8 May 2025 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in Leading Britain's Conversation on 8 May 2025 Image: Defence Minister Richard Marles will meet again with his British counterpart Grant Shapps Mar 24. Defence Images The September 2021 launch of the AUKUS partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States did more than pave the way for Australia to obtain nuclear-powered submarines. It signalled a turning point: the three longstanding partners see deeper collaboration on cutting-edge military capabilities as essential preparation for an increasingly contested global order. The reasons are obvious. Long before the current US administration’s position on Ukraine, rhetoric in support of Russia, and the opening salvos of what could become a global trade war, two broader trends had already put both the United Kingdom and Australia on the back foot. First, an increasing number of states are willing to use armed force to settle disputes. Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine is the clearest example, but conflict is also flaring across the Middle East, tensions have spiked recently in South Asia, and China is exerting growing military pressure on Taiwan while harassing Philippine government and fishing vessels inside the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone in the South China Sea. Secondly, while war’s brutality endures, its conduct is changing fast: drones now roam land, sea and sky, artificial intelligence speeds decision-making, and ballistic and hypersonic missiles dominate the battlespace. Together, these trends require Australia, the United Kingdom and other like-minded partners to be ready to defend their vital interests with force—and to accelerate technological upgrades to stay battlefield-relevant. These dynamics gave rise to AUKUS. Pillar I will deliver nuclear-powered submarines for Australia while expanding United Kingdom and United States shipbuilding capacity; Pillar II binds the three nations to develop the next wave of capability—hypersonics, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence and other battlefield enablers. Yet AUKUS alone is no panacea. Elements of Washington’s change in approach to Ukraine, Russia and NATO show why Canberra and London should also strengthen complementary partnerships and widen the circle of technical defence cooperation. Their shared history, industrial synergies and broadly aligned strategic outlook make Australia and the United Kingdom natural partners for deeper collaboration beyond the formal alliance with the United States. With both the United Kingdom and Australia boosting defence spending, the scope for deeper technical collaboration is expanding. April’s deal between their defence science and technology agencies on future weapons systems is a promising start, but the partnership can—and should—go much further to strengthen each nation’s capabilities and defence industries. It must be ambitious, to meet the deteriorating strategic circumstances at pace. How do we achieve this between Australia and the United Kingdom? Make it a priority. Strip away red tape, share risk and start building together beyond submarines. Joint production lines for uncrewed underwater vehicles, uncrewed aerial vehicles, shared test ranges for hypersonics, and a security framework that protects intellectual property without throttling collaboration would give both nations sharper teeth at lower cost and create jobs at home. Bilateral collaboration of this degree will only help to underwrite AUKUS collaboration and mitigate some of its risks. If Canberra and London can turn good will and intent into actual capability before the decade ends, they will prove that determined middle powers need not wait for Washington’s lead to safeguard their interests—and Europe and the Indo-Pacific will be safer for it.

24 April 2025 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Conversation Image: United States Navy Virginia-class submarine USS Minnesota alongside Fleet Base West in Western Australia. Defence Images Australian strategic thinking has long struggled to move beyond a narrow view of defence that focuses solely on protecting our shores . However, in today’s world, our economy could be crippled without an enemy boot stepping foot on Australian soil. Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines through AUKUS marks a shift in this mindset. It is not a strategy in itself, but a structural pivot: a recognition that our vital interests lie far beyond the coastline, and that defending them requires Australia to project its maritime power. Protecting our vital sea lanes Over a century ago, US naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan observed that “wars are won by the economic strangulation of the enemy from the sea”. While not universally true, this maxim is directly relevant to an island nation like Australia – 99% of our international trade moves by sea. But not just any trade – our critical supplies of fuel, fertiliser and ammunition all come by sea. Australia’s economy and defences would be crippled if these things were stopped at sea. These vulnerabilities are compounded by our growing dependence on undersea cables for communications. Strategic concepts that rely on making Australia’s territory a hard target, such as the “ strategic defensive ”, fail to grapple with this reality, perpetuating a flawed understanding of how to defend Australia. Viewing Australia’s interests solely through the lens of avoiding or defeating a territorial attack overlooks the reality that an adversary could cripple the nation far more easily through the maritime, space or cyber domains. The ability to project power in the seas and oceans far from Australia’s shores is critical to protecting these seaborne supply lines and sustaining the national economy. This is where AUKUS comes in – the endurance and range of nuclear-powered submarines are a key element. Developing a future maritime strategy Australia’s future nuclear-powered submarines would make adversary naval task groups vulnerable if they threatened our maritime trade routes. Much more is needed, however, to deliver a coherent maritime strategy. This includes: expanding our surface combatant fleet addressing the vulnerability of Australia’s limited number of resupply, mine warfare and hydrographic vessels and resolving longstanding issues around our strategic fleet (commercial ships that could be requisitioned in a time of crisis). We must also expand our flagged merchant shipping fleet by reforming the Australian International Shipping Register . And we must strengthen our domestic maritime security through the establishment of a national coastguard . But AUKUS, as the centrepiece of our future undersea capability, is a good start. AUKUS’ critics AUKUS has attracted plenty of criticism — particularly following the new Trump administration’s moves away from the US’ traditional allies in Europe. Yet, despite claims the three-phase AUKUS submarine plan is failing, it remains remarkably on track . Like any complex defence acquisition, it carries risks. These risks include the continued political will to keep the deal on track, as well as the workforce, delivery schedule and cost pressures that come with building the submarines. But the relevant question is not whether risks exist — if that were the test, most defence programs wouldn’t proceed. The question is whether the risks around AUKUS are being effectively mitigated. And as the three phases of the AUKUS deal progress, these risks will continue to evolve. Australia must remain focussed on addressing them. Political will is firm The political risk has been most salient recently, given the Trump administration’s actions on Europe, Ukraine, foreign aid and tariffs. But while these disruptions are significant, they were largely foreshadowed. By contrast, the political signals coming out of Washington around AUKUS have been overwhelmingly positive . This is because AUKUS is in the US’ strategic interests as much as it is in Australia’s interests. Importantly, the political commitment to AUKUS in Canberra, Washington and London has already been demonstrated. The “ optimal pathway ” to guide the agreement into the 2030s was signed within 18 months of AUKUS’ launch in September 2021. And the AUKUS treaty that enables the US and UK to transfer nuclear submarine technology and equipment to Australia has since been signed and entered into force among all three partners. In Australia, bipartisan support has held for over three years, with no sign of weakening. Australia’s importance to the US Many critics have also focused on the risks posed by the US submarine industrial base and its ability to build nuclear-powered submarines quickly enough. The US would need to increase its production rate to two Virginia-class submarines per year by 2028 – and subsequently to 2.33 submarines per year – in order to reach the target US fleet of 66 submarines by 2054 . But this does not preclude the sale of three Virginia-class submarines to Australia in the early 2030s. Australia is not just a recipient of submarines from the US — it will help enable the US’ undersea operations in the region. Our role as a rotational hub for US submarines and the longstanding support we can offer the US fleet through facilities such as the Harold E. Holt submarine communications station makes our contribution far more valuable than the notional loss of three submarines on paper. Could this change in the future? Like all international arrangements, of course it could. But there is no indication at present that it will. The defence of Australia is not simply about protecting our continent from attack — it is about safeguarding vital national interests. For an island nation, that means securing maritime trade routes and undersea infrastructure. Even for those concerned about the extremely unlikely prospect of invasion, a robust maritime strategy also enables threats to be defeated well before they reach our shores. Through its emphasis on maritime power projection, AUKUS reflects a fundamental shift in how we think about defending Australia in the decades ahead.

