9 December | Jennifer Paker *Originally published in the Sydney Morning Herald on 9 December 2025 Image: AUSMIN 2025 (Secretary of State Marco Rubio X Post ) Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles and Foreign Minister Penny Wong are visiting Washington this week for the 35th Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations, known as AUSMIN. This year’s AUSMIN will be markedly different to those of previous years. It is the first under the current Trump administration and comes amid a strategic environment that has shifted sharply in just 12 months. Australia should use this AUSMIN to set clearer expectations with the US about our respective roles in an increasingly contested region and to advance the essential conversation on how responsibilities would be divided in the event of conflict. The past three AUSMIN meetings have been successful, locking in expanded force posture initiatives and demonstrating a shared commitment to the rules-based order. Marles and Wong have been able to advance Australia’s interests while signalling alignment with the US on regional challenges. This AUSMIN is different. The US has deployed its largest force presence in the Caribbean in decades , raising questions about the legality of operations against drug-trafficking vessels and whether such actions comply with the law of armed conflict. That makes the usual language on upholding international norms harder to sustain. It also comes just days after the Trump administration released a new National Security Strategy that appears to view Australia differently. Under the Biden administration, Australia appeared to hold a more prominent place in US thinking on the Indo-Pacific, reflected in repeated senior-level visits, AUKUS progress and expanded force posture arrangements. Yet in last week’s US National Security Strategy, Australia is mentioned only three times: once in reference to India and the Quad; again in a call for partners to adopt trade policies that “rebalance China’s economy”; and, oddly grouped with Taiwan, in a line stating that the US will maintain its “determined rhetoric on increased defence spending”. None of this suggests the relationship is in poor shape. It is strong. The October meeting between Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and President Donald Trump was broadly successful, with Trump reaffirming his support for the alliance, praising Australia’s defence initiatives, including progress at the Henderson shipyard in Western Australia , and backing AUKUS “full steam ahead”. Confidence has also been reinforced by reports that the US review of AUKUS has produced positive findings that endorse the pact and identify ways to strengthen it. What these developments signal is that the relationship must now be approached differently. If the US National Security Strategy is any indication, at AUSMIN 2025 the US will place pressure on Australia’s defence spending and on what we are doing to strengthen our own capability. Marles will have several initiatives to point to, including last Friday’s announcement that Australia will begin manufacturing the guided multiple launch rocket system this month, a precision ground-launched rocket that can strike targets more than 70 kilometres away. But we will need to do more, not because the US tells us to, but because more is required to defend our own national interests in an increasingly dangerous world. The modest increases already announced will take Australian spending from about 2 per cent of GDP to 2.3 per cent by 2033-34. These will cover nuclear-powered submarines and new frigates but little else. Australia lacks many of the capabilities needed for modern conflict and to reduce our vulnerability to military coercion, at precisely the moment our strategic guidance warns that such a conflict is becoming more likely . If the US National Security Strategy is any guide, Australia is also likely to face pressure over its trade dependence on China and aspects of that broader relationship. The more important question for this AUSMIN is not where the US may apply pressure, but how Australia chooses to think about the relationship and what messages we want to send. Since the end of the Cold War, and almost certainly without intending to, Australia has become increasingly dependent on the US for security. Decades of constrained defence spending and limited strategic ambition reflect this trend. The alliance remains vital, but in an unpredictable strategic environment, Australia must think carefully about how it protects its own autonomy while working with an ally that appears less driven by shared history and values than in the past. As I wrote in this masthead in August , Australia needs a frank conversation with the US about roles and responsibilities, including the geographic delineation of missions in the region. I asked then who is responsible for defending Australia and its regional interests and noted that our strategy does not provide a clear answer. It should be Australia, supported by the US. That requires a direct conversation with Washington and a reassessment of our own strategy and force design. AUSMIN 2025 is the moment to begin outlining those responsibilities. The Australia-US alliance remains central to our security, but the message from Washington is unmistakable. Australia will be expected to shoulder more of its own defence burden, and we should embrace that shift. Meeting this moment requires more than higher spending. It demands clarity about the kind of relationship we want with the US and the confidence to define where Australia must lead. AUSMIN ’25 is the time to draw those lines and to shape an alliance that strengthens and complements, rather than substitutes for, Australia’s own strategic weight.

