24 July 2026 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Lowy Institute's The Interpreter on 24 July 2026 Ukraine’s drones achieved sea denial – but that’s not what a blue-water navy needs to maintain. Image: The Rattler, foreground, Unmanned Surface Vehicle escorts HMS Tyne off the coast of Scotland (Daniel Bladen/UK MoD) When the UK launched its Defence Investment Plan on 30 June, the government promised a “generational transformation” of the military that would apply the lessons of Ukraine’s fight to resist Russian invasion and equip Britain to fight the wars of today and tomorrow. For the Royal Navy, this meant a hybrid fleet in which frigates operate alongside uncrewed vessels above and below the surface, linked by artificial intelligence as a single force. This amounts to a blueprint for a hybrid navy, with fewer crewed surface combatants and greater reliance on large uncrewed vessels operating as part of a distributed force. For navies such as Australia’s, this may look like an attractive – potentially cheaper – answer to capability gaps. But looks are deceiving. Naval leaders from Australia to the United States have adopted the term “hybrid fleet” to describe their future ambitions. But the UK’s plan takes the concept much further, without first demonstrating that the enabling technology can deliver it. In doing so, it misreads the most important lessons of maritime drone warfare in Ukraine. The problem is not the use of uncrewed systems. It is the assumption that they can provide a cheap and reliable substitute for crewed warships operating far from home in harsh seas. Fleet design should begin with the strategic task, not enthusiasm for a particular technology. Ukraine’s maritime challenge was one of sea denial. It employed remotely controlled boats between 5 and 8 metres, packed with explosives, alongside cruise missiles, to deny Russia’s freedom of manoeuvre in the Black Sea. This forced much of the Russian Black Sea Fleet to remain in port and allowed Ukrainian grain shipments to leave the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits, hugging the coast. Ukraine also benefited from land borders through which weapons and supplies could flow. As the UK’s Defence Investment Plan notes, nearly 90% of UK freight trade is transported by sea. Its maritime challenge is therefore much broader than Ukraine’s. It needs to deny adversaries freedom of manoeuvre in areas such as the Greenland–Iceland–UK Gap, including through its Atlantic Bastion plan. But it must also be able to achieve sea control and maintain its own freedom of manoeuvre. Sea control requires the sustained projection of maritime power, which in turn requires endurance and persistence. Enthusiasm for drone warfare risks overlooking the practical challenges of operating large uncrewed vessels at sea, particularly in a contested electromagnetic environment. These challenges have not been resolved through experimentation. The UK’s proposed future fleet includes at least 19 crewed surface combatants: 13 frigates and at least six Common Combat Vessels. By comparison, at the end of the Cold War in 1990, the Royal Navy operated. 13 destroyers and 35 frigates. The Royal Navy currently has six Type 45 destroyers and seven remaining Type 23 frigates on its books, although announced decommissionings will soon reduce the frigate fleet to five. The Royal Navy intends to address its numbers problem through an undisclosed number of large uncrewed vessels: the Type 91 missile barge, Type 92 anti-submarine warfare platform and Type 94 radar picket. All are intended to enter service between 2030 and 2035. But these are not the platforms used in Ukraine. Industry concepts suggest they could be between 80 and 100 metres long and displace approximately 2,000 to 3,000 tonnes, making them larger than Australia’s Arafura-class offshore patrol vessels. Unlike Ukraine’s small uncrewed surface vessels, these will be expected to operate at sea for extended periods as part of a force seeking to achieve sea control. Three practical problems stand out: maintenance, survivability and control. While the designs for these large uncrewed vessels do not yet exist, they will be complex. The sea is a harsh environment, and keeping vessels at sea requires constant maintenance. These vessels may need to deploy for months without it. Missiles at sea also require strict environmental controls and regular attention, which will be difficult to provide without personnel onboard. Beyond the challenges of maintenance and likely reduced operational availability, the next problem is defence. If these vessels cannot defend themselves, they will become priority targets. If they are designed to defend themselves with surface-to-air missiles and counter-drone capabilities, they will become more expensive and complex, with additional systems requiring maintenance. Even if they can operate autonomously for periods, coordinating them, passing targeting information and authorising engagements will still depend on reliable communications in a contested electromagnetic spectrum. That is a considerable risk. Fighting in Ukraine has shown how heavily contested the electromagnetic spectrum will be. Uncrewed systems will have an important role in the future Royal Navy, but they cannot be treated as a cheap substitute for crewed surface combatants. Ukraine has demonstrated the value of small, expendable systems in achieving sea denial. It has not demonstrated that large uncrewed warships can provide sustained sea control across the North Atlantic. Fleet design should begin with the strategic task, not enthusiasm for a particular technology. The UK risks reducing its proven fleet concepts of today in return for an untested fleet tomorrow. Australia and other smaller navies should be wary of following it.

19 July 2026 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published with Channel News Asia on 19 July 2026. Access original publication here Image: USS Donald Cook (DDG 75) transits the Arabian Sea while an MH-60S Sea Hawk flies nearby. @CENTCOM page on X. The strategic waterway is becoming the clearest test of whether any state can use force to rewrite the rules governing freedom of navigation United States President Donald Trump’s proposal to charge a 20 per cent fee on cargo moving through the Strait of Hormuz under US protection was quickly walked back within a day. But it revealed how much the war is shifting. More than 130 days into the conflict, what started as an effort to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions is, at its core, becoming a fight over freedom of navigation. Iran’s continued attacks on commercial shipping, despite the economic incentives contained in the June memorandum of understanding (MOU), show that Tehran is serious about using control of the Strait of Hormuz as leverage. The US must adapt its strategy in response, but the threat to charge a toll was fundamentally in the wrong direction. CHANGING THE RULES OF THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ Iran has a history of attacking and interfering with shipping, from the Tanker War during its conflict with Iraq in the 1980s to attacks on six civilian vessels in and around the Gulf of Oman in 2019, and many other incidents of interference. When Iran wants to send a strategic message, it attacks shipping. In this context, it was not surprising that Iran responded to the first attacks by the US and Israel on Feb 28 by targeting civilian ships across the Gulf of Oman, Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. But Iran’s broader intention is to permanently change the navigation regime in the Strait by establishing the Persian Gulf Strait Authority, creating a new route into and out of the Gulf, and charging tolls for safe passage. Even so, many assumed these measures would apply only during the conflict and that economic incentives would persuade Tehran to allow ships to transit safely again, like it did before the war. A CRUCIAL TEST The Strait of Hormuz is becoming the clearest test of whether freedom of navigation remains an enforceable international principle. Around 80 per cent of international trade in goods by volume is carried by sea, and more than 99 per cent of international data traffic passes through cables on the seabed. Both depend on an open and predictable maritime order. Freedom of navigation, protected under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), is increasingly under pressure, from Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea beginning in 2023 to China’s actions in the South China Sea. Specifically, UNCLOS protects the right of transit passage through “straits used for international