22 April 2025 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review on 22 April 2025 as part of their election 'Policy Pitch' series 'The Australian Financial Review asked prominent people to propose one policy initiative they believe political parties should pledge to do, should they win the election ' . Here's my pitch. Image: Originally published in the Australian Financial Review What’s the pitch? Talk on Defence in the last term and into the election has focused on capability, workforce and spending . While an important issue, absent from the discussion, has been the structure of Defence. Whoever forms the next government will face the formidable task of reshaping the structure of the Australian Defence Force and the Department of Defence to ensure readiness for any potential crisis or conflict in our region. The ADF – the army, navy and airforce – and the Department of Defence were formed in 1976 following the influential Tange reviews. The structure of the ADF has developed over time, with the forming of the Joint Operations Command in 2004 to manage ADF operations across the three services, and the Joint Capabilities Group in 2017. The Department of Defence has undergone several structural changes since its inception Subsequent reviews have expanded the Defence bureaucracy to meet peacetime requirements, most notably through the 2015 First Principles Review. While that review aimed to streamline Defence and ensure it was fit for purpose, it instead entrenched a cumbersome committee system and reduced accountability among key decision-makers. A decade on, the department’s structure has further morphed, now comprising 14 groups, and the roles of the army, navy, and air force chiefs have been diminished. Although these measures may reduce peacetime risk, they risk paralysing decision-making in a crisis or conflict. Why is it needed? Military strategists have long warned that prolonged peace can breed excessive bureaucracy, as illustrated by the Royal Navy’s challenges at the Battle of Jutland during World War I – sparking the famous rat-catchers or regulators debate [leaders who are willing to break conventions to achieve a goal, versus those who are cautious and rule-bound]. Although Australia has participated in conflicts over the past 80 years, they were distant engagements of choice. A conflict in the Indo-Pacific, however, would demand a far more agile Defence structure, with whole-of-nation and whole-of-government co-ordination. To prepare, we must streamline the Defence portfolio: reduce unnecessary hierarchy, empower the service chiefs, limit committee influence, increase spending ceilings of key leaders and delegate authority down. A concise, focused review should ensure clear accountability, a solid chain of command, greater agility in decision-making at lower levels, with decision-making geared toward the needs of any future crisis or conflict. This will develop a more resilient and self-reliant Defence structure. How much would it cost? Optimising our Defence structure to match current strategic circumstances is far less expensive than acquiring major new military hardware. In 2018, for example, the Department of Defence informed a parliamentary inquiry that it had spent approximately $245 million on consultancies to implement reforms from the First Principles Review. While that figure doesn’t necessarily indicate the cost of a new structural review today – and outsourcing is not ideal – it gives an order of magnitude cost. What would you scrap to pay for it? In this instance, Defence itself is best placed to determine how it should be organised for future crises or conflicts rather than another external review. Ultimately, the benefits of streamlining our Defence structure would likely far outweigh the costs. Importantly, business as usual activities – particularly acquisitions – must continue throughout the review, so we don’t lose critical preparation time for potential crises. Naturally, such a review will consume valuable decision-making capacity, potentially posing a greater cost than mere dollars. Still, to realise its benefits, it must be prioritised over other initiatives – possibly including some workforce measures. If done correctly, however, it should ultimately generate greater workforce capacity, but it will also ensure the organisation is better prepared for potential crises or conflicts – a lesson we don’t want to learn the hard way once a crisis hits.

15 April 2025 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian on 15 April 2025 Image: Image of RAAF  Corporal Samantha Mead (center) with the aviators she mentored on the Top Chicks program: Melina Young/Department of Defence . The Ukraine war has been called the bloodiest conflict since World War II. As of July 2024, 10,000 women were serving in frontline combat roles. Try telling them – from the safety of an Australian lounge room – they don’t belong there. But that’s exactly what the now disendorsed Liberal candidate for Whitlam, Benjamin Britton , did last week when he doubled down on his claim that women didn’t belong in combat. The idea of women in combat is not new – it dates back centuries. That this topic has re-entered mainstream political debate is dangerous and damaging. It risks undermining the morale of our defence force and stoking a culture war at precisely the moment when we should be focused on enhancing capability. National security is a bipartisan priority, with both sides acknowledging the strategic uncertainty Australia faces – war in Europe , instability in the Middle East and China’s assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific. Y et instead of strengthening our defence capability, recent political discourse risks undermining it. The resurfacing of comments from Britton – calling for the removal of women from combat roles to “fix the military” – and a 2018 interview in which opposition defence spokesman Andrew Hastie claimed the “fighting DNA” of close combat units was “best preserved when exclusively male” do exactly that. It’s important to clarify what combat roles actually entail. These are positions that engage directly with enemy forces – traditionally found on warships, in fighter aircraft and on the battlefield. But as the character of war has evolved across the five domains – land, sea, air, cyber and space – so too has the nature of combat. The lines are increasingly blurred, exemplified by growing recognition of drone operators as combat roles. Today, defining a combat role is far less clear-cut than it once was. Which only reinforces how ludicrous it is to exclude 50 per cent of the Australian population from these roles. Australia’s journey towards fully integrating women has been a long one. Women have proudly supported Australian military operations since the Boer War in 1899. In 1990, the chief of navy lifted restrictions on women serving at sea, with Royal Australian Navy women deploying in frontline roles during the Gulf War aboard HMAS Westralia. By 1998, the navy allowed women to serve on submarines. In 1992, most Australian Defence Force roles were opened to women, with only a few exceptions remaining – clearance divers, combat engineers, infantry, artillery, airfield defence and special forces. In 1992 the Royal Australian Air Force opened fighter pilot roles to women, though uptake has been slow because of cultural barriers rather than capability. Yet even before that, in 1990, female RAAF pilots were already flying C-130s in combat-related roles, and by 2000 women were serving as navigators in Australia’s F-111 strike aircraft. While admittedly the nature of conflict across the domains is different, these are combat roles where women’s lives are on the line and the sacrifices are just as real. The journey towards the inclusion of women in land combat roles in Australia has been slower. While ADF women have made key contributions to peacekeeping missions since the 1990s, it wasn’t until 2011 that the formal ban on women serving in land combat roles was lifted – extended to special forces roles in 2014. This was despite the first woman earning her commando green beret as early as 1981 and women serving as combat medics alongside special forces in Afghanistan before the policy change. But what of Britton’s specific comments? Setting aside his apparent misunderstanding of the broad range of combat roles, he expressed concern about “women’s hips”. It’s true that studies in Australia and Britain have found that body armour designed for men can have adverse physical impacts on women. But these same studies conclude that such issues can be resolved through improved design. It’s not a reduction in protection, just a redesign to fit the body it’s intended for. And what about the success rates of women in these physically arduous roles? In 2018, the director of workforce strategy for the army told a parliamentary committee that attrition rates for women in combat roles were broadly the same as those for men. Likewise, the proportion of applicants, male and female, who fail to meet the physical employment standards for these roles shows no significant gender difference. As for the so-called fighting DNA of close combat units – I’ve never served in land combat – it’s an experience that deserves the respect of a grateful nation. But based on my operational experience, from service at sea during the second Gulf War to chasing armed drug smugglers in the Caribbean, I can say this: the fighting DNA of a warship is strengthened, not weakened, by diversity of all kinds – including gender. Australia faces the real prospect of conflict in our region. Faux culture wars such as this serve only to distract from the serious task of preparing our defence force for the challenges ahead.

