Military Coercion is on the Rise and Australia is Vulnerable
- Jennifer Parker
- 5 hours ago
- 4 min read
Jennifer Parker | 30 November 2025
We have forgotten what it feels like to face the visceral prospect of attack. Countries that cannot resist coercion will struggle to defend their interests.
Image: A Royal Australian Air Force F/A-18F Super Hornet aircraft conducts an aerial display as part of the RAAF Richmond Air Show 2025. Defence Images.
Rumours suggest another Chinese naval task group may be heading towards Australia. While such a deployment poses no direct threat and warships are entitled under international law to operate in international waters, it inevitably recalls the Chinese task group that circumnavigated Australia in March. That voyage, while overblown by some, was a deliberate show of maritime coercion in a shifting strategic environment.
China’s growing aggression in the Indo-Pacific, along with Russia’s assault on Ukraine and the war in the Middle East, have made one thing clear: military force has returned as a normal tool of coercion. For Australia, the question is how we reduce our vulnerability to military coercion, and that conversation begins with defence spending.
Despite recent small funding boosts, Australia still lacks the capabilities needed to safeguard our national interests in a far more contested world. We cannot guarantee the security of our own ports because we lack modern mine-detection systems; our land-based missile-interception capability is close to symbolic; and we have almost no sovereign space assets to support defence operations. Yet in a period of mounting global instability, we are asking military aircraft to fly less and our ships to spend less time at sea simply to stay within budget. The reality is unavoidable: our resourcing does not align with our strategy, or with the threats our own leaders continue to highlight.
It is never easy to discuss the prospect of conflict, or even a major military crisis short of it. While we honour sacrifice on Remembrance Day and Anzac Day, we have understandably forgotten what it feels like to face the visceral prospect of attack: the fear felt in Darwin in February 1942, in Katherine a month later, or in Sydney when midget submarines entered the harbour in May of that same year.
This is not to suggest Australia is on the brink of attack; it is not. Rather, it highlights that we have lived in relative peace since 1945 and those memories have receded. Yet these are the circumstances our political leaders evoke when they say we face “the most challenging strategic circumstances since World War II”.
Aggressive harassment increasing
States increasingly use military coercion to solve their problems. Countries that cannot resist coercion will struggle to defend their interests and way of life. Australia is already experiencing degrees of military coercion.
Take the South China Sea. Two-thirds of Australia’s maritime trade passes through it. As an island nation utterly dependent on maritime trade, the South China Sea is fundamental to our security and prosperity. Australia has operated there consistently since the end of World War II.
“We still lack a range of key capabilities that are essential to reducing the impact of military coercion and, in the worst case, responding to conflict.”
Yet with China’s growing military power, our ADF women and men have faced increasingly aggressive harassment in international waters and airspace. The most recent example in October this year involved a Chinese fighter aircraft releasing flares close to an Australian patrol aircraft, which could have disabled its engine and caused loss of life.
This is military coercion: an attempt to pressure Australia not to operate freely in international airspace.
The circumnavigation of Australia by a Chinese naval task group of three ships fits into the same category. It was not on the way to anywhere, it offered no scientific value, and China’s maritime trade does not depend on the Southern Ocean. It was a demonstration of capability and a show of force we will see again.
But make no mistake, it is a form of military coercion. As I wrote at the time, Australia did not need to be alarmed and should temper its response, but we must be alert and ready to respond to a changing world.
While there are many steps Australia must take to prepare for this change, one point is fundamental: to withstand military coercion we must have the military capability to deter it where possible or to respond if it cannot be prevented.
The recent Lowy Poll found 51 per cent of Australians support higher defence spending.
Although the Albanese government has announced major plans for new submarines, new surface ships and an expanded missile inventory, we still lack a range of key capabilities that are essential to reducing the impact of military coercion and, in the worst case, responding to conflict.
We are trying to meet a rapidly changing strategic environment on a lean budget, spending about 2 per cent of GDP on defence. In the Cold War it was around 2.7 per cent; in the 1950s, about 3 per cent.
In nominal terms we are spending more, but as a share of the economy it is significantly less. As a result, we cannot afford many of the critical capabilities needed to protect ourselves from the increasing trends of military coercion and conflict.
Australia must recognise how quickly the world is changing and act accordingly. Modest increases to defence spending will not bridge the gap between our strategic ambitions and the capabilities we can field.
The government’s plan to reach 2.3 per cent of GDP by 2033-34 does not match the pace or scale of the strategic deterioration we face. If we are serious about resisting coercion and protecting our national interests, defence funding must rise beyond that level, and soon. Delay only heightens our vulnerability to military coercion.