navigation” which cannot be impeded or suspended. For Asian economies that depend on trade, the outcome of Iran’s actions will affect not only energy security and shipping costs, but also the rules governing other contested waterways. WASHINGTON’S FAILED BET Washington initially tried to restore passage through the strait by economic pressure, via a naval blockade of Iranian ports then economic incentives. Neither proved enough. During the April ceasefire, the US did not respond every time Iran attacked or interfered with shipping. In fact, the ceasefire enacted on Apr 8 was predicated on Iran reopening the strait. That did not happen, yet the US for the most part maintained the ceasefire. When the Jun 17 MOU was signed, the US appeared to believe that significant economic incentives would be the decisive factor. Point 5 of the MOU states that Iran would use its “best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days” but also leaves the “future administration and maritime services” to further dialogue and discussion, ”in line with” international law. Tolls are not consistent with international maritime law. But, unfortunately, this section of the MOU was very ambiguous, leaving both sides to make varied interpretations. The latest Iranian attacks on commercial ships on Jul 6 and Jul 7 showed that economic incentives in the MOU would not be enough for Tehran to give up its key source of negotiating leverage. Three ships were attacked, including a Qatari liquefied natural gas tanker struck very close to the Omani coast while allegedly using an alternative route to get around the one authorised by Iran. THE GREATER CHALLENGE The challenge for the US is that if it allows Iran to impede shipping through attacks, Tehran’s control could become permanent, with broad implications for freedom of navigation. Understood in this context, it is easy to see why the US responded to Iran’s attacks on three ships transiting in and around the strait by striking Iran. The US calculates that freedom of navigation is critical, and if economic incentives didn’t work, deterrence by punishment may. But the conflict has demonstrated that bombing alone is unlikely to restore safe passage through the Strait. As the conflict becomes a battle over freedom of navigation, it exposes a gap in the US strategy and shows how earlier missteps are coming back to undermine it. When Mr Trump said on Monday (Jul 13) that he would impose a charge on cargo vessels transiting the Strait, it was at odds with the principle the US is seeking to defend. Despite a quick U-turn, a US president suggesting that the principle of freedom of navigation is easily abandoned weakens the broader argument. The greater challenge is that the US approach to the war has left allies and partners unwilling to send assets to help protect navigation in the region, as a number did during the Tanker War. To secure that support, Washington must frame the next phase around protecting commercial shipping, rather than the broader conduct of the war. The US cannot defend freedom of navigation alone, or only when convenient. It must rebuild international support and make clear that no state can use force to control a global waterway. What happens in Hormuz will shape not only this conflict, but the future security of maritime trade.

29 June 2026 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Conversation on Monday 29 January 2026 Tensions have again escalated in the Middle East, with the United States and Iran trading strikes around the Strait of Hormuz. It follows reports of an Iranian drone attack on a cargo ship trying to transit through the strait. Both the US and Iran have accused each other of breaking the agreed 60-day interim peace deal. Since Iran was attacked by the US and Israel it has increasingly signalled its intent to make control of the Strait of Hormuz a permanent feature. This has raised fears that after the conflict, it could permanently impose tolls on the roughly 130 ships that transit the strait each day. While Iran may desire a guaranteed source of revenue, the region is unlikely to accept it tolling the strait. More importantly, it would not work. The Strait of Hormuz is not a canal. No legal way The world is right to be concerned. Since the war began, Iran has sought to deter ships from transiting the Strait of Hormuz, attacking more than 40 neutral merchant vessels and killing several innocent merchant mariners. Combined with missile and drone attacks and the placement of sea mines in the strait, commercial shipping has effectively ground to a halt for more than three months, with significant economic consequences. Concern has been further fuelled by the wording of the recent 14-point interim deal, which stated that Iran would use its “best efforts” to ensure the safe passage of commercial vessels “with no charge, for 60 days only”. The plan says Iran would discuss future arrangements with Oman and other Gulf states, “in line with applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz”. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Strait of Hormuz is an international strait where all ships enjoy a right of transit passage that coastal states cannot suspend. While parts of the strait pass through Iranian territorial waters, the main traffic separation scheme lies within Omani waters. Traffic separation schemes are routes established by the International Maritime Organisation to safely manage traffic in busy chokepoints. Think of them as recommended roadways. Despite concerns about the wording of the deal, Iran could not lawfully impose a toll on transit passage. But also no practical way But the real question is whether Iran could practically impose a toll, particularly given it has effectively halted most commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz for more than three months. At first glance, there are obvious precedents. Ships pay to transit canals such as the Suez and Panama canals. But these are fundamentally different waterways. They lie within the territory of a single state and are narrow, controlled transit routes. The navigable channel of the Suez Canal, for example, is typically around 200 metres wide. The Strait of Hormuz is different. At its narrowest point it is approximately 39 kilometres across, including areas of both Omani and Iranian waters. The scale of the waterway makes it far more difficult to physically stop, inspect and control vessels that refuse to pay a toll. Imposing a toll is one thing; enforcing it against unwilling ships is another entirely. Ships transiting the Suez Canal enter via Port Said in the north or Suez in the south, then Suez Canal Authority pilots get onboard the vessels and join a tightly controlled convoy system for the transit. The canal’s confined and highly regulated nature makes it virtually impossible for vessels to transit without complying with canal authorities and paying the required tolls. For the Strait of Hormuz, international law aside, shipping companies and states are unlikely to voluntarily accept a permanent toll on transit through an international strait. The issue is not simply cost, but the precedent it would set for freedom of navigation and the governance of straits around the world. Leverage or long-term control? Iran would not be charging ships for a service, as occurs in the Suez or Panama canals. It would be charging vessels for exercising a pre-existing right of transit through an international strait. Oman and other Gulf states have warned that tolling arrangements would undermine free passage and set a dangerous precedent. Companies would therefore have to be coerced into paying. But unlike the Suez or Panama canals, the Strait of Hormuz is far larger and more difficult to police, making enforcement challenging. During the current conflict, Iran has deterred shipping through the use of weapons, killing innocent mariners and disrupting global trade. While the international response has at times been muted, such actions are not a sustainable means of enforcing a permanent toll in peacetime. Unless Iran is willing to continue attacking innocent merchant vessels after the conflict ends, an approach that would attract significant diplomatic pressure, sanctions and criticism, including from countries such as China, it is unlikely to have either the incentive or the enforcement mechanism required to compel ships to pay a toll that is inconsistent with international law. Iran is using its success in disrupting shipping through the Strait of Hormuz as leverage in negotiations. But leverage and long-term control are not the same thing. While Iran can disrupt shipping, it is unlikely to permanently toll the Strait of Hormuz.