2 April 2025 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review on 2 April 2025 Rather than repeatedly reassessing the program, we should concentrate our political and intellectual capital on ensuring it stays the course. Image: Image of US navy Virginia-class USS  Minnesota arriving in Guam: Justin Wolpert/United States Navy . Former prime minister Malcolm Turnbull has called for an “urgent assessment of the state of the AUKUS submarine project.” So, where are we? Over the past three and a half years, a significant amount has been achieved. Of course, the endeavour is risky – like all national endeavours – but that doesn’t mean we should abandon a complex undertaking such as AUKUS. Instead, we need to manage and mitigate the risk. Since the announcement in September 2021 that Australia intended to acquire nuclear-powered submarines in partnership with the United Kingdom and the United States, the plan has received significant media attention, scepticism and criticism. In a healthy democracy, any sudden decision made without a competitive evaluation process will inevitably face scrutiny. There are four major risks to the AUKUS national enterprise: the political will of all partners; delivery schedule; the cost of acquiring and sustaining the capability (including its impact on Australia’s broader Defence budget ); and workforce challenges, both for uniformed personnel and within the submarine-building industry. While these risks remain significant, the progress so far demonstrates a commitment to proactive mitigation. On the political front, the partnership demands considerable backing from the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia amid global upheaval. Yet despite changes in government across all three nations since AUKUS was first announced, the initiative has retained bipartisan support, a point reinforced by the US Congress supporting it through the passing of the National Defence Authorisation Act in December 2023, including the sale of three Virginia-class submarines to Australia. The political will was further reinforced by the agreement of all three partners on the optimal pathway for Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines within 18 months of its announcement and the signing of the trilateral AUKUS treaty in August last year, which came into effect in January. Although the treaty was finalised before President Donald Trump’s election, the new US administration has since shown strong support, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio calling AUKUS “something that I think you’re going to find very strong support for in this administration” and a “blueprint” for co-operation. The new US secretary of defence stated in February that “the president is very aware, supportive of AUKUS, recognises the importance of the defence industrial base”. Regarding the cost risk, while it is undeniably substantial , it is not orders of magnitude higher than the ill-fated conventional Attack-class submarine project. Senate estimates from October 2021 put that project’s acquisition and sustainment costs at almost $235 billion through to 2080. In last year’s budget, the Australian government allocated funding within the defence to cover the expected costs of acquiring nuclear-powered submarines over the next decade. While the overall defence budget remains a significant concern, this measure has been an important step in mitigating the cost risks of AUKUS. Australia has been steadily increasing nuclear-submariner training in the United States and the United Kingdom, and since mid-2024, shipbuilders from South Australia and Western Australia have been training on nuclear-powered submarines in Hawaii. Whether these measures will prove sufficient remains to be seen, but it is a promising start. Schedule risks remain a key concern, particularly for the phase two sale of three Virginia-class submarines set to begin in 2032. The Collins-class vessels are already beyond their intended service life, meaning the entire plan hinges on the Virginias arriving on time – or at least only slightly delayed. The 2023 National Defence Authorisation Act, which lies at the heart of Turnbull’s concerns, mandates that in 2031 – 270 days before the sale of the first Virginia-class submarine – the US president certifies that certain conditions are met. Notably, the transfer of the submarines will not degrade US undersea capabilities . “Undersea warfare effectiveness hinges on more than raw submarine numbers; it depends on having the right submarines in the right place at the right time.” As Turnbull correctly notes, the US submarine industrial base is already struggling to meet its planned production rate of two Virginia-class submarines per year and is unlikely to reach its goal of 66 attack submarines by 2054. However, this does not mean that the US president in 2031 would seek to undermine Australia’s submarine program by refusing to sell three submarines. Undersea warfare effectiveness hinges on more than raw submarine numbers; it depends on having the right submarines in the right place at the right time. This is where access to Australia’s western naval base, HMAS Stirling – and the maintenance facilities it will provide for US nuclear submarines – becomes crucial. It will help ensure US submarines can be deployed effectively when and where they are needed. Australia’s broader contributions, including the continued support of the Harold E. Holt Communications Station north of Exmouth, further bolster US undersea warfare capabilities by facilitating secure communications with nuclear-powered submarines in the region. It is imperative for Australia to make clear to the US just how vital submarines are to our national security, and to emphasise that the extensive support we provide, including access to Australia’s strategically important geography, is part of the deal. This is especially important given the more transactional nature of the current US administration and alliance framework. In response to Turnbull’s call for an “urgent assessment”, the answer is that Australia’s plan to acquire nuclear-powered submarines remains on track. Yes, it carries significant risks – as any major national endeavour does – but the challenges have been identified, and mitigation measures are in place. The progress made over the last three and a half years is substantial. Rather than repeatedly reassessing the program, we should concentrate our political and intellectual capital on ensuring it stays the course.

