Australia is serious about preparedness, the public must be treated as capable of understanding the strategic environment it now faces.