16 January 2026 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review on 16 June 2026 Image: HMA Ships Arunta and Warramunga sail towards a merchant ship in the East Australian Exercise Area during the Fleet Concentration Period. Defence images. Nuclear-powered submarines are not being acquired because Australia is seeking conflict but because it is a maritime trading country. The AUKUS “independent” inquiry opened last week with a familiar list of concerns from long-time critics of the program. Witnesses pointed to risks ranging from the industrial base to the prospect that reactor fuel disposed of in 2060 could be recovered for use in nuclear weapons 10,000 years in the future. While every major defence acquisition carries risk, and AUKUS is more complicated than most, one issue raised during the hearings warrants far more attention than the rest: the role of Australia’s future nuclear-powered submarines and what their acquisition means for the nation’s strategy towards China. While an inquiry led by commissioners who have long opposed Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines can hardly be described as independent, it nevertheless highlights an important lesson for government. Despite substantial progress under AUKUS, the government has sometimes struggled to communicate its benefits effectively. Former foreign minister Gareth Evans told the inquiry that it was an “inescapable conclusion” that Australia’s future nuclear-powered submarines would have only one role: “finding, tracking, attacking and destroying [nuclear-armed] Chinese submarines” as they operate in the western Pacific. As a maritime strategist who spent two decades specialising in anti-submarine warfare, I found that a remarkable claim. Is it possible? Certainly. Is it the most likely employment of Australia’s future submarines? Almost certainly not. China’s nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines, a key component of its second-strike nuclear capability, operate from Hainan Island and are widely assessed to patrol primarily within the South China Sea. They do not generally leave that area because it increases their risk of detection. Locating and tracking them is, of course, a key task for the United States, but it is unlikely to be the primary mission of Australia’s future submarines. Australia is a maritime trading nation whose prosperity and security depend on access to the sea, lengthy maritime trade routes and a vast maritime domain. Their ability to operate undetected is what makes submarines so versatile. For Australia, that versatility is most valuable in protecting national interests across vast maritime distances. This is no small task. Australia possesses the world’s third-largest maritime domain, and operating across it is challenging. The speed and endurance provided by nuclear-powered submarines are therefore critical. A conventional submarine takes about nine days to travel from Sydney to Perth – a nuclear-powered submarine can do so in roughly half that time and is much less likely to be detected. The Chinese naval task group’s circumnavigation of Australia last year illustrated the challenge. A conventional submarine lacks the speed to intercept such a deployment unless it is positioned well in advance. When operating across the world’s third-largest maritime domain with only a small number of submarines, transit speed matters. Australia’s limited submarine force is more likely to be employed locating, tracking and, in conflict, destroying adversary naval task groups and submarines that threaten the nation’s maritime trade, while conducting intelligence collection and supporting special forces operations across the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Discussion of the role of Australia’s future nuclear-powered submarines inevitably leads to a broader question: is AUKUS really all about China? Former deputy ambassador to China in the 1970s, John Leslie Lander, argued that AUKUS was “clearly aimed at China” and based on a “fictional threat from China”. But is that really true? This goes to the heart of much of the emotion surrounding Australia’s defence debate and is therefore worth addressing. Good strategy starts with a plan to defend a nation’s vital interests. Australia’s pivot towards maritime capability, from an expanded surface fleet in the 2030s to the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines and the development of amphibious capability, reflects a simple reality: one of Australia’s most important national interests is the protection of its maritime trade. Ninety-nine per cent of Australia’s imports and exports move by sea, including essentials that underpin both prosperity and national security. Protecting these interests requires the ability to project power through the maritime domain, not merely defend the country’s northern approaches. While missile and drone attacks are plausible, the greater risk is maritime coercion: interference with the sea lines of communication on which our economy and security depend. Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines is first and foremost about protecting a vital national interest: maritime trade. While China’s military build-up is a major factor shaping Australia’s strategic environment, the capability is ultimately about protecting Australian interests rather than targeting any one country. Few events illustrated this more clearly than the Chinese naval task group’s circumnavigation of Australia in February and March 2025, and the return of a second task group in November 2025. But that is precisely why the debate must be anchored in Australia’s interests, not caricatures of them. Nuclear-powered submarines are not being acquired because Australia seeks conflict with China, nor because Canberra has surrendered its strategic agency to Washington. They are being acquired because this country is a maritime trading nation whose prosperity and security depend on access to the sea, lengthy oceanic trade routes and a vast maritime domain. In an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific, where for the first time since 1942 a regional military power possesses the ability to threaten Australia’s maritime supply lines and trade at scale, the ability to protect those interests is not optional. It is the foundation of a credible defence and an insurance policy that underpins Australia’s security.

9 June 2026 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Australian Defence Supplement on 2 June 2026 Image: The first Speartooth LUUV is handed over to the US Navy at C2 Robotics’ Melbourne site. From left, RAN Navy’s Directorate of Maritime Integrated Capabilities Captain Tony Miskelly, C2 Robotics chief executive Troy Duggan, and US defence attache in Canberra, Captain Josh Fagan, USN. Picture: C2 Robotics Australia is critically dependent on infrastructure lying on the ­seabed. More than 95 per cent of our international data traffic travels through subsea cables, alongside the pipelines and energy infrastructure that underpin the economy. As the maritime domain becomes increasingly contested, the battle beneath the oceans is intensifying. Chinese naval deployments around Australia are reminders that control of our ­surrounding seas can no longer be assumed, and we should apply the same assumption to the underwater domain. Undersea cables, seabed infrastructure and the systems used to monitor and protect them are now part of strategic competition. That growing vulnerability helps explain Australia’s increasing investment in undersea warfare capabilities, including systems such as Ghost Shark and Speartooth. While significant gaps remain in areas such as hydrography and mine warfare, investments in capabilities including AUKUS, the Hunter-class frigate’s towed array sonar, the Bluebottle uncrewed surface vessels with towed array sonars, and uncrewed underwater vehicles should provide Australia with the greatest underwater situational awareness capability it has ever possessed. What happens in the underwater domain, and our ability to respond to developments there, is understandably shrouded in secrecy. But in April, British Defence Secretary John Healey provided a rare public glimpse into this contest when he de­classified a Russian operation inside the United Kingdom’s Exclusive Economic Zone. The operation involved a Russian Akula nuclear-powered submarine and two specialist vessels from Moscow’s Main Directorate for Deep Sea Research, which Healey said are designed to survey underwater infrastructure in peacetime and sabotage it in conflict. The UK has every reason to be concerned following a series of attacks on undersea cables and pipelines in the Baltic Sea. But the capability to interfere with subsea cables, pipelines and broader seabed infrastructure is rapidly expanding. China is investing heavily in undersea capabilities, from sensors and uncrewed underwater vehicles to increasingly sophisticated submarines. In 2025, considerable attention was given to reports that Chinese researchers had developed a deep-sea cable cutter capable of severing cables at depths of up to 4000m. Chinese-flagged vessels, and vessels crewed by Chinese nationals, have been suspected of interfering with several subsea cables servicing Taiwan. The growing accessibility of uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUV) also means state and non-state actors increasingly have the ability to surveil and interfere with critical underwater infrastructure. Key to underwater domain awareness is understanding where your vulnerabilities lie and maintaining strong maritime domain awareness above the surface. Many recent incidents involving undersea infrastructure have not involved submarines at all, but ­surface vessels dragging anchors across cables and pipelines. Monitoring one of the world’s largest maritime domains is an immense challenge, made harder by Australia’s fragmented maritime security architecture spread across multiple agencies and without a dedicated coastguard. Amid this growing competition, Australia does appear to be leaning more heavily into undersea warfare capabilities. In 2024, the government projected that undersea warfare would account for 17 per cent of the Defence Integrated Investment Program (IIP) over the decade. In 2026, that figure increased to 23 per cent, the single largest proportional investment area. Much of this investment is driven by Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine program, although the full scope of Australia’s undersea capabilities likely remains classified. Still, there are some public ­indicators. The government has announced a $1.7bn investment in the Ghost Shark extra-large autonomous underwater vehicle, and an undisclosed investment in the smaller, much more affordable Speartooth large uncrewed underwater vehicle (LUUV) which is optimised for seabed warfare and agile undersea operations, reaching areas Ghost Shark cannot. Manufacturers C2 Robotics last month also delivered the first of a batch of Speartooth LUUVs to the US Navy. And late last year, the US Navy ordered a variant of Ghost Shark to demonstrate delivery of large payloads across extended ranges underwater. The full capabilities of Ghost Shark and Speartooth remain unclear publicly, but Defence has promoted their potential roles in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, logistics and strike. Taken together, these capabilities should significantly strengthen Australia’s broader undersea warfare posture. This investment is also supported by the 2023 acquisition of ADV Guidance, a converted civilian vessel intended to support undersea operations. In any future regional conflict, and potentially well short of conflict, Australia’s critical undersea infrastructure will be targeted. Protecting it requires Australia to understand activity both above and below the sea. That demands a genuinely integrated maritime security architecture, clear responsibilities across government, and the capability to detect and respond to threats. Australia’s maritime security system remains fragmented and, at least publicly, responsibilities for protecting subsea infrastructure are far from clear. But from a capability perspective, Australia does appear to be leaning into ­elements of the challenge through investments in Hunter-class frigates, uncrewed underwater vehicles and broader undersea warfare capabilities. Australia is finally beginning to invest seriously in understanding and operating in the underwater battlespace. Given the nation’s dependence on critical seabed infrastructure, that investment is long overdue.