24 March 2025 | Jennifer Parker Image: Royal Australian Navy Minehunter Coastal HMAS Diamantina anchors in the Derwent River in support of the 186th Royal Hobart Regatta. (Defence Images) The Australian government has said, and frequently reiterated that we are facing our most ‘ complex and challenging  strategic environment since World War II—diplomatic language for a region where conflict is increasingly likely, though not inevitable. That means Australia could soon need the women and men in its Defence Force to defend our vital interests. The real question isn’t whether defence spending is 2 or 3 per cent of GDP but whether our personnel have the capabilities they need. Right now, the answer is no—and we must act accordingly. Many challenges hinder Defence’s ability to respond quickly—from structural issues to slow acquisition processes, committee structures designed for another time and absence of reserve reform. However, inadequate spending remains a significant constraint. It's a common misconception in Australia that defence spending is at record highs . While that may be true in nominal terms, it isn’t when measured relative to GDP, or when you consider the amount of military equipment it can purchase. The cost of military equipment is known to inflate at a higher rate  than the broader economy. A 2006 RAND Corporation study  found that the cost of surface combatant ship costs rose by 10% annually between 1950 and 2000—twice the average inflation rate in the broader economy. Though Australian Defence spending has outpaced broader inflation, it can no longer buy as much military equipment for the same funds as it once did. For the financial year to June 2025, the government has planned to spend $55.7 billion on Defence , covering the Department of Defence, the Australian Signals Directorate and the Australian Submarine Agency. Of that total, $52.6 billion was allocated directly to Defence—nominally the largest allocation in our history. When the 2024–25 budget was announced, the government said it expected the money would represent around 2 percent  of GDP. The plan was for this to grow to 2.4 percent by 2033–34.  If this occurs, it will be a significant investment, but it is unlikely to be enough as most of it will be spent on ships and submarines, leaving little room for anything else. Although assessing defence spending as a share of GDP is imperfect, it remains useful for historical analysis and international comparison. The exact figure for Australia in 2024–25 is 2.01 percent —lower than at any point in the Cold War  era except maybe 1949–50, when the ratio rounded to 2.0 percent. On average, during the Cold War, Australia spent 2.7 percent of GDP on defence. In the 1950s, when regional concerns were high, the average was 3.37 percent. It’s clear that in relative terms Australia isn’t spending at record levels even by Cold War standards on Defence—a reality that sits uneasily with bipartisan statements on the gravity of our strategic situation. After the Cold War, Australia took a peace dividend, dropping defence spending significantly. From 1990 to 2023, it averaged 1.9 percent of GDP  and dipped as low as 1.6 percent in 2013–14. In 2016, when spending reached 2.1 percent of GDP, the government committed to annual increases of 5.0 to 5.5 percent,  but inflation has been high since 2021, strongly eroding  these gains. Despite perceptions of record-high spending, Defence remains largely  on the path set by the 2016 White Paper  nearly a decade ago. This is despite the 2020 Defence Strategic Update  dropping the rolling presumption that conflict would not occur within 10 years, despite the eruption of conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, and despite rising Chinese aggression. According to the 2024–25 Defence budget, the spending trajectory won’t materially change until 2027–28. Although the budget added $5.7 billion  for the period 2024–25 to 2027–28, $3.8 billion  of that won’t arrive until 2027–28 under the current plan. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review  said the ‘ADF’s current force structure is not fit for purpose for our current strategic circumstances’, a point with which the government agreed in its National Defence Strategy statement. Because there’s been no increase in the Defence budget’s purchasing power of military equipment, the only way to improve the immediate force structure has been to cut some capabilities to fund others. The full extent of the 2024 ‘re-prioritisation’ of the Integrated Investment Program  remains unclear. Yet publicly disclosed cuts include cancelling the formerly proposed Joint Support Ship (affecting replenishment and sealift), axing replacement mine warfare vessels (leaving no dedicated mine warfare ship at a time when such threats are expanding), reducing the number of planned infantry fighting vehicles and deferring plans to buy a fourth squadron of F35 fighter aircraft. While it’s wise to ensure the defence capability budget is properly prioritised, it’s difficult to imagine a maritime concept of operations to defend Australia’s vital interests that doesn’t include enhanced replenishment and coastal mine-clearing capabilities. Both examples show these capabilities weren’t cut for having little value but because the budget hadn’t grown to meet the threat outlined in the National Defence Strategy. Meanwhile, other gaps remain across the portfolio—from insufficient counter-drone capabilities and a lack of land-based ballistic missile defence to inadequate guided weapons stocks. This underlines how a constrained budget has left Australia without many defence essentials. While Defence spending is increasing, it isn’t at a historic high when measured in relative terms or the amount of military equipment it can buy, and it certainly isn’t calibrated to our most serious circumstances since World War II. Any debate about whether to spend 2 or 3 per cent of GDP is a distraction; we need to define the capabilities required to safeguard our vital interests, then secure the funding—fast. If we don’t seize this moment, we risk leaving our women and men in uniform without the tools they need when it matters most.

March 13 2024 | Jennifer Parker Image: Department of Defence. Today marks 12 months since the release of the ‘optimal pathway’ Australia needed to follow to acquire a force of nuclear-powered and conventionally-armed attack submarines (SSNs) under the AUKUS agreement with the United States and the UK. The milestone has been marked by claims that domestic budget wrangling in the United States is a profound threat to Australia’s submarine plan with the Biden administration proposing to fund only one Virginia class submarine in fiscal year 2025. Whilst Australia must be alert to US domestic issues that may affect AUKUS, including the looming presidential elections, to boil the agreement down to simple submarine numbers largely misses the point of the agreement and what’s been achieved so far. Although the provision of SSNs to Australia is about capability, it is also about signaling to China that deep-seated US relationships in the region matter and should cause Beijing to think twice about its aggressive activities. AUKUS is just one strand of this network, but it is important to US Indo-Pacific strategy . To renege on the transfer of SSNs to Australia would undermine US credibility and influence in a region with many Southeast Asian states already hedging their bets. There is, of course, an issue with the US submarine industrial base and much of the US wrangling on AUKUS is geared towards gaining more funding for its own industry. Australia is providing $4.5 billion to help the US step up construction. The US Navy currently plans to have a fleet of 355 surface ships and at least 66 SSNs. It currently has 50 SSNs and, as the Los Angeles class submarines are gradually decommissioned, this may dip to 46 in 2030. The US is now building, on average, 1.2 to 1.3 submarines per year. To build up its submarine fleet, it needs to increase that rate to an average two Virginia class submarines a year. This increases to 2.33 boats per year if the US is to provide three SSNs to Australia in the 2030s. Reaching and maintaining that rate will be further complicated by the need to prioritise the building of its seaborne nuclear-deterrent replacement, the Columbia class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), and addressing the increasing SSN maintenance backlog. But assuming that the US would automatically renege on the deal to sell Virginias to Australia in the 2030s because it may not meet its target of 66 attack submarines in 2053, fundamentally misunderstands the US strategy supporting AUKUS. The US submarine industrial base is a risk, but it is not the sole consideration. Putting US domestic issues aside, there’s much to like about what the AUKUS optimal submarine pathway has achieved in its first year. When the AUKUS plan was announced in September 2021, the lack of detail and consultation on Australia’s intent to acquire SSNs was apparent. Whilst the project has many critics, greater regional acceptance has been signaled by Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s willingness to have Australian SSNs visit his country . When AUKUS was announced, the three partners undertook to outline a detailed plan for Australia to acquire SSNs within 18 months. A year ago the nuclear-powered submarine optimal pathway was announced and set out an effective ‘crawl, walk run’ approach. Phase 1 established submarine rotation force West (SRF-W) with US and UK submarines rotating through HMAS Stirling from 2027. This ‘crawl’ phase would allow Australia to develop the infrastructure, maintenance and stewardship capabilities and skillsets to support nuclear-powered submarines. Australia will acquire three to five Virginia class submarines in the 2030s. This ‘walk’ phase is intended to see Australia operate its capability at a smaller scale before proceeding to the ‘run’ phase and sharing the building of a new SSN with the UK. There’s no denying that this ambitious plan has high degrees of risk—including tumultuous US politics and its lagging submarine industrial base. If it all goes wrong, the age of Australia’s Collins class submarines would expose it to a capability gap. But despite a sparse flow of information, particularly for Australian defence industry, the AUKUS SSN optimal pathway appears to be on track. Having three countries reach agreement on the optimal pathway was no mean feat. Another significant achievement was the establishment of the Australian Submarine Agency. And Australia has focused heavily on training both its naval personnel and the wider defence industry workforce in submarine operations and maintenance. Australian officers are graduating from the US nuclear-powered submarine school, and maintainers are in Guam learning how to maintain SSNs. Perhaps the most significant achievement was US Congress passing the National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA) in December 2023 authorising the transfer of the three promised Virginias to Australia in the 2030s, the maintenance of US submarines in Australia by Australians, and the training of Australian contractors in US shipyards. It’s not all rosy. Defence agreements of this magnitude never are. The NDAA authorisation of the transfer of course came with caveats, including the requirement for the US president of the day to certify to Congress prior to any transfer that the ‘submarines would be used for joint security interests’ and ‘Australia is ready to support their operations and nuclear power procedures’. This endorsement is not a given. Australia will need to meet an ambitious infrastructure and governance plan to convince the US that it is able to safely operate and maintain the capability. The strategic importance of this agreement is much larger than the issue of the number of attack submarines in the US order of battle, and Australia should not be constantly distracted by US domestic debates over its submarine industrial base. Despite the plan’s risks, a lot has been achieved in 12 months.