8 December 2023 | J Parker * Originally published in The Strategist on 8 Dec 23 Image: Department of Defence . ‘This is Australia’s most challenging strategic environment since the Second World War. And looking back to the lead-up to the Second World War provides important lessons about the need to invest in defence.’ Minister for Defence Industry Pat Conroy, National Press Club address , 28 November 2023 Last month, Minister for Defence Industry Pat Conroy took to the stage at the National Press Club to address concerns that Australia’s planned acquisition of nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines under the AUKUS arrangement lacked a social licence. Defending the $368 billion acquisition, Conroy outlined the challenging strategic circumstances Australia now faces. The situation had deteriorated further since the release of the defence strategic review in April 2023, he noted, with war in the Middle East and increasingly unsafe actions of Chinese military aircraft and warships in the South China Sea and Northeast Asia. Despite the geographical realities that are driving Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, many argue that the government lacks public support for such a significant acquisition. That is borne out in the latest United States Studies Centre poll , which indicates that only 49% of Australians support acquiring these submarines. The eye-watering cost hasn’t won the plan many friends in a country experiencing a cost-of-living crisis. With this background firmly established, Conroy gave a commendable defence of the acquisition highlighting the tactical, operational and strategic realities that justify this bold capability direction. The address seemed on point and on the rails until journalist Kym Bergman asked about defence funding. When I asked Defence Minister Richard Marles the same question in September at the ASPI conference, he responded that ‘strategy without money is just hot air’. Bergman noted that ASPI’s budget analysis, The big squeeze , released on 29 May, said core funding for the Defence Department had been reduced at a time when unprecedented demands were being placed on it. ‘Between 2023–24 and 2025–26, defence funding drops from $154 billion to $152.5 billion,’ Bergman said. The minister rejected the assertion, saying: ‘ASPI were picking and choosing between what parts they counted and what parts they didn’t count. I urge you to look at the defence papers. Every year the defence funding goes up.’ His response highlighted the greatest single risk to Australia’s defence: the ‘squeezing’ of the defence budget. The issue that became readily apparent in that response is that the government is still not ready to admit that the defence budget is under extreme pressure at a time when Conroy had stated that investment is needed. Budgets are not a matter of interpretation, or perception; they are simply a matter of numbers and maths. As part of the process of making the numbers work, Defence is compensated for fluctuations in the exchange rate and is forecast to receive $4 billion in compensation over the next three years. This is, of course, not real money; it simply acknowledges the fact that Defence pays more for capabilities when the Australian dollar is low. When you remove the compensation for foreign exchange fluctuations, the real funding of Defence becomes clear. In the March 2022 budget forecast, Defence core funding was predicted to be $154.0 billion for the next three financial years. The budget delivered in May 2023 forecasts $156.5 billion for Defence over the same period. That’s an increase, yes—but it’s not a real increase. When you remove the $4 billion compensation for exchange rate fluctuations, Defence receives $152.5 billion dollars across the next three years. This is a reduction of $1.5 billion for the defence budget over the next three years compared with last year’s forecast. That was highlighted in ASPI’s defence budget brief and confirmed by Defence’s chief financial officer, Steven Groves, in Senate estimates on 30 May. This reduction in forecast defence spending is a matter of public record. The pain of the reduction in budget forecasts of Defence’s core funding is further exacerbated by the doubling of inflation eroding the purchasing power of the defence budget. All of this is happening as additional requirements from the DSR and AUKUS initiatives are squeezed into the budget. The government has forecast an increase in defence spending between 2027–28 and 2032–33 of $30.5 billion, with Treasury indicating a growth in defence spending as a percentage of GDP from 2.05% to 2.30% over the same time. But with wars in Europe and the Middle East, and with the chances of a miscalculation in the South China Sea increasing daily, we must ask ourselves as a nation whether we can wait until 2027–28 for defence funding relief. In May, my co-authors and I wrote in ASPI’s defence budget brief: ‘The strategic context for the 2023–24 defence budget is complex and extremely challenging. There’s currently a gap, and quite a significant one, between the rhetoric of the 2023 DSR and the 2023–24 defence budget (and forward estimates).’ This remains as accurate today as it was in May. Denying the simple fact that the defence budget is under pressure does little to assist the conversation about the stark strategic circumstances we find ourselves in. In the end, it’s just maths.