5 June 2026 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Conversation on 5 June 2026 Image: The Conversation (Virginia-class fast attack submarine USS Minnesota, pictured here in Perth, is a Block II vessel.Colin Murty/AAP) Following the recent announcement that Australia would acquire three submarines already in US service rather than two used submarines and one new one, AUKUS has again dominated headlines. AUKUS is a defence capability agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. Since it was announced in 2021, it’s rarely been out of the news. But how much of what you have heard is true? As a former Navy officer specialising in anti-submarine warfare, I am frequently asked the same questions about AUKUS. While I can’t address everything in one article, here are the details behind some of the most common claims. Why is Australia buying used submarines? Australia has Collins class submarines that entered service between 1996 and 2003. Work should already be underway to replace them, but decades of delays and underfunding have left us with an ageing fleet. Though the Collins class submarines will each go through a multi-year maintenance period extending their life, they won’t last long enough. They will need to be decommissioned before Australia can co-design, build and produce submarines here under AUKUS. A stopgap solution is required. The purchase of three Virginia class submarines in 2032, 2035 and 2038 will provide this, and also give Australia the ability to start operating nuclear-powered submarines. Think of it as a “crawl, walk, run” approach. The Virginias are the walk phase before we start building our own nuclear-powered submarines. Acquiring submarines already in service reduces risk and complexity, avoids the challenges of introducing a new submarine, and removes the need for initial certification trials. Is Australia getting a less capable submarine? Not in any meaningful sense, though the third Virginia will be an older version than planned, so its sensors will probably be slightly less capable. Australia will now receive three Block IV Virginia class submarines. These remain among the most capable attack submarines in the world. They carry more than 20 torpedoes and 12 Tomahawk land strike missiles. Much of the commentary this week has suggested Australia has lost additional missile capacity because the submarines we’re receiving won’t have the “Virginia Payload Module” – a new hull section that allows the submarines to carry more missiles. But that commentary is incorrect. The submarine Australia was expected to receive in 2038 was never intended to have that capability. In conflict, Australia would predominantly use these submarines in an anti-submarine and anti-ship role. Land strike missiles are not used for this and so the extra capacity isn’t essential. It’s also capability the US has said it is not willing to provide. The main difference is the third submarine will have fewer years of life remaining than a new boat. A Virginia class submarine off the production line would normally have a 33-year life. At Senate estimates this week, the Australian Submarine Agency said each boat will have more than 20 years of life remaining when we receive them. Claims these submarines would only have eight years of life do not withstand scrutiny. The kind of submarines Australia will receive only started entering service in 2020. Are we paying $368 billion for three used submarines? The figure most often quoted for AUKUS is $368 billion. While technically correct, this figure covers costs through to 2055 including infrastructure, workforce and maintenance costs over 31 years, plus the purchase of Virginia class submarines to Australia and building our own submarines. Of the total, about $244 billion is the projected cost, while the remaining $122.9 billion is a 50% contingency on top. This is money set aside to cover risks, cost growth and unforeseen problems. Most defence projects carry 5–10% contingency. The Department of Defence’s 2026 Integrated Investment Program states nuclear-powered submarines will cost between $71 billion and $96 billion over the next decade. Against projected defence funding of about $887 billion over the same period, this equates to around 8–11% of defence spending. Can the US build enough submarines for Australia? This is one of the most legitimate points of debate in the discussion. The US reduced its production rate of submarines after the Cold War. Since 2011 it has set a goal of increasing its build rate to two submarines a year. From 2016–19 it averaged 1.9 boats a year. According to the US Congressional Research report on Virginia class submarines, this build rate dropped off due to workforce issues during COVID and challenges associated with moving to the build of the new Block V submarine, which is 2,000 tonnes larger than the Block IV Virginia. The US is investing billions of dollars into its submarine industrial base to address this issue. In May, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Daryl Caudle told Congress he expects Virginia production to reach two boats per year in around 2032. He previously said the US will need to get to a 2.3 production rate to get to its 2054 goal, including the sale of three Virginias to Australia. The US is presently building 1.3 a year. The US submarine industrial base challenges are real, and will take significant effort to address. Has the US said it will not sell submarines to Australia if it doesn’t get there? No. Is AUKUS risky? Yes. AUKUS is the most complex defence project in Australian history. There are risks in the US and UK industrial bases, workforce growth, infrastructure and funding. Anyone claiming otherwise is not engaging with reality. But much has been achieved in less than five years. Australia has established a submarine base near Perth, embedded personnel in US and UK submarine programs, commenced major infrastructure works, trained hundreds of personnel, and secured US congressional approval for the submarine transfers. At the recent AUKUS Defence Ministers’ Meeting, all three countries stated the program remained on track. Based on the evidence available today, I agree. This is a multi-decade program. There will be changes along the way. Not every adjustment is evidence of failure. What happens if Australia abandons AUKUS? Australia cannot simply walk away from AUKUS and pick another submarine off the shelf. Any alternative would require a new acquisition process, a new agreement and years of negotiation. There is also no obvious replacement. France’s nuclear-powered submarines, for example, are built through a single shipyard and can take more than a decade to complete. If Australia was to abandon a second submarine program in little more than a decade, this time with our closest ally, it would be hard to imagine another country lining up to partner with Australia on a future submarine project. After cancelling the French submarine program and significantly reducing other naval programs, our reputation for delivering in this area is already under pressure. AUKUS should continue to be scrutinised. But that scrutiny should be anchored in facts. Any proposal to abandon it must also explain what replaces it and how Australia avoids a submarine capability gap. Having spoken with officials in our partner nations, the concern raised most often is not the US or UK industrial base. It is Australian political will. As a nation, we should be mindful of that and measured in our debate.