14 March 2025 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Sydney Morning Herald on 14 March 2025 I mage: Virginia-class submarine USS Minnesota to come alongside Fleet Base West in Western Australia. Defence Images The world is in a difficult stage of its recent history, and the new United States administration’s change of tack is undeniably jarring. President Trump has re-litigated America’s relationship with Europe through NATO, applied maximum pressure on Ukraine to push it towards negotiations, and said precious little about Russia. Meanwhile, a trade war has kicked off, and Australia’s now facing tariffs on steel and aluminium and maybe more from our closest ally. Does any of this put our alliance with the United States under threat? Absolutely not. Does it change Australia’s plans to acquire nuclear-powered submarines? Again, no. Here’s why. Australia’s defence strategy since World War II has been anchored in its alliance with the United States, formalised in the 1951 ANZUS Treaty . This treaty obliges both nations to “act to meet the common danger” if either is attacked, and it has weathered many tests over the decades – we are, after all, very different countries. Like all critical defence frameworks, it’s rightly attracted public debate about its precise scope. Alliances are built on relationships, history, reliability and trust – not just treaties. Reassessing our strategic underpinnings is healthy, but any review should rest on facts. At this point, there’s no sign the US is an unreliable ally of Australia. In the first 50 days of Trump’s term, senior officials – from the secretary of state to the president himself – have repeatedly underscored Australia’s importance to US security. While the current administration does not necessarily have a consistent view across key players, the endorsement should be comforting to Australia. Some have pointed to diverging US-Europe relations as a red flag, but the US has long urged Europeans to invest more in their own defence – this is hardly new. We may dislike the tone of the current demands, yet they don’t signal unreliability when it comes to the Indo-Pacific. In fact, US officials openly acknowledge that encouraging Europe to handle its own conventional defence allows the US to refocus on deterring conflict with China. That’s where Australia comes in. A century of mateship is a lovely phrase – but that’s not why countries work together. Throughout our alliance, we haven’t agreed on everything, but it’s been rooted in shared strategic interests rather than purely shared values. Those interests are more aligned now than at any time since World War II, given China’s increasingly assertive stance. As for tariffs on Australian steel and aluminium, they’re unwelcome – even unreasonable – but they affect only a small fraction of our exports. This disagreement doesn’t equate to a shaky foundation in our overall defence relationship. The Australia-US alliance extends far beyond economic tiffs or even AUKUS – our plan to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. It supports vital intelligence-sharing and extended nuclear deterrence, critical as China rapidly expands its nuclear arsenal. North Korea has already demonstrated nuclear capabilities. When it comes to AUKUS, calls for a “Plan B” seem off-base. Contingency planning is prudent, of course, but there’s no evidence that AUKUS is going off track. Like any major defence acquisition, it’s complex, and the nuclear dimension adds to the challenge. It will not always go to plan. But the pertinent question isn’t “is it risky?” but “are we managing the risks effectively?” Critics highlight the US submarine industrial base as a weak link. True, America has struggled to meet production targets for Virginia-class subs, and broader shipbuilding delays persist. Yet Australia’s recent $800 million contribution aims to help strengthen that base. The US administration has also proposed an overhaul of maritime industries. Even if progress is slower than planned, there’s little indication that Australia won’t receive three Virginia-class submarines from 2032. All the attention on building two US attack submarines a year is really about meeting the goal of 59 submarines by 2054, not the rate itself . Access to Australian bases outside the range of many Chinese missiles may be the more critical determinant in any Indo-Pacific conflict. Additionally, there’s plenty in AUKUS for the US. Beyond funding and industrial support, having a robust ally in Australia and the geographical access that affords is pivotal to Washington’s strategic aims in the Pacific. If the current US administration is seen as more transactional, it only underscores Australia’s growing strategic value. We should affirm our importance in every discussion with Washington, ensuring mutual benefit remains clear. A final point often overlooked in “Plan B” debates is Australia’s own reliability as a defence partner. We’ve cancelled or scaled back several major projects in recent years – scrapping the French attack sub deal in 2021, reducing Hunter-class frigates, and halving the Arafura Offshore Patrol Vessel program . If we were to walk away from our most important defence project with our most important security partner – absent a major project failure – it would send a strong message that Australia can’t be counted on. That reputation would harm our ability to secure advanced capabilities in our most serious strategic circumstances since World War II. Continuously questioning our strategic foundations is wise, and planning for contingencies is part of good governance. But none of that implies the alliance is unstable or that AUKUS is doomed. So far, the evidence suggests both remain strong. As global stability erodes, a measure of stoicism will serve us better than alarmism. Healthy scepticism is prudent, but catastrophising every US move only casts doubt on our own reliability as an ally and capability partner.