April 12, 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist on 12 April 2024 Image: Hunter-class frigate: BAE Systems. Almost a year ago, the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) set homework for the Department of Defence, including reprioritising the country’s rolling plan for military capability spending, the Integrated Investment Program (IIP). That update is now nearly due.   But we should not assume that the government can address defence funding problems by shifting funds between projects in a spending plan that is already overburdened.  There’s a widespread view in the public that Defence wastes money, a view reinforced in recent years by critical Australian National Audit Office reports detailing cost increases for many Australian Defence Force projects. The Hunter frigate program is a well-known example, with the Government citing the $20 billion cost increase as one reason for cutting the project from nine to six frigates.  This leads to false assumptions that better fiscal responsibility and prioritisation will free up pots of gold within the IIP. It doesn’t help that the IIP is poorly understood and that Defence engages little in public discourse, whether to justify skyrocketing costs, debunk myths around capability acquisition or highlight its on-budget delivery of most projects.  Created in response to a recommendation of the 2015 First Principles Review, the IIP outlines Defence’s funding lines for capability acquisition and sustainment for the coming 20 years.  Only two public versions have been released, one in 2016 and one in the 2020 Force Structure Plan (FSP), leaving a public impression that the IIP remains fixed for long intervals. In fact, it is a classified living document, updated twice a year. The updates include reprioritisation.  The DSR highlighted the deterioration of Australia’s strategic circumstances, including the ‘the prospect of major conflict in the region that directly threatens our national interest’. Accordingly, it called for a highly integrated, enhanced-lethality ADF.  To achieve this, parts of the ADF need to be reshaped, new capabilities must be acquired and some that already in planning need to be accelerated. The DSR gave some indication of those changes, but the vast majority have been left as homework for the department. The first instalment of the biennial National Defence Strategy (NDS), to be issued with the IIP update, will hopefully reveal more details.  While many of the DSR’s recommendations were welcome, the handbrake on its success was the government’s position that the review’s changes of approximately $19 billion must be cost-neutral within the forward estimates—from 2023-24 to 2026-27.   Although the recently announced replacement and expansion of the Royal Australian Navy’s surface combatant fleet is expected to come with a $1.7 billion uplift in the forward estimates, this doesn’t address the broader requirements of the DSR or NDS. Fiscal relief for the defence budget is not due until 2027-28, with an uplift of $30 billion to be provided from then until 2032-33.  A cost-neutral DSR implied some combination of two things: some of the announcements were at least partly factored into the IIP already, and some projects in it would need to be cancelled or amended. Indeed, some cancellations and amendments were made public when the DSR was released, but many were not.  The DSR made plain that the IIP was under significant pressure. Unfunded announcements had been pushed into it since the 2020 FSP without going through the prioritisation process.  The 2016 white paper recommended that the IIP carry 20 percent overprogramming, meaning that for each year the programmed spending would be a fifth higher than available funding. That was based on the historical observation that there will always be some projects that slip. It’s a sound budgeting mechanism, but the DSR revealed that the IIP was actually carrying 24 percent overprogramming. And changes called for in the DSR have probably added to that.  To address the funding pressure, the DSR recommended that ‘lower-priority projects’ should be stopped or suspended and that ‘funding should be released by the rebuild and reprioritisation of the IIP’.  While reprioritisation within the IIP makes sense in our changing strategic circumstances, the problem is that it has been the go-to bucket of money for some time. The Defence funding envelope was set in the 2016 white paper, so almost every capability change since then has resulted in reshuffling of existing IIP funds. In the last couple of years, such initiatives as the Australian Signals Directorate’s uplift of $11.5 billion for the Redspice program and the $38 billion investment in Defence workforce growth have wreaked havoc on the IIP, resulting in the cancellation, reshaping or shaving of projects.  The likely result is that, despite the DSR’s recommendation to generate additional capability funding through removing the IIP’s low-hanging fruit, it is unlikely that there is any low-hanging fruit left. Considering the IIP pressure described in the DSR and the need to fund such efforts as Redspice and Defence workforce growth, the overall acquisition and sustainment program is clearly at significant risk.  Defence Minister Richard Marles has already signalled that the IIP to be released in coming weeks will show significant cuts to projects.  While talk of reprioritisation and greater fiscal responsibility is easy to sell to a public that’s unfamiliar with the IIP, repeated pillaging of what has likely become a bare bones capability program is risky in a time where our strategic reviews say we should be strengthening preparedness.  We must not imagine that there is a pot of gold at the end of the IIP rainbow. Defending the country simply demands a real uplift of funds, and Defence needs to explain publicly why this matters, otherwise we will be piling more risk onto the capability program at one of our greatest times of need in nearly 70 years.