4 June 2026 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Lowy Institute's The Interpreter on 4 June 2026 The announcement this week changed the mix of submarines Australia will receive – it did not change the program’s purpose, or its prospects. Image: United States Navy Virginia Class submarine USS Mississippi arrives at Fleet Base West, Rockingham, Western Australia for a routine port visit. Defence Images. Much of the reaction to this week’s AUKUS announcement that Australia will acquire three in-service Virginia-class submarines and forgo buying a new US-built boat has missed the point. While some have portrayed the decision as a fundamental change to the deal, in reality, it is a relatively minor adjustment to a program that will run for more than 30 years and one that actually reduces risk for Australia. The practical effect is that all three Virginia-class submarines Australia acquires in the 2030s will be of the same configuration. That matters. Commonality is a core principle in capability acquisition. Operating three of the same submarines simplifies workforce, training, maintenance and sustainment requirements. The downside is that an in-service submarine has less life remaining than a newly built boat. But that was already true of the first two submarines Australia was due to receive. The operational benefits are real. The boats will have common systems, support requirements and training pipelines. It also reduces pressure on the United States industrial base by removing the need to build a separate submarine for Australia. But it does not change the purpose of AUKUS. Debating whether the third submarine is new or already in service misses the more important question. The objective of AUKUS has never been to acquire three Virginia-class submarines. The objective has always been to establish an Australian nuclear-powered submarine capability and industrial base. That was the goal when AUKUS was announced in 2021 and it remains the goal today. The Virginia-class submarines were always intended as a bridging capability, ensuring Australia built a submarine force while developing the workforce, infrastructure and industrial capacity needed for its own nuclear-powered submarines. The Virginia-class subs also provide a pathway to develop the skills and experience required before the arrival of the first Australian-built boat. This week’s announcement does not change that trajectory. If anything, it reduces some of the risk along the way. Debating whether the third submarine is new or already in service misses the more important question. Is Australia progressing towards building a local nuclear-powered submarine capability? The answer is yes. For an island nation with one of the world’s largest maritime domains and an economy dependent on maritime trade, submarines are essential to maintaining the capability to protect its interests. There will always be arguments for and against nuclear-powered submarines. Just as there are arguments about tanks, frigates, fighter aircraft or the structure of Defence itself. Debate is healthy. An informed public debate is essential to the country. For all the claims of crisis – including in launching a self-appointed inquiry. into Australia’s submarine capability – the program has survived political change in all three countries and reviews in both the United States and United Kingdom. The plan for the three-phase pathway was agreed by all three countries within 18 months of the announcement. Australia has embedded hundreds of personnel in US and UK submarine programs, begun maintenance on allied nuclear-powered submarines and is preparing HMAS Stirling to support Submarine Rotational Force-West next year. Discussions with the International Atomic Energy Agency are progressing and the design for the shipyard that will build the submarines in South Australia is in progress. In truth, much has been achieved in the nearly five years since AUKUS was announced. Risks remain. No major defence project is risk free, and AUKUS is the most complex capability program in recent Australian defence history. But these risks should be considered in context and grounded in fact. Challenges in the US and UK submarine industrial bases, workforce generation, infrastructure and funding are real, but they are known and being actively managed. These risks require management, not abandonment. If Australia were to abandon a submarine program that remains on track, it would almost certainly forgo a credible submarine capability for a decade or more, at a critical time for the nation’s security. Walking away from a second submarine program in little more than a decade, this time involving the country’s closest ally, would also further damage Australia’s reputation as a defence partner. After abandoning the French Attack-class program and significantly reducing the planned production runs of the Hunter-class frigates and Arafura-class offshore patrol vessels, there would be limited confidence among major submarine builders that Australia could be relied upon to see such projects through. Australia should continue to scrutinise AUKUS, challenge assumptions and test alternatives against the facts. But the reality is that AUKUS remains on track.

26 May 2026 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Australian on 26 May 26 Image: 4.5 tons of Wold War II High Explosive is destroyed just off the coast of Bougainville during Operation RENDER SAFE 14. Defence Images. Australia is an island nation with one of the world’s largest maritime domains, and its prosperity and ­security depends on seaborne trade, including fuel, fertiliser and pharmaceuticals. Yet as Australia invests heavily in nuclear-powered submarines and an expanded surface fleet in the 2030s, a critical vulnerability remains: Australia has little real capacity to detect and clear sea mines. Sea mines are the simplest way to shut down a port, a chokepoint or a coastal trade route. They can be laid at scale by dedicated vessels, but just as easily deployed by submarines, fishing boats or other vessels of opportunity and, increasingly, uncrewed systems. As the Strait of Hormuz shows, even the suggestion of mines is enough to deter traffic. Iran’s warnings alone have kept most ships away, with the few transiting vessels steering clear of the traffic separation scheme, which Iran has declared mined, and hugging the coasts. Australia’s coastal waters were mined during both world wars, first by a German raider and later by German raiders and Japanese submarines. The Royal Australian Navy also laid defensive mines to protect key ports and restrict submarine access. After World War II, the Royal Australian Navy spent years clearing more than 1800 mines. In 1947, HMAS Warrnambool was lost during these operations after striking a mine, with four sailors killed. Australia’s geography makes it particularly vulnerable. Its large ­island mass and dispersed ports mean mining is a simple and effective way to shut down access. The People’s Liberation Army – Navy is assessed to hold a vast inventory of sea mines, likely in the tens of thousands. In any major Indo-Pacific conflict, Australian ports and key chokepoints such as the Torres Strait should be expected to be mined. Mines would stop our ports and coastal trade, and threaten the operation of our naval forces, ­including nuclear-powered submarines. Mines near HMAS Stirling would immediately halt operations at our only submarine base. Given Australia’s experience during both world wars, and China’s vast sea mine inventory, mine clearance should be a priority. It is not treated as one. Australia’s capability is in a parlous state, having been neglected for decades. This is not new. In 1989, the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs examined the threat mining posed to Australia and the capability required to respond. It prompted a reinvigoration of mine warfare, including reorganisation and, critically, acquisition. The committee was clear that “the development of a capable mine countermeasures force must be one of the highest priorities for the ADF.” Yet in 2026, while our geography and maritime dependence remain unchanged, the threat has grown. We have no strategic warning time, we face our most ­dangerous circumstances, and our mine warfare capability is marginal at best. Of the six minehunters commissioned in the 1990s and early 2000s, only two remain. Both are over 20 years old, heavily used and nearing decommissioning. Their planned replacements and the deployable mine warfare capability under SEA 1905 were cancelled in the 2025 Integrated Investment Program, most likely due to budget pressures. The result is stark. In 2026, Australia is left with two ageing minehunters and a small, Sydney-based team operating limited, largely experimental systems, including reportedly fewer than 20 uncrewed underwater vehicles and a handful of mine neutralisation systems. Mine warfare received little ­attention in the 2024 Integrated Investment Program, and the cancellation of future capability has been met with claims it will be solved by autonomy. Uncrewed systems will shape parts of mine warfare, but without a clear plan or platforms to deploy them from, that promise is hollow. Beyond port clearance, these systems still need to operate from a vessel, and the last suitable platforms are nearing decommissioning. “Vessels of opportunity” lack the hardening and signature management required to operate in or near a minefield. Advances in autonomy reduce risk, but do not remove the need for vessels. The Royal Australian Navy needs deployable mine clearance capabilities that make use of ­advances in uncrewed systems, but it also needs dedicated vessels to operate them from. Yet the latest Integrated Investment Program expands its discussion of mine warfare without allocating funding to a capability identified as a top priority more than three decades ago. The point is simple. ­Nuclear-powered submarines are of little use if the waters outside their ports are mined. Beyond capability, Australia needs a concept of operations, as recognised in the 1989 Senate inquiry. Mine warfare must be distributed and responsive. It is of little use concentrating capability in Sydney if Port Hedland is mined. Australia needs deployable mine warfare teams and key capabilities positioned across both coasts. This is well suited to a model supported and augmented by a reinvigorated Naval Reserve. Australia’s ports, coastal trade routes and Pacific partners are vulnerable to mine warfare. As in the past, in any regional conflict Australian waters should be expected to be mined. Despite having no strategic warning time and facing our most dangerous circumstances since World War II, Australia has little more than a token capability to respond. That must change, and quickly.