27 February | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Sydney Morning Herald on 27 February 2025 Image: People’s Liberation Army-Navy cruiser Renhai in the Coral Sea. Defence Images. The Chinese naval task group’s deployment in our region is clearly aimed at sending a message and testing Australia’s responses – not only on the military front, but socially and politically. The worst misstep would be to overreact and hand China a propaganda win that could undermine Australia’s legitimate military activities in the South China Sea and North-East Asia. Australia has long thrived on the freedom and prosperity we’ve enjoyed since World War II. Our distance from Europe’s and the Middle East’s flashpoints made conflict seem remote. We’ve ingrained the notion that while our people fight in distant conflicts, the threat never reaches home. Yet the deployment of a Chinese naval task group off our east coast has exposed our vulnerabilities as a maritime nation reliant on trade. While this reality is felt acutely, our proper response is to invest in the ships, aircraft and submarines needed to safeguard our maritime interests – not to manufacture a crisis that undermines our societal resilience and political capacity to respond to genuine challenges. Australia isn’t on a major trade route or a transit point. Naval task groups rarely operate in our region – unless they’re visiting Australia – so a Chinese task group is especially notable. Deployed more than 8000 kilometres from China’s coast, this three-ship task group – including one of the world’s most advanced warships –  was clearly meant to send a message .   Under international law, China’s warships can operate on the high seas (beyond 200 nautical miles from our coast). They can also conduct exercises within Australia’s exclusive economic zone (up to 200 nautical miles from our coast). They can even operate in our territorial sea (within 12 nautical miles of our coast), provided their transit is continuous, expeditious and does not disrupt Australia’s good order. This isn’t legal semantics – it’s a fundamental aspect of the freedom of the seas that Australia regularly exercises through our naval deployments. While it may be surprising to see naval task groups conducting live-fire exercises in our region, warships – including Australia’s – regularly do so on long deployments for training, maintaining skills or myriad other reasons. This is simply what warships do. China’s gunnery firing took place on the high seas, about 640 kilometres (340 nautical miles) from our coast – the distance from Canberra to Melbourne. China is well within its rights to conduct such exercises without informing Australia or New Zealand. While no international law requires it, best practice from having undertaken many gunnery firings at sea is that warships maintain at least 18 kilometres (10 nautical miles) from known civilian air routes during live-fire exercises. Air Services Australia reported that 49 aircraft had to be diverted because of the Chinese warships’ firing exercise. Clearly, these warships were too close to these flight paths. This diversion is a nuisance, but aircraft are routinely diverted for various reasons, and there’s no evidence they were at risk. The Chinese warships’ radars would have continuously tracked the aircraft, ensuring they stopped the gunnery serial if the aircraft approached their safety zone – just as any responsible warship would. Warships should also issue warnings to civilian aircraft and vessels several hours in advance – and at regular intervals – during the exercise. It remains unclear how early Chinese warships issued this warning, but we know from Senate estimates that it was first heard by a Virgin Airlines aircraft 30 minutes after the warships began their drills. The Chinese warships’ close proximity to civilian air routes – and their apparent failure to provide timely warnings – deserves diplomatic rebuke. However, their presence and live-fire exercise on the high seas do not. The freedom of the seas is fundamental to our security as a maritime trading nation. Claims that China’s warships shouldn’t be operating in our exclusive economic zone or conducting live-fire exercises on the high seas undermines this principle, giving China a propaganda win to challenge our necessary deployments to North-East Asia and the South China Sea – routes that carry two-thirds of our maritime trade. This is not a crisis. Treating it as one – with over-the-top indignation – diminishes our capacity to tackle real crises as the region deteriorates. Moreover, since this deployment was meant to test us, it signals to China that we lack societal resilience and a genuine perspective on what is a threat. If the Chinese naval task group deployment is meant to signal that they can operate in our region, sustain a presence and threaten our critical sea supply lines, how should we respond to the vulnerability we’ve felt these past two weeks? We must respond by heeding the message – mitigating our vulnerabilities and investing in our maritime capability. At our most challenging strategic moment since World War II, our current  surface combatant  fleet is the smallest and oldest we’ve had since 1950.   Our warships have limited endurance at sea due to inadequate numbers of replenishment ships, and our ability to protect sea lanes from mines is also limited – to name but a few of our  challenges . We must address this and swiftly, and that means having a hard look at our defence spending.   At only 2 per cent of GDP, defence spending falls well short of our Cold War average of 2.7 per cent. It’s also time to ramp up our industrial capacity and engage in genuine discussions about societal and industrial mobilisation. That means, if we were to be in a conflict, how would we mobilise the civilian population to support our forces and home defence, and how would we mobilise industries to produce what we need to sustain the conflict? We must respond by enhancing our preparedness and military capability, not by handing China a propaganda victory that undermines our ability to tackle real crises and the fundamental principle of freedom of the seas. While conflict in our region isn’t inevitable, the threat is real and demands a measured response underpinned by preparedness, investment and partnerships. Warships have the right to freedom of navigation. Live gunnery firings are common. Overreaction and panic will only undermine our efforts.

23 February 2025 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review on 23 February 2025 Image: Defence Images From left - People’s Liberation Army-Navy Fuchi-class replenishment vessel Weishanhu, and Renhai-class cruiser Zunyi. To safeguard our vital interests at sea, we must demonstrate self-reliance within our alliances, and develop and resource a comprehensive maritime strategy. China now fields the world’s largest navy, and this week’s rare foray into our exclusive economic zone should be a wake-up call for Australians. Our most critical economic and security interests travel by sea, and in a rapidly deteriorating strategic environment, we can’t afford complacency . It’s time for Australia to step up as a genuine maritime power. Over the last decade, China has morphed from a modest coastal navy into a true blue-water force. In 2015, the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s battle force – submarines, surface combatants and aircraft carriers – stood at 255 vessels, according to the US Congressional Research Office. That figure has soared to 400 in 2025, with further growth on the horizon. The fleet’s quality has also jumped, with around 70 per cent of China’s current battle force built since 2010. Australia’s navy fields just 16 battle-force vessels – its smallest and oldest in decades. That includes six submarines aged 22 years to 29 years, seven ANZAC-class frigates (19 years to 27 years old), and three much newer Hobart-class destroyers that lack the firepower of true destroyers. While the government plans to grow the fleet to levels not seen in decades by the 2030s and 2040s, the current shortfall is compounded by dwindling support capabilities – like replenishment, hydrography and mine warfare – after decades of underinvestment by successive governments. Comparing ship counts alone may be crude, but it highlights China’s drive to become a true blue-water maritime power. Its rapid fleet expansion goes hand in hand with sweeping structural reforms, including the creation of a coast guard in 2013 – now the world’s largest maritime law enforcement outfit, boasting over 142 vessels. Among them is the so-called “monster ship”, Coast Guard 5901 – nearly four times the size of Australia’s ANZAC-class frigates, which form the backbone of our surface combatant fleet. T he growth and modernisation of China’s navy has gone hand-in-hand with an increasingly expeditionary strategy. Chinese naval deployments to the Indian and Pacific oceans are on the rise, marked by the establishment of a naval base in Djibouti in 2017 and increasingly common Pacific port visits, including stops in Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea as well as hospital ship deployments to the South Pacific. Against this backdrop, Australia shouldn’t be shocked to see a Chinese navy task group off our east coast. It’s rightly considered an uncommon occurrence, particularly since Australia’s east coast isn’t exactly on the way to anywhere – making it clear this was a deliberate show of capability. But we should expect it to become increasingly common. Why should Australia care about China’s growing naval and maritime power? Because our core vulnerabilities lie at sea. Some 99 per cent of our trade travels by ship, and 99 per cent of our data travelling to the rest of the world passes through undersea cables. But it’s not just about data and trade – it’s the critical goods that keep our economy running and ensure our security, from fuel and ammunition to pharmaceuticals and fertiliser. Cut off those supplies, and we cripple our economy and security – no fuel means grounded F-35s and idle trucks nationwide. In a crisis or conflict, an adversary wouldn’t need to invade our shores to bring Australia’s economy – and by extension, our defence – to its knees. All they’d have to do is cut off our critical seaborne supplies: fuel, fertiliser, ammunition, pharmaceuticals, and more. In a rapidly deteriorating strategic environment, Australia must be able to defend its maritime domain. Recognising this vulnerability means Australia must develop the capacity to protect critical seaborne supplies in a crisis. It demands focus, structural reform, speed and investment. The 2021 announcement of AUKUS (our nuclear-powered submarine pathway), the planned surface combatant fleet expansion, and the army’s move to adopt maritime strike are all crucial steps, but they aren’t enough – we must address the wider gaps in the fleet, and do it at speed. We must recognise that maritime capability isn’t just hardware – it’s also structure and mindset. We need to reform our civil maritime security, establish a coastguard to free the Royal Australian Navy from border policing, and adjust our legislative architecture to build a genuinely capable maritime strategic fleet. Australia shouldn’t – and can’t – hope to match China’s naval might. Our maritime strategy hinges on alliances and partnerships across the region, including deeper co-operation with partners like the United States, Japan, and India. Yet to safeguard our vital interests at sea, we must demonstrate self-reliance within our alliances – we must develop a comprehensive maritime strategy and resource it. China’s naval demonstration on Australia’s east coast should serve a reminder of our vulnerability, and a warning that addressing this vulnerability requires Australia to truly recognise its place as a maritime power – our future prosperity and security depend on it.