April 18, 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review 17 April 2024 We need to move towards a wider conversation around national security, mobilisation, and be clear on the vulnerability in our capabilities until the late 2030s. Image: Defence Minister Richard Marles at the National Press Club of Australia in Canberra discussing the first National Defense Strategy and attendant Integrated Investment Program 17 April 2024. The launch of the National Defence Strategy and integrated investment program 12 months on from the Defence Strategic Review hits all the key themes. In many ways, the 2024 National Defence Strategy represents where Australia needed to be in 2020, unlike the Force Structure Plan it does seek to focus the Australian Defence Force and provides funding to support the necessary changes including acceleration of capabilities. Analysts will pull apart the capability and funding aspects over the coming days. At face value, the National Defence Strategy achieves the defence and strategy elements of what it says on the tin, but there are three fundamental issues at the national level. The evolution of warfare and interference short of warfare in the political, economic, cyber and information spheres demonstrates that to defend Australia’s national interests beyond coercion, we must go beyond a defence strategy, and move towards a national security strategy. Conflicts in Europe, the Middle East and our own experience with economic coercion and cyberattacks demonstrate that we need to be able to co-ordinate all elements of national power to affect a strategy of deterrence by denial. This is not only a nice to have, it is a must as we see countries such as China undertaking what in many instances could be considered, political, economic, information and cyber warfare that directly impinge on Australia’s national interests. The National Defence Strategy also avoids the use of the term mobilisation. Confining the issue of preparedness, to purely a military sense. The 2020 Force Structure Plan and the terms of reference for the Defence Strategic Review highlighted the need for mobilisation to be considered. Not only mobilisation of the Australian Defence Force, but more broadly a discussion of national mobilisation. Are we putting the architecture, mechanisms and processes in place to be in a position to mobilise all necessary elements of Australian society should the increasing strategic risk be realised? The National Defence Strategy, much like the public-facing Defence Strategic Review is glaringly quiet on these points. The third and perhaps most stark issue with the National Defence Strategy and its associated integrated investment program is the period of risk from now until the late 2020s to early 2030s. The government is entirely correct in its assertion that it is seeking to reshape the Australian Defence Force into a more lethal, agile force tailored towards a strategy of deterrence by denial. But the key elements of this force, whether it be ships, submarines or the underlying infrastructure will not be in place for some time. In some ways, at the point in which Australia finds itself, this may be unavoidable, as previously mentioned, many of the elements of the National Defence Strategy would have been perfectly appropriate for 2020. This is a quandary not of the government’s making, it is a clear result of the negligence of successive governments and, at times, a disinterested public, but it is a vulnerability that we must now acknowledge and work hard to utilise Australia’s other elements of national power to mitigate. Despite these significant issues, there is much to like about the National Defence Strategy on face value and its associated integrated investment program from a defence perspective. It builds upon the Defence Strategic Review and announcements relating to the AUKUS submarine optimal pathway and surface combatant fleet expansion. In many ways, it seeks to deliver an enhanced, and more lethal, Australian Defence Force to respond to the deteriorating strategic circumstances. It is supported by additional funds, $5.7 billion in the forward estimates and predictions of $50 billion over the next 10 years, addressing the criticism that the Defence Strategic Review recommendations lacked funding. Fleshing out the Defence Strategic Review’s recommendation of a strategy of deterrence by denial, the National Defence Strategy seeks to bolster this approach. Highlighting that to protect Australia’s national interests from coercion in a dramatically deteriorating global order, the Australian Defence Force needs power projection capabilities including long-range strike, cyber and maritime capabilities which the integrated investment program supports with significant investment over the next 10 years. What is not exactly clear, is the full spectrum of projects that have been cut. What is not exactly clear, is the full spectrum of projects that have been cut, delayed or rescoped to support the prioritised integrated investment program. Many of the cuts announced today were announced in the Defence Strategic Review. Navy’s future joint support ship has been cancelled. This capability would have addressed some of the Australian Defence Force’s significant shortfalls in sealift capability to get the Army and its equipment overseas, although likely mitigated by Army’s acquisition of its new littoral vessels. But it does highlight a fundamental shortfall in the ability to the Navy’s auxiliary force, with the cancellation of the joint support ship, the Navy has only two auxiliary vessels to replenish its growing surface fleet with fuel, ammunition, and food at sea. While there are still significant holes in the Australia Defence Force’s capability to resource the strategy of deterrence by denial, to the government’s credit, the National Defence Strategy does go some way to addressing these gaps, and finally is supported by the resources to do so. But we need to move beyond the National Defence Strategy, towards a wider conversation around national security, mobilisation and be clear on the period of vulnerability from now until the late 2030s in our defence capabilities.

Jennifer Parker | 30 November 2025 *Originally Published in the Australian Financial Review on 28 November 2025 We have forgotten what it feels like to face the visceral prospect of attack. Countries that cannot resist coercion will struggle to defend their interests. Image: A Royal Australian Air Force F/A-18F Super Hornet aircraft conducts an aerial display as part of the RAAF Richmond Air Show 2025. Defence Images. Rumours suggest another Chinese naval task group may be heading towards Australia . While such a deployment poses no direct threat and warships are entitled under international law to operate in international waters, it inevitably recalls the Chinese task group that circumnavigated Australia in March. That voyage, while overblown by some, was a deliberate show of maritime coercion in a shifting strategic environment. China’s growing aggression in the Indo-Pacific, along with Russia’s assault on Ukraine and the war in the Middle East, have made one thing clear: military force has returned as a normal tool of coercion. For Australia, the question is how we reduce our vulnerability to military coercion, and that conversation begins with defence spending. Despite recent small funding boosts, Australia still lacks the capabilities needed to safeguard our national interests in a far more