22 May 2026 | Jennifer Parker & Dr Troy-Lee Brown *Originally published on 22 May by the Perth US Asia Centre The Iran war is again exposing a reality Australia has long overlooked: the Indian Ocean sits at the centre of the nation’s economic and strategic security. Image: United States forces prepare to board an oil tanker in the Indian Ocean in early February 2026 after the vessel violated a U.S. embargo of sanctioned ships in the Caribbean. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF WAR Key takeaways Australia’s economic and national security are deeply tied to the Indian Ocean. Western Australia’s ports, energy infrastructure and subsea cables are critical national assets, but remain lightly protected. Competition in the Indian Ocean is growing through naval presence, China’s infrastructure investment across the region, and undersea activity. Australia’s growing focus on the Indian Ocean will require a clearer strategy and stronger maritime posture. The Iran war is again exposing a reality Australia has long overlooked: the Indian Ocean sits at the centre of the nation’s economic and strategic security. For decades, Australian strategy has been dominated by a Pacific outlook. Much of the nation’s defence infrastructure, force posture and strategic thinking developed along the east coast and looked towards the Pacific. Yet Australia’s security and prosperity have always depended on the Indian Ocean. The region carries critical sea lines of communication linking Australia to fuel, trade, and global markets. Much of the nation’s prosperity is tied to Western Australian ports, from Port Hedland, Australia’s largest bulk export port, to Fremantle, a critical gateway for container trade and maritime logistics. Together with major energy export hubs such as Karratha, these ports underpin not only Australia’s economy, but increasingly its national security. Much of the nation’s prosperity is tied to Western Australian ports… these ports underpin not only Australia’s economy, but increasingly its national security. The Indian Ocean: An increasingly contested region The Indian Ocean is no longer a secondary theatre. China has steadily expanded its presence across the region through port investments, dual-use infrastructure, and growing undersea surveying activity. At the same time, the Iran war has again shown how quickly instability in the Indian Ocean can disrupt shipping, energy supplies, and maritime trade far beyond the Middle East. The sinking of the Iranian warship Dena by a US submarine off Sri Lanka in March this year, reportedly along key maritime routes to China, was a visceral reminder that the Indian Ocean can no longer be viewed as strategically benign. Persistent vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean Australia is increasing its presence, capability and partnerships in the Indian Ocean. AUKUS, Australia’s rapidly expanding defence relationship with India, and its growing engagement across Indian Ocean states all reflect this shift. Australia’s defence relationship with India has shifted significantly over the past decade, while Australia’s Defence Cooperation Program has also expanded into the Indian Ocean, including the delivery of an Australian-funded Guardian class patrol boat to the Maldives earlier this year. These developments reflect a growing recognition that Australia’s strategic interests extend well into the Indian Ocean. Australia has pivoted towards the Indian Ocean before, from the establishment of HMAS Stirling in 1978 to the formalisation of its two-ocean strategy in the 1987 Defence White Paper. Yet the importance of the Indian Ocean continues to slip from Australia’s broader strategic debate. While Australia is increasingly focused on its dependence on, and access to, the Indian Ocean, significant vulnerabilities remain. Australia still has limited capacity to protect critical ports and infrastructure in the northwest, particularly in areas such as mine warfare, port protection, and maritime security operations. Maritime competition and domain awareness Strategic competition is reshaping the ways in which power is exercised in the Indian Ocean. From a more persistent naval presence to expanding economic and security relationships, regional dynamics are shifting rapidly. China, in particular, has expanded its investment and influence across Indian Ocean littoral and island states as it seeks to secure access to critical maritime trade routes. Over the past decade, an increase in Chinese ‘scientific research’ vessels has coincided with a greater presence of PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) surface and potentially subsurface vessels. These changing dynamics underline the growing importance of achieving a clearer picture of what is going on in the Indian Ocean through improved maritime and undersea domain awareness. Subsea infrastructure and maritime vulnerability The strategic significance of the Indian Ocean is not just the maritime trade routes linking Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Oceania. It also lies in the dense network of undersea fibre-optic cables that keep our economy online and powered. Perth has emerged as Australia’s major subsea cable hub. At the same time, systems such as the North West Cable System linking Darwin and Port Hedland underpin connectivity for Australia’s critical resources and energy sectors. These vital connectivity links sit alongside key ports in northwest Western Australia that are critical to the economy, yet remain lightly protected, with few maritime assets permanently based in the region. This also raises a broader question about how much visibility Australia really has across its western maritime approaches and beneath the sea in the Indian Ocean. We have already seen the impact of contested maritime domains and the growing accessibility of technologies capable of threatening shipping and maritime infrastructure. From the Black Sea to the Middle East, low-cost mines and uncrewed systems have shown that you do not need a large navy to cause significant disruption. Attacks on shipping, or even the suggestion of maritime threats, can send insurance premiums soaring, reroute shipping and disrupt global trade. The consequences for Australia would be significant if uncrewed underwater vehicles targeted the North West Cable System or if it was suggested that sea mines had been deployed near Port Hedland. Australia’s Indian Ocean shipbuilding and sustainment hub A significant increase in investment in critical Defence-related infrastructure has positioned Western Australia to play a greater strategic role, especially in the maritime domain. Infrastructure on HMAS Stirling was already undergoing extensive upgrades prior to the AUKUS announcement. In addition, the Australian Maritime Complex at Henderson is also being transformed, reflecting the growth of the defence industry – now set to become WA’s second largest industry after resources. In 2025, Austal and the Commonwealth signed a 15-year Strategic Shipbuilding Agreement that will see the long-time Henderson-based shipbuilder construct general purpose Mogami frigates for Navy and Landing Craft Medium and Landing Craft Heavy for Army. The uplift in maritime infrastructure positions Perth to play a broader role as Australia’s Indian Ocean gateway for sustainment, logistics, and the development of surface and undersea capabilities across the region. The uplift in maritime infrastructure positions Perth to play a broader role as Australia’s Indian Ocean gateway for sustainment, logistics, and the development of surface and undersea capabilities across the region. Australia’s incomplete Indian Ocean pivot In many ways, Australia’s Indian Ocean pivot is only half complete. Nearly 40 years after the two-ocean navy strategy was introduced, it is time to think more seriously about what an Indian Ocean strategy requires. Australia has built a far larger footprint in the west through infrastructure, capability investment, and partnerships. But significant gaps remain. Northwest Western Australia is critical to the nation’s economy, yet still has limited protection and domain awareness. As the Indian Ocean becomes more contested, Australia needs a clearer strategy for the region and a maritime posture that reflects the region’s growing strategic importance.

