The Indian Ocean is no longer secondary
- Jennifer Parker
- 2 days ago
- 5 min read
22 May 2026 | Jennifer Parker & Dr Troy-Lee Brown
The Iran war is again exposing a reality Australia has long overlooked: the Indian Ocean sits at the centre of the nation’s economic and strategic security.
Image: United States forces prepare to board an oil tanker in the Indian Ocean in early February 2026 after the vessel violated a U.S. embargo of sanctioned ships in the Caribbean. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF WAR
Key takeaways
Australia’s economic and national security are deeply tied to the Indian Ocean.
Western Australia’s ports, energy infrastructure and subsea cables are critical national assets, but remain lightly protected.
Competition in the Indian Ocean is growing through naval presence, China’s infrastructure investment across the region, and undersea activity.
Australia’s growing focus on the Indian Ocean will require a clearer strategy and stronger maritime posture.
The Iran war is again exposing a reality Australia has long overlooked: the Indian Ocean sits at the centre of the nation’s economic and strategic security.
For decades, Australian strategy has been dominated by a Pacific outlook. Much of the nation’s defence infrastructure, force posture and strategic thinking developed along the east coast and looked towards the Pacific. Yet Australia’s security and prosperity have always depended on the Indian Ocean.
The region carries critical sea lines of communication linking Australia to fuel, trade, and global markets. Much of the nation’s prosperity is tied to Western Australian ports, from Port Hedland, Australia’s largest bulk export port, to Fremantle, a critical gateway for container trade and maritime logistics. Together with major energy export hubs such as Karratha, these ports underpin not only Australia’s economy, but increasingly its national security.
Much of the nation’s prosperity is tied to Western Australian ports… these ports underpin not only Australia’s economy, but increasingly its national security.
The Indian Ocean: An increasingly contested region
The Indian Ocean is no longer a secondary theatre. China has steadily expanded its presence across the region through port investments, dual-use infrastructure, and growing undersea surveying activity. At the same time, the Iran war has again shown how quickly instability in the Indian Ocean can disrupt shipping, energy supplies, and maritime trade far beyond the Middle East.
The sinking of the Iranian warship Dena by a US submarine off Sri Lanka in March this year, reportedly along key maritime routes to China, was a visceral reminder that the Indian Ocean can no longer be viewed as strategically benign.
Persistent vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean
Australia is increasing its presence, capability and partnerships in the Indian Ocean. AUKUS, Australia’s rapidly expanding defence relationship with India, and its growing engagement across Indian Ocean states all reflect this shift. Australia’s defence relationship with India has shifted significantly over the past decade, while Australia’s Defence Cooperation Program has also expanded into the Indian Ocean, including the delivery of an Australian-funded Guardian class patrol boat to the Maldives earlier this year.
These developments reflect a growing recognition that Australia’s strategic interests extend well into the Indian Ocean. Australia has pivoted towards the Indian Ocean before, from the establishment of HMAS Stirling in 1978 to the formalisation of its two-ocean strategy in the 1987 Defence White Paper. Yet the importance of the Indian Ocean continues to slip from Australia’s broader strategic debate.
While Australia is increasingly focused on its dependence on, and access to, the Indian Ocean, significant vulnerabilities remain. Australia still has limited capacity to protect critical ports and infrastructure in the northwest, particularly in areas such as mine warfare, port protection, and maritime security operations.
Maritime competition and domain awareness
Strategic competition is reshaping the ways in which power is exercised in the Indian Ocean. From a more persistent naval presence to expanding economic and security relationships, regional dynamics are shifting rapidly. China, in particular, has expanded its investment and influence across Indian Ocean littoral and island states as it seeks to secure access to critical maritime trade routes.
Over the past decade, an increase in Chinese ‘scientific research’ vessels has coincided with a greater presence of PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) surface and potentially subsurface vessels.
These changing dynamics underline the growing importance of achieving a clearer picture of what is going on in the Indian Ocean through improved maritime and undersea domain awareness.
Subsea infrastructure and maritime vulnerability
The strategic significance of the Indian Ocean is not just the maritime trade routes linking Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Oceania. It also lies in the dense network of undersea fibre-optic cables that keep our economy online and powered. Perth has emerged as Australia’s major subsea cable hub. At the same time, systems such as the North West Cable System linking Darwin and Port Hedland underpin connectivity for Australia’s critical resources and energy sectors.
These vital connectivity links sit alongside key ports in northwest Western Australia that are critical to the economy, yet remain lightly protected, with few maritime assets permanently based in the region. This also raises a broader question about how much visibility Australia really has across its western maritime approaches and beneath the sea in the Indian Ocean.
We have already seen the impact of contested maritime domains and the growing accessibility of technologies capable of threatening shipping and maritime infrastructure.
From the Black Sea to the Middle East, low-cost mines and uncrewed systems have shown that you do not need a large navy to cause significant disruption. Attacks on shipping, or even the suggestion of maritime threats, can send insurance premiums soaring, reroute shipping and disrupt global trade. The consequences for Australia would be significant if uncrewed underwater vehicles targeted the North West Cable System or if it was suggested that sea mines had been deployed near Port Hedland.
Australia’s Indian Ocean shipbuilding and sustainment hub
A significant increase in investment in critical Defence-related infrastructure has positioned Western Australia to play a greater strategic role, especially in the maritime domain.
Infrastructure on HMAS Stirling was already undergoing extensive upgrades prior to the AUKUS announcement.
In addition, the Australian Maritime Complex at Henderson is also being transformed, reflecting the growth of the defence industry – now set to become WA’s second largest industry after resources. In 2025, Austal and the Commonwealth signed a 15-year Strategic Shipbuilding Agreement that will see the long-time Henderson-based shipbuilder construct general purpose Mogami frigates for Navy and Landing Craft Medium and Landing Craft Heavy for Army.
The uplift in maritime infrastructure positions Perth to play a broader role as Australia’s Indian Ocean gateway for sustainment, logistics, and the development of surface and undersea capabilities across the region.
The uplift in maritime infrastructure positions Perth to play a broader role as Australia’s Indian Ocean gateway for sustainment, logistics, and the development of surface and undersea capabilities across the region.
Australia’s incomplete Indian Ocean pivot
In many ways, Australia’s Indian Ocean pivot is only half complete. Nearly 40 years after the two-ocean navy strategy was introduced, it is time to think more seriously about what an Indian Ocean strategy requires.
Australia has built a far larger footprint in the west through infrastructure, capability investment, and partnerships. But significant gaps remain. Northwest Western Australia is critical to the nation’s economy, yet still has limited protection and domain awareness. As the Indian Ocean becomes more contested, Australia needs a clearer strategy for the region and a maritime posture that reflects the region’s growing strategic importance.