contested world. We cannot guarantee the security of our own ports because we lack modern mine-detection systems; our land-based missile-interception capability is close to symbolic; and we have almost no sovereign space assets to support defence operations. Yet in a period of mounting global instability, we are asking military aircraft to fly less and our ships to spend less time at sea simply to stay within budget. The reality is unavoidable: our resourcing does not align with our strategy, or with the threats our own leaders continue to highlight. It is never easy to discuss the prospect of conflict, or even a major military crisis short of it. While we honour sacrifice on Remembrance Day and Anzac Day, we have understandably forgotten what it feels like to face the visceral prospect of attack: the fear felt in Darwin in February 1942, in Katherine a month later, or in Sydney when midget submarines entered the harbour in May of that same year. This is not to suggest Australia is on the brink of attack; it is not. Rather, it highlights that we have lived in relative peace since 1945 and those memories have receded. Yet these are the circumstances our political leaders evoke when they say we face “the most challenging strategic circumstances since World War II”. Aggressive harassment increasing States increasingly use military coercion to solve their problems. Countries that cannot resist coercion will struggle to defend their interests and way of life. Australia is already experiencing degrees of military coercion. Take the South China Sea. Two-thirds of Australia’s maritime trade passes through it. As an island nation utterly dependent on maritime trade, the South China Sea is fundamental to our security and prosperity. Australia has operated there consistently since the end of World War II. “We still lack a range of key capabilities that are essential to reducing the impact of military coercion and, in the worst case, responding to conflict.” Yet with China’s growing military power, our ADF women and men have faced increasingly aggressive harassment in international waters and airspace. The most recent example in October this year involved a Chinese fighter aircraft releasing flares close to an Australian patrol aircraft, which could have disabled its engine and caused loss of life. This is military coercion: an attempt to pressure Australia not to operate freely in international airspace. The circumnavigation of Australia by a Chinese naval task group of three ships fits into the same category. It was not on the way to anywhere, it offered no scientific value, and China’s maritime trade does not depend on the Southern Ocean. It was a demonstration of capability and a show of force we will see again. But make no mistake, it is a form of military coercion. As I wrote at the time , Australia did not need to be alarmed and should temper its response, but we must be alert and ready to respond to a changing world. While there are many steps Australia must take to prepare for this change, one point is fundamental: to withstand military coercion we must have the military capability to deter it where possible or to respond if it cannot be prevented. The recent Lowy Poll found 51 per cent of Australians support higher defence spending. Although the Albanese government has announced major plans for new submarines, new surface ships and an expanded missile inventory, we still lack a range of key capabilities that are essential to reducing the impact of military coercion and, in the worst case, responding to conflict. We are trying to meet a rapidly changing strategic environment on a lean budget, spending about 2 per cent of GDP on defence. In the Cold War it was around 2.7 per cent; in the 1950s, about 3 per cent. In nominal terms we are spending more, but as a share of the economy it is significantly less. As a result, we cannot afford many of the critical capabilities needed to protect ourselves from the increasing trends of military coercion and conflict. Australia must recognise how quickly the world is changing and act accordingly. Modest increases to defence spending will not bridge the gap between our strategic ambitions and the capabilities we can field. The government’s plan to reach 2.3 per cent of GDP by 2033-34 does not match the pace or scale of the strategic deterioration we face. If we are serious about resisting coercion and protecting our national interests, defence funding must rise beyond that level, and soon. Delay only heightens our vulnerability to military coercion.

19 November 2025 | Jennifer Parker *Originally Published in the Sydney Morning Herald on 17 November 2025 Image: Soldiers from Australia’s Special Operations Engineer Regiment, alongside partners from the US conduct deliberate pre-mission rehearsals in preparation for the next phase of Exercise Talisman Sabre 25, ensuring precision, cohesion, and mission readiness. Defence Images. It is not warmongering to discuss how a changing world may affect Australia’s way of life, just as it did during World War II. It is prudent and responsible to have a national conversation about how we prepare for the changes outlined in Australia’s National Defence Strategy. And that preparation must include a clear-eyed discussion about defence spending. We are repeatedly told by politicians on both sides that Australia faces its most challenging strategic circumstances since WWII. They are right. In plain speaking, this means that the potential risk of conflict, or a major military crisis short of it, is rising. And with it, the likelihood that our Australian Defence Force women and men may once again be called on to put their lives on the line for the nation. It is in this context that outgoing RSL president Major General Greg Melick (retired) called on the government to increase defence spending during his Remembrance Day speech. Former prime minister Paul Keating called Melick a ‘dope’ and accused him of wanting to drag Australia ‘into a military exchange with the Chinese’. This suggests a deeply unserious grasp of our strategic reality. More troubling, it is disrespectful to our veterans from a man who appears to be better known for his offensive outbursts than his time as prime minister three decades ago. To reflect on the costs of war and the Australians who have served, without considering whether the next generation may be asked to do the same, is to risk leaving them unprepared. We must ask whether they would have the equipment and resources needed to prevail. Many respected veterans, strategists, former defence ministers and our major ally, the United States, believe they do not. Defence spending in Australia now sits at about 2.04 percent of GDP, meaning just two cents in every dollar of our economy goes towards safeguarding our security in a rapidly changing world. While the government has committed to increasing this to about 2.3–2.4 percent by 2033–2034, this is hardly a historic high. During WWII, defence spending reached about 34 percent of GDP in 1942–43. Even setting that extraordinary mobilisation aside, in the 1950s it averaged above 3 percent, and throughout the Cold War it sat at roughly 2.7 percent. Yet we routinely describe today’s strategic circumstances as more dangerous than those of the Cold War. Measuring defence spending as a percentage of the economy, the government argues, is unhelpful. While there is some truth to that, it nonetheless reflects where we place our national priorities. If defence is