9 May 2026 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published with Channel News Asia on 9 May 2026. Access original publication here The abrupt “pause” of Project Freedom after two days undermines confidence in the United States’ ability to secure the critical waterway, says defence professor and navy veteran Jennifer Parker. Image: Guided-missile destroyer USS Rafael Peralta (DDG 115) enforces the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports against M/T Stream after it attempted to sail to an Iranian port, April 26. (CENTCOM X) CANBERRA: President Donald Trump’s Project Freedom lasted just two days. The United States mission to guide ships through the Strait of Hormuz supported only two vessels exiting the Gulf before it was suspended on Tuesday (May 5). Iran had disrupted the critical waterway – through which roughly 20 per cent of global oil supply passes – to gain leverage in the war. Given the impact on the global economy, one question might seem obvious: Why has the US Navy, the world’s most powerful navy, not simply restored safe passage through the strait? The answer is more complicated than either side’s rhetoric suggests. In the opening weeks of the conflict, Mr Trump indicated he could reopen the strait with relative ease. He called on allies and partners, including Japan and Australia, to help provide naval escorts. They declined. The assumption underpinning this was straightforward: Overwhelming naval power should be able to keep the narrow waterway open. Confidence in the Strait of Hormuz Despite political declarations and media headlines, the strait is neither fully open nor fully closed. Commercial shipping has been deterred because shipowners, insurers and crews do not believe it is safe. More than 40 merchant vessels have reportedly been attacked or harassed by Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman since the conflict began. Adding to the uncertainty are Iranian claims that sea mines have been laid in the normal transit route through the strait. The Pentagon told US lawmakers mine clearance could take up to six months. Iran has also directed ships to pay a toll to move through Iranian territorial waters, with reports this week that Tehran has unilaterally created the “Persian Gulf Strait Authority” to enforce its new transit rules. The cumulative effect has been to sharply reduce maritime traffic through one of the world’s busiest international waterways. Geography Favours Iran The problem is that forcing open the Strait of Hormuz would be an asset-intensive and operationally demanding mission. The challenge of operating in this chokepoint is geography. Iran’s position along the northern edge of the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman allows it to use relatively cheap cruise missiles, uncrewed aerial vehicles and small boats to threaten shipping with very limited warning time. US warships supported by airpower can defend themselves and limited groups of escorted vessels against these attacks. But doing so over prolonged periods is demanding on crews and rapidly consumes missiles that cannot be replenished at sea. While there is no fixed ratio, it is unlikely a single US destroyer could effectively protect more than two or three merchant ships transiting the Strait at one time, particularly given that the merchant vessels themselves have no ability to defend against these threats. Any sustained escort operation would also require extensive intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support across the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman, as well as coverage of Iran’s coastal areas to provide early warning of attacks. Combat air patrols would need to remain overhead, supported by helicopters ready to respond to drone or small boat attacks on shipping. Maintaining this effort over time would likely also require limited marine corps raids against Iranian Revolutionary Guard launch sites along the coast or on Iranian-held islands. High Risk, Limited Reward Even if a large-scale escort effort were feasible, it would only be capable of moving a fraction of the usual transit volume safely through the waterway. Around 130 vessels normally pass through the Strait of Hormuz each day. Project Freedom managed two ships in two days, underscoring the reality that even a substantial military effort – involving warships, aircraft and surveillance assets – would not come close to sustaining normal shipping flows. These realities help explain why Washington initially avoided large-scale escort operations, before announcing Project Freedom. The mission was intended to guide limited numbers of ships through the strait using destroyers, more than 100 aircraft and 15,000 military personnel – not to restore normal commercial traffic. Even that limited ambition proved challenging. Regional partners appeared unconvinced that the mission could remain limited. Project Freedom was reportedly suspended in part after Saudi Arabia refused US access to its airspace and bases. This likely reflected concerns that the military operation could quickly escalate into direct confrontation. Iran had repeatedly warned that foreign warships escorting commercial traffic through the strait would be treated as hostile actors. The Limits of Naval Power in the Gulf Lost amid the geopolitical signalling is the plight of merchant mariners themselves, with more than 20,000 seafarers thought to be stranded in the Gulf. A limited, but protected corridor, would have enabled more vessels and stranded seafarers to leave the Gulf safely. But that option has receded for now. And so, they remain trapped, unable to transit through the Strait of Hormuz due to fears of Iranian attacks, with no clear timeline for a return to normal shipping operations and no immediate plans for the US or a multinational coalition to come to their rescue. The abrupt pause of Project Freedom has added further uncertainty and likely undermined confidence in the US. Even overwhelming naval power has its limits. The events playing out in the Strait of Hormuz are demonstrating this in real time. Warships can reduce risk and provide reassurance, but they cannot easily restore commercial confidence in a contested maritime chokepoint.