23 February 2025 | Jennifer Parker Image: Defence Images Royal Australian Navy sailors on HMAS Arunta keeping watch on People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) Fuchi-class replenishment vessel Weishanhu and Jiangkai-class frigate Hengyang in the Tasman Sea. Summary points: Chinese Task Group 107’s deployment to the Tasman Sea is a deliberate show of operational capability in the region, and Australia should head the message. Live firing exercises on the high seas are standard training practices permitted under international law. Australia does this on our deployments, and we should avoid over-reacting. It’s not aggressive, it’s just what warships do on the high seas. There is no legal obligation for foreign warships to notify coastal nations over 300 nautical miles away about live firing activities on the high seas. Best practices require maintaining safe distances from civilian flight paths, implementing defined safety traces, and issuing proper communications. While China’s manoeuvre underscores its blue-water capabilities, Australia should focus on addressing its naval capability gaps rather than overreacting to this event. An over-reaction hands China an unnecessary propaganda win next time Australia conducts live firings on the high seas while deployed, and may constrain our own training opportunities in the future. Over the weekend, media coverage  was dominated by reports of Chinese Task Group 107 stationed roughly 640 kilometres  (348 nautical miles) off Australia’s coast. China’s rare deployment to our region—without stopping in Australia or New Zealand and far removed from major maritime routes—appears to be a deliberate display of its capability to deploy and sustain operations here. While concerns about China’s expanding naval might, especially in the South China Sea and East Asia, are valid, Australia should keep this ‘live firing activity’ in perspective. Here’s why. Incident Overview On Thursday 13 February, the Australian government  announced that a Chinese naval task group—comprising a Jiangkai II frigate, a Renhai cruiser, and a tanker—was operating in the Coral Sea, with one of the vessels having transited the Torres Strait. Officials were quick to emphasize that the group was acting in accordance with international law. On 20 February, the Financial Times  reported the task group had turned south and was roughly 150 nautical miles (approximately 278 kilometres) from Sydney, roughly the distance from Canberra to Sydney. By Friday 21 February, it was about 640 kilometres  (approx. 345 nautical miles) off Eden (roughly the distance from Canberra to Melbourne), issuing radio warnings of an imminent live-fire exercise and reportedly adopting a ‘firing formation’—likely formation one, in which ships align in a straight column to deploy a target. The media reported that flights had to be diverted  and the Australian government initially expressed that they had not received the required warning. Maritime Law and Sovereign Rights Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea  (UNCLOS), which entered into force in 1994, coastal states may claim various maritime zones. Two zones are relevant here: the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Generally, a state’s territorial sea extends 12 nautical miles (approx. 22km) from its coastline, though overlaps can occur with other countries reducing this. Coastal states have the ability to regulate activities in territorial sea. Foreign ships, including warships have the right to transit through the territorial sea under the ‘ innocent passage’  regime, foreign ships may transit this zone without prior permission, as long as they do nothing to threaten the security of the coastal state and their passage is continuous and expeditious. In practical terms, warships retain the right of innocent passage but may not conduct live-fire exercises, or similar activities without the coastal state’s explicit approval. The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is the second maritime area of interest and has featured prominently in recent media coverage. Generally, the EEZ extends up to 200 nautical miles (Approx. 370 kilometres) from a state’s coast, unless it overlaps with another country’s zone. Within its EEZ, coastal states, including Australia exercise certain sovereign rights—particularly for resource management—but they do not enjoy full sovereignty. Crucially, foreign warships may operate within Australia’s EEZ so long as they do not interfere with its resource-related activities or infrastructure. Importantly, warships may conduct exercises, including gunnery drills, within the EEZ—a right Australia itself exercises. Beyond the EEZ (beyond 200 nautical miles) lie the high seas, where only limited restrictions on warships apply—most of which are not relevant here. Essentially, warships may conduct exercises, including gunnery drills, as long as they do not interfere with others’ lawful use of the sea or airspace. The Routine of Live-Firing Exercises The key point is that these live firing gunnery drills happen routinely. Australian ships, for example, perform live firing during deployments commonly to train crews and maintain proficiency with their gunnery systems. For the Chinese task group, these guns range from medium-range guns—like the 130 mm (5-inch) gun on China’s Renhai cruiser or the 76 mm gun on the Jiangkai II—to close-in weapon systems, 12.7 mm guns, and small arms. Importantly, warships have the right to undertake these routine drills on the high seas. Best Practices for Gunnery Drills Safety Protocols and Monitoring Procedures vary by country, but from my experience conducting medium-range gunnery exercises in two different navies, each commanding officer is responsible for safe execution. This typically involves both visual and radar monitoring of a defined ‘safety trace,’ whose range and altitude depend on the weapon system and the Navy in question's safety rules. For a 130 mm (5 inch) gun like the Renhai’s, for instance, the weapon’s maximum range of about 23 km (12.5 nautical miles) might be extended by a 2,000-yard safety buffer, plus a 4,000-yard corridor on either side, up to around 37,000 feet to generate a safety trace. The height of the safety trace will be dependant on the weapon and the range of the target they are firing at. These figures are merely illustrative; each navy applies its own safety rules. Civilian airliners typically cruise at around 35,000 feet—a range that can overlap with a warship's safety trace. This underscores the importance of planning to ensure that vessels maintain a safe distance from established civilian flight routes. Maintaining Distance from Civilian Flight Routes When planning a gunnery exercise, best practice is for ships to conduct it away from known civilian flight paths. The exact distance varies by national regulations, but for a medium-calibre weapon, a 10-nautical-mile buffer was standard for medium range guns in my own gunnery days. Although the details remain unclear, indications from flight diversions suggest that the Chinese warships may have been too close to civilian air transit routes. If this is the case, it represents poor practice that warrants diplomatic discussion. Effective Communications and Notifications Before commencing live firings, warships should transmit a secure message on the designated VHF channel for surface ships and the aviation guard circuit. The aviation guard circuit—set at 121.5 MHz for civilian use (International Air Distress or VHF Guard)—is reserved exclusively for distress communications and is actively monitored by air traffic control and related agencies. Ships will also fly Flag Bravo—a red-dovetail