consistently under-resourced, we are not investing in the capabilities our ADF women and men need to succeed should they ever be called upon to defend the country. At the same time, ministers maintain that it is better to focus on funding the capabilities we need rather than meeting an arbitrary target. While also true in one sense, it is equally clear that the ADF faces significant capability gaps. The reality is stark: Australia now has an extremely limited ability to defend critical infrastructure and ADF bases against missile strikes, a defining feature of modern conflict. While we plan new ships to protect sea lines of communication, the navy is struggling to generate the warships it already has due to sustainment pressures. Our capacity to clear mines from the approaches to our ports, a core task in WWII, is now almost non-existent. I could go on. The list is long. The simple truth is that, on any meaningful metric, our ADF women and men do not have the capabilities they need to protect Australia in a changing world. We need to prioritise our security if we want to preserve the way of life we take for granted. It is in this context that we should listen to the concerns of our veterans about defence spending and have a serious national conversation about how we support our ADF women and men in uniform as the world deteriorates. What we should not do is personally attack those who raise these issues, as we saw last week. We are better than that as a country. Our veterans are seeking to protect the nation, just as they did in uniform, through highlighting the risks we face.

4 November 2025 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Lowy's The Interpreter 4 November 2025 Image: Grappling with how to defend a continent spanning 7.7 million square kilometres can seem overwhelming (Jake Badior/Defence.gov.au) There is growing concern about the shifting geopolitical environment, the increasing use of military force to settle disputes, and what this means for Australia’s future security and prosperity. Grappling with how to defend a continent spanning 7.7 million square kilometres, and national interests that extend far beyond our shores can seem overwhelming. Since the 2023 Defence Strategic Review , Australia’s defence strategy has rightly focused on protecting the nation through the maritime domain: defeating potential threats before they reach our coastline and safeguarding the maritime trade routes that sustain both our economy and our warfighting effort. But what does that actually require? Much more than AUKUS or Australia’s investment in nuclear-powered submarines and continuous naval shipbuilding. It demands consolidation of the nation’s maritime departments , greater coordination across defence, civil and industry elements, and investment in enabling capabilities, from mine-warfare and seabed monitoring to logistics and sustainment. As argued in A Maritime Strategy for Australia 2035 – a new report from the University of New South Wales Naval Studies Group – these flagship programs will only deliver their intended impact if Australia transitions to a genuine national maritime strategy. Without the less headline-grabbing investments in reform, coordination and enabling capabilities, warships and nuclear-powered submarines won’t be enough. Why does this matter? Because as Australia looks across the geopolitical landscape, the trend is clear: states are increasingly willing to use force to achieve their aims. Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, renewed conflict in the Middle East, and this year’s fighting between India and Pakistan, and Thailand and Cambodia, all reflect a world where the post-war multilateral system, once kept in check by institutions such as the United Nations Security Council, is breaking down. As Australia looks across the geopolitical landscape, the trend is clear: states are increasingly willing to use force to achieve their aims. Closer to home, China has developed one of the most formidable militaries in the world. Central to this has been the expansion and modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, now boasting more than 370 battle-force ships, around 70% launched in just the past decade. Its actions around Taiwan and increasingly assertive behaviour towards Australian and other nations’ ships and aircraft in the South China Sea underscore the risks. The recent firing of flares near an Australian maritime patrol aircraft in international airspace could, in extreme circumstances, have caused catastrophic engine failure and loss of life. And earlier this year, China’s naval task group circumnavigated Australia, an unmistakable demonstration of its growing long-range maritime capability and a reminder of our vulnerabilities across a vast maritime domain on which our national prosperity depends. In the face of such global instability and China’s overwhelming military power, it can seem daunting to consider how Australia should protect its national interests. But the answer is not to try to match China’s military strength. It begins with understanding what those interests are, where Australia’s vulnerabilities lie, and how best to protect them in the event of a crisis or conflict. This requires a genuinely national approach to security, one that extends beyond defence and the military to include economic, industrial and societal resilience. Australia is not about to be invaded, but it remains acutely vulnerable across the maritime, cyber and space domains. While many commentators argue that Australia’s geography protects it, that same geography is a double-edged sword. Our vast maritime domain and dependence on seaborne trade make us exposed. A Maritime Strategy for Australia 2035 argues that Australia must urgently close capability gaps and strengthen naval readiness, but also that reducing vulnerability requires more than high-end military hardware. The report sets out how to make this national approach real: from rebuilding mine-warfare and hydrographic fleets and investing in uncrewed aerial vehicles that can operate from naval platforms, to creating a ministerial-level maritime governance body to coordinate Australia’s defence, industry and civil maritime efforts. It also calls for a coastguard-style body to take over policing and border-protection tasks, freeing the Navy to focus on high-end warfighting, alongside an independent costing of the nuclear-powered submarine program and a push to standardise ship designs and supply chains. Practical reforms that turn strategy into capability. As an island nation dependent on maritime trade, our defence strategy has finally recognised the centrality of the sea. We must also recognise the importance of civilian maritime capability. That means developing policy settings to encourage Australian-flagged ships capable of carrying critical supplies during crisis or conflict and rebuilding a national mariner skills base. In the history of Australia’s strategic debate, we have long grappled with what it takes to defend both our continent and our interests. As an island nation dependent on maritime trade, our defence strategy has finally recognised the centrality of the sea. But this cannot rest on warships and nuclear-powered submarines alone. It requires a truly national maritime strategy , one that integrates defence, industry and civil capability. The UNSW Naval Studies Group report sets out how we can begin that essential task. Australia’s future security and prosperity depend on it.