22 April 2026 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in Lowy's The Interpreter on 22 April 2026 Image: HMAS Canberra and HMAS Warramunga while on deployment on the East Coast of Australia (Defence images) In 2023, the Australian government adopted a “strategy of denial” to guide defence planning, defined as an “defensive approach designed to stop an adversary from succeeding in its goal to coerce states through force, or the threatened use of force, to achieve dominance.” The 2026 National Defence Strategy and its associated Integrated Investment Program, released last week, offer the next steps in achieving this plan, with maritime capabilities a crucial component. But gaps remain. The 2026 Strategy is careful to distinguish a strategy of denial from a strategy of sea denial. Sea denial, as seen in the Black Sea or the Strait of Hormuz, can restrict an adversary’s freedom of manoeuvre, but it does not guarantee our own. Securing freedom of manoeuvre across the maritime domain through sea control is essential to protecting long sea lines of communication and enabling maritime power projection. The 2026 Strategy recognises this, committing to work with allies and partners to protect Australia’s critical sea lines of communication, reinforced by ADF tasks focused on defending economic connections and strengthening maritime domain awareness. It also broadens the concept of maritime strategy, with a stronger focus on defence industry policy and supply chain resilience. Reducing the volume of critical goods that must move by sea is an important part of any effective approach. This reflects an attempt to take a more national view, but sits awkwardly in what is still a military strategy and would be better developed in a whole of government maritime strategy. Sea denial can restrict an adversary’s freedom of manoeuvre, but it does not guarantee Australia’s own. The 2026 Strategy sets out 11 priorities for the integrated force, many with a clear maritime focus. It includes undersea warfare to project force, hold an adversary at risk and maintain situational awareness. It extends to maritime capabilities for sea denial and localised sea control to deny access and enable ADF freedom of action, and amphibious capability. These themes were evident in the 2024 edition of the strategy but are now more clearly expressed. Even so, the 2026 Strategy is still not clear on how Australia would protect its sea lines of communication. It would have been stronger if this had been set out as a layered, whole of government approach, rather than left to be inferred. The Integrated Investment Program released alongside the 2026 Strategy outlines the prioritised capability investments to implement the longer-term vision. The maritime elements of the capability investment program remain largely the same as in 2024. Of the 11 capability priorities outlined in the investment program, several are maritime, including undersea operations, sea denial and localised sea control, and amphibious army capability supported by investment in targeting and missile. Maritime capability still makes up a large share of the investment program, at around 41%. In line with Defence announcements over the past year, the Integrated Investment Program reinforces the central role of nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS arrangement. It also places growing emphasis on extra-large and large uncrewed underwater vehicles such as Ghost Shark and Speartooth. While their full capabilities are not public, their likely intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and strike roles should help bridge the gap between the ageing Collins-class and the future Virginia-class submarines. These uncrewed underwater vehicles are also likely to play an important role in seabed warfare, an area of increasing focus. Whether this will be sufficient remains uncertain. A positive shift in the Integrated Investment Program is the broader view of maritime capability, with renewed attention to areas such as hydrography and mine warfare that were largely overlooked in the 2024 version. But the added detail is not matched by a clear plan or funding to close the capability gaps in the earlier version. The Integrated Investment Program includes references to autonomy and uncrewed systems helping to address these shortfalls, but it remains unclear how, likely reflecting budget constraints. As it stands, the approach leans heavily on the promise of autonomy without explaining how it will deliver. On localised sea control – where the distinction with a strategy of pure sea denial becomes important – this task rests with the surface combatant fleet of frigates and destroyers, consistent with the selection of the upgraded Mogami general purpose frigate in August 2025. While the expanded capability will be considerable, these ships will not arrive until the 2030s and 2040s. In the meantime, the present fleet of ten surface combatants – including seven ageing Anzac-class ships – will fall to nine in 2026 and not grow again until the first Mogami enters service around 2030. There is no ambition to accelerate the Hunter class frigates, not expected until 2034. The Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessel announced in 2024 curiously remains, despite indications the US will move away from this – leaving Australia’s ambition feeling rather aspirational. Replenishment is a more immediate gap. The ability to keep ships at sea through replenishment is scarcely addressed in the Integrated Investment Program. After cancelling the future multi role vessels in 2024, the investment program maintains that two replenishment ships are enough. They are not. This does not support continuous operations and provides no real resilience. It remains a clear capability shortfall. The 2026 Strategy describes a more dangerous and unpredictable era, with higher levels of state conflict than at any time since 1946, and acknowledges Australia’s core maritime vulnerability of sea lines of communication, yet the 2026 Integrated Investment Program still does not provide the ability to protect it over the next five years – a risk that is compounding.

20 April 2026 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review on 16 April 2026 Does Australia have the capability to defend itself and protect its maritime lifelines? Under the current funding profile, the answer is no, we would be relying on the United States to do it for us. The second iteration of the National Defence Strategy arrives against the backdrop of conflict in the Middle East already affecting Australia’s fuel, fertiliser, plastics supply and more. The petrol pump is a visible reminder that, as an island nation with the world’s third largest exclusive economic zone, our critical vulnerability lies in our dependence on secure maritime supply chains to sustain the economy and our capacity to fight. The strategy recognises this reality and reflects a more dangerous strategic environment. But despite the rhetoric and announced increases in defence spending , it is likely to remain a well-written document that is not properly resourced, cannot be delivered, and leaves Australia no safer. Defence spending quickly becomes emotive. Some call for 5 per cent of GDP with little explanation of what capability that would buy. Others argue any increase comes at an unnecessary impact on health, education and housing. Neither view is serious. At its core, defence spending is about risk. It is about whether Australia has the capability to defend itself and protect the flows of fuel, food, fertiliser and goods that keep the country functioning. As we are learning in the current fuel supply crunch, the flow of these critical supplies are the foundations of economic stability and national power. Defence capability is, in effect, an insurance policy against conflict and coercion. Put plainly, wars are becoming more frequent, and the chances of Australia being drawn into one are increasing. And the risk is rising. In recent years there has been more state-on-state conflict than at any time since the Second World War. The strategy itself notes that “international norms against the use of force and coercion are weakening, with more states already engaged in conflict at the start of 2024 than at any point since 1946”. Put plainly, wars are becoming more frequent, and the chances of Australia being drawn into one are increasing. The problem is not the strategy. It is the funding. As Defence Minister Richard Marles said in 2023, “strategy without money is just hot air”. He was right. Yet, that is where we find ourselves in 2026. The government has committed an additional $14 billion over the next four years and $53 billion over the decade. That sounds substantial. It is not. The claim that defence spending will reach 3 per cent of GDP by 2033 relies on a revised measure that includes items such as veterans’ pensions, which do not generate capability. Under traditional measures, spending sits closer to 2.3 to 2.5 per cent of GDP. This is the first government in a decade to lift defence spending, which deserves acknowledgment. But the increase is marginal when measured against the capability required and the risks Australia now faces. As a share of the economy, spending remains below Cold War levels, despite a far more complex and contested strategic environment. The government has been keen to highlight its record compared with previous governments, which is a clear increase and improvement. But the strategy itself makes clear that the risk of conflict is significantly higher than it was even two years ago. Spending has increased. The risk has increased faster. The test is simple: does Australia have the capability to defend itself and protect its maritime lifelines? Under the current funding profile and Integrated Investment Program, the answer is no, we would be relying on the US to do it for us. A central theme of the strategy is greater self-reliance within the alliance. Yet, Australia’s Defence Force today has less capacity overall to operate independently and execute key missions than it did during the Cold War. Despite the focus on the maritime domain, Australia still has just 10 surface combatants, about 70 per cent of which are ageing and of limited utility in modern naval warfare. Sustainment is constrained, with only two replenishment ships to keep the fleet at sea. Reforms welcome Protecting maritime trade is not simply a numbers game, but even on that measure the gaps are obvious. While Thursday’s announcements will improve mine warfare and seabed capabilities, on the face of things they do not appear to close the broader gap. Much has been achieved over the past two years. There have been reforms to procurement, progress in domestic missile production and acquisition, and long-term plans to expand the navy through new surface combatants and nuclear submarines. But as risk has increased, decisions should have been taken to accelerate the Hunter-class frigates, consider additional or upgraded Mogami-class vessels, expand replenishment capacity, and rapidly address mine warfare shortfalls. Those decisions have not been made, most likely due to resourcing constraints. The strategy is sound, but it is not matched by the resources required to deliver it. The fiscal outlook is constrained, with inflationary pressures and even the International Monetary Fund calling for governments to rein in spending. That does not make this an easy ask, but it does not make it any less necessary. However defence spending is measured, the question is capability. Do we have what is required to defend Australia in a more dangerous world? We do not. The plans announced on Thursday do not change that. Until they do, the strategy will remain constrained by funding, and Australia will remain exposed.