flag—to signal to nearby vessels and aircraft that live firing is in progress. Prior to live firing, a warning should be broadcast to alert nearby aircraft, with periodic updates during the exercise. According to the Defence Minister , the Chinese warships did issue such notifications. The timing of these alerts depend on a Navy’s procedures, but issuing them a few hours in advance is generally prudent. It should be noted that there is no requirement to notify a country 345 nautical miles away about such live firing. While Australian ships inform air services 48 hours in advance—who produce a Notice to Airmen NOTAM)—when exercising in domestic waters, no such mandate applies to foreign vessels operating on the high seas. Conclusion: Focusing on Capabilities Warships routinely conduct live firing exercises on the high seas to maintain training and operational readiness. The Chinese task group’s recent manoeuvres occurred well outside Australia’s EEZ—approximately 640 km (345 nautical miles) from the coast. While there is some evidence that these firings may have encroached on civilian flight routes, details remain unclear; if confirmed, interference with civilian air traffic would merit diplomatic discussion. Importantly, there is no requirement for foreign vessels on the high seas to notify a nation 345 nautical miles away of their activities. Australia should indeed be concerned about China’s demonstrated capability to deploy and sustain a task group in the Tasman Sea. However, rather than overreacting to actions that align with international law and standard gunnery practices—thus providing additional propaganda fodder for Beijing—we must focus on what this blue-water capability means for our own maritime security. It is time to seriously invest in and address the evident capability gaps in our navy.

13 February | Jennifer Parker * Originally published in ASPI's The Strategist on 12 February 2025 Image of HMAS Hobart: Daniel Goodman/Department of Defence . Attack missile boats are no substitutes for the Royal Australian Navy’s major warships, contrary to the contention of a 4 February 2025 Strategist article . The ships are much more survivable than attack boats and can perform long-range operations that small vessels cannot. In the article, the author argues, for example, that a single missile hit could cripple a billion-dollar warship. In fact, this is highly unlikely. The planning for the number, type and direction of travel of missiles needed to successfully engage a warship is a tactical art. The calculations are classified, but the Salvo Equation is an unclassified means of understanding how many missiles must be fired to damage a major warship, such as a destroyer or frigate. The number is greater than most people assume. The debate on warship survivability isn’t new, and it remains paper-thin. Warships are designed to float, move and fight. As the RAN’s Sea Power Centre describes , they are survivable ‘through layered defence systems, signature management, structural robustness and system redundancy’. Just because a missile is fired doesn’t mean it will strike, and even a strike doesn’t ensure the ship is disabled. It’s true that threats to warships close to coasts have increased, and the proliferation of uncrewed aerial vehicle, uncrewed surface vessels and anti-ship missiles has made operations more complex. However, as offensive threats evolve, so do defensive capabilities, tactics and procedures. This is the dance of naval warfare. To bolster the flawed claim that warships are ‘increasingly vulnerable in modern conflicts’, the article points to the 42-year-old, poorly maintained Russian cruiser Moskva , which Ukraine sank in the Black Sea in 2022, as a ‘most advanced warship’. Yet far more modern US, British and French warships have repelled more than 400 Houthi missile attacks in the Red Sea since 2023 without sustaining damage. Fourteen months of Red Sea operations show that well-armed warships with trained crews are highly effective. The article conflates strategy with concepts, saying ‘the urgency of shifting Australia’s naval strategy to distributed lethality cannot be overstated’. Think of a naval strategy as the big-picture plan for what a nation aims to achieve at sea with its naval capability (as opposed to maritime), while a naval concept is the theoretical framework that explains how its navy might actually fight and operate to achieve those goals. ‘Distributed lethality’ fits within the established concept of Distributed Maritime Operations , which isn’t about any particular category of vessel, large or small; it’s a way of fighting that emphasises massed effects through robust, networked communications that allow for dispersal of maritime units. At its core, it’s a network-centric, not platform-centric, concept—as applicable to a fleet of frigates and destroyers as to smaller craft. It’s a concept the RAN, at least in theory, has already embraced. In a 2024 speech on Distributed Maritime Operations, Fleet Commander Rear Admiral Chris Smith said ‘distribution as a core concept of our operations … seeks to manage a defensive problem while seizing an offensive opportunity’. Australian naval strategy: reach and balance In advocating for a shift towards attack boats, the article dismisses their limited range and endurance as problems that are easily fixed. They are not: range and endurance are fundamental to Australia’s naval strategy and central to the concept of reach. At its core, reach is the requirement for a maritime power to be able to protect its vital interests at range from its territory. As an island nation dependent on long sea lines of communication for essential seaborne supply—from fuel to fertiliser, ammunition and pharmaceuticals—Australia needs an ability to protect critical imports and exports. Doing that requires the combination of sensors and weapons that cannot fit into an attack boat: heavy and bulky towed-array sonars, large radars mounted high, long-range air-and-missile defence systems, and helicopters for hunting submarines. Acceptance that Australia’s vital interests at sea are far from its coast is inherent in the roles ascribed in Australia’s National Defence Strategy . They include power projection, such as the capabilities of the Australian Army’s new amphibious fleet, which require protection that attack boats can’t provide. Limited endurance and operational range are deficiencies that cannot be mitigated by basing in northern Australia, as the article suggests. Territorial force posture such as northern operating bases cannot transform coastal green-water naval assets such as attack boats into the open ocean blue-water capability Australia requires. Another key strategic requirement for Australia is having a balanced fleet, anchored by larger destroyers and frigates. The essence of the idea of a balanced fleet is that a smaller fleet of ships must operate across the spectrum of maritime tasks. Attack boats cannot fight effectively in all three spheres of maritime warfare: surface, air and sub-surface. While they may complement frigates and destroyers where the budget allows, they are unsuitable to form the backbone of Australia’s fleet. The call for such vessels falls into the common trap of thinking that modern naval warfare is simply about missile capability. But what is needed to constitute a balanced fleet is a mix of capabilities that can be brought together only in a frigate or larger ship. This debate is an opportunity to highlight a crucial issue often overlooked in Australian strategic thought. The country needs a naval strategy with genuine reach and a balanced fleet, capabilities that simply can’t be met by a force built around attack boats.