21 October 2025 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review on 21 October 2025 Image: Philippine Military resupply mission was hit with a water canon from a Chinese Coast Guard cutter. Philippine Military Photo The White House meeting between Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and US President Donald Trump produced a string of positives. Chief among them is Trump’s ringing endorsement of AUKUS and his first public commitment to sell nuclear-powered submarines to Australia under phase two of the deal. The message was clear: the defence relationship between the US and Australia remains strong. It was also a message Australia needed to hear after yet another unsafe and unprofessional intercept by a Chinese fighter aircraft, which endangered the crew of a Royal Australian Air Force P-8 maritime patrol aircraft operating lawfully in international airspace over the South China Sea on Sunday. During recent Senate estimates hearings, senior Defence Department officials again warned that Australia’s strategic circumstances are “deteriorating.” Defence secretary Greg Moriarty cautioned that “the risk of an incident has heightened over recent years, and the trends continue to be worrying”. He’s right. Sunday’s events are proof enough: the P-8 was harassed by the Chinese fighter that released flares dangerously close to its flight path, a reckless act that could have caused engine failure and cost Australian lives. This incident is not an isolated case or the actions of an overly aggressive People’s Liberation Army Air Force pilot who will be reprimanded on return to base. It forms part of a clear pattern of aggressive and reckless behaviour by Chinese pilots and naval commanders toward Australian – and other nations’ – ships and aircraft operating in international waters and airspace, regions through which more than two-thirds of Australia’s vital maritime trade flows. The Australian public was first made aware of such behaviour in early 2022, when an RAAF P-8 operating within Australia’s exclusive economic zone had a military-grade laser directed into its cockpit by a Chinese naval vessel transiting the Arafura Sea. Since then, several unsafe and unprofessional incidents involving China’s navy and air force have been publicly acknowledged by the Australian government, from Chinese naval units using active sonar against Australian divers from HMAS Toowoomba in the Japanese Exclusive Economic Zone in November 2023, to a Chinese fighter deploying flares in front of an Australian naval helicopter from HMAS Hobart conducting UN sanctions enforcement in the Yellow Sea in May 2023. In total, six incidents have been publicly confirmed, though there are almost certainly more. This pattern of harassment toward Australian ships and aircraft operating to our north extends back more than a decade, something I have witnessed firsthand at sea. But both the nature and intensity of these encounters have escalated in recent years, and while the public may have become accustomed to hearing of them, we cannot lose sight of what they represent: deliberate actions in international airspace and waters that endanger the lives of Australian Defence Force women and men. “In this context, Trump’s ringing endorsement of AUKUS, and his personal commitment to sell nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, is significant.” These incidents are also the canary in the coal mine for a rapidly changing security environment, driven by four prominent factors. First, the breakdown of the multilateral system that once helped dampen the use of military force by states. Second, the growing willingness of states to use force to settle disputes, from Europe and the Middle East to Asia. Third, the rapid expansion of China’s military capability. And finally, Beijing’s increasingly aggressive use of that capability, from coercive manoeuvres around Taiwan to dangerous incidents in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone and beyond. During my recent visit to Beijing for the Australia-China High Level Dialogue, Chinese officials were explicit: China views the South China Sea as part of its “core interests” and believes that foreign military assets have no right to operate there, despite it being international airspace and waters under international law. Beijing feels justified in using increasingly reckless and dangerous behaviour to assert this claim; a stance that directly undermines the security of a maritime trade-dependent nation like Australia. Trump confidently declared that while AUKUS served as a deterrent to China, “we won’t need it”. When asked whether China would invade Taiwan, he replied that it would not, emphasising his “good relationship” with Beijing. But as Australia learnt on Sunday, the facts in the air over the South China Sea tell a different story. Warnings from Australia’s Defence Department are echoed even more strongly by senior leaders in the US Indo-Pacific Command, including Admiral Samuel Paparo, who earlier this year described China as being on a “dangerous course,” noting that the PLA’s “aggressive manoeuvres around Taiwan” in February were not “exercises” but “rehearsals”. His predecessor likewise warned that China’s strategy resembled a “boiling frog”, a gradual, deliberate escalation until it is too late to respond. In this context, Trump’s ringing endorsement of AUKUS, and his personal commitment to sell nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, is significant. Sunday’s unsafe and unprofessional incident by the People’s Liberation Army is yet another clear example of a deteriorating regional environment in which Australia’s national security interests are directly challenged. While conflict is not inevitable, I don’t share Trump’s rosy outlook on China. Australia must prepare for the possibility of crisis or conflict; not to invite it, but to deter it. And if deterrence fails, we must be ready to respond. Australia cannot afford to become the desensitised boiling frog.

15 September 2025 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Sydney Morning Herald on 15 September 2025 Image: Papua New Guinea Defence Force soldiers from the 1st Battalion, Royal Pacific Islands Regiment during the Presentation of Colours at Murray Barracks in Port Moresby on Sunday, 15 September 2025. (Defence Images) Debate on Australia’s defence strategy often centres on the budget and the plan to acquire nuclear-powered submarines . Both matter, but an equally critical pillar – partnerships – receives far less attention. The anticipated signing of what Papua New Guinea’s defence minister has called a “mutual defence” treaty underscores this point, highlighting the renewed focus on a neighbour whose security is inseparable from Australia’s own. The signing of a defence treaty between Australia and Papua New Guinea is expected this week, when Prime Minister Anthony Albanese travels to PNG to coincide with the 50th anniversary of the nation’s independence. It will be more than symbolic. It reflects an increasingly close defence relationship built in recent years, including the 2023 bilateral security agreement , major Australian investment in the Lombrum Naval Base expansion in PNG, and deeper co-operation through exercises such as Talisman Sabre . Australia and Papua New Guinea have a longstanding relationship, but several factors are driving the renewed security focus. Chief among them is China’s growing influence across the Pacific, particularly in PNG over the past decade . While Australia remains PNG’s largest trading and aid partner, China is now its second-largest trading partner, with major investments in critical infrastructure. Beijing has sought to leverage this economic relationship into security ties, lobbying PNG to sign a security deal in 2023 and a policing agreement in 2024, both of which ultimately stalled. China’s push shows it views the Pacific as a strategic arena, evident in its 2022 security agreement with Solomon Islands. A Chinese security and, more specifically, military foothold in the Pacific, particularly in PNG, would directly threaten Australia’s interests. It could enable Beijing to cut Australia and the US off from Pacific sea lines of communication, and position missiles or broader military forces within striking distance of Australia. While such a scenario is not an immediate likelihood, it explains why PNG sits so high on Australia’s security agenda, and on China’s too. The signing of a defence treaty between Australia and PNG is about more than countering China’s influence. It also recognises PNG’s enduring importance to Australia, both historically and geographically. In World War I, Australia’s first naval casualty, Able Seaman Bill Williams , died on September 11, 1914 at the Battle of Bita Paka in PNG, Australia’s first military operation as a nation. For its part, PNG needs significant investment to modernise its defence capabilities. Despite releasing a defence white paper and national security policy in 2013, resourcing shortfalls have limited progress, prompting Port Moresby to seek partners, signing security agreements in 2023 with Australia, the US and the UK . While it is not yet clear how this week’s expected treaty will build on the 2023 Framework for Closer Security Relations , it will undoubtedly elevate the relationship further. PNG Defence Minister Billy Joseph has described it as a “mutual defence treaty”, enabling a “totally integrated force” with the Australian Defence Force, with a consultation requirement similar to NATO’s: obliging the two countries to consult when their territorial integrity, security or political independence are threatened. Other reports suggest it may also pave the way for PNG citizens to serve in the ADF. While the 2023 security agreement between Australia and PNG already contained a clause on security consultation, the new treaty may strengthen this commitment, which serves both countries’ interests. A mutual defence treaty would typically imply an obligation to respond to an attack on either party, akin to NATO’s famed Article 5 : an attack on one is an attack on all. Whether this treaty will go that far remains unclear, but the possibility is significant. Equally notable is the discussion of force integration. Integration is better understood as a spectrum rather than a binary choice. Full integration would imply a common command-and-control framework to direct units from either military, common training, interoperable equipment, and the sharing of highly classified information. That is an ambitious goal that remains unlikely in the near term. Still, steps towards deeper co-operation include Colonel Boniface Aruma’s appointment as deputy commander of Australia’s 3rd Brigade in January 2024. While “full integration” may be out of reach, greater interoperability and shared structures mark positive progress for both countries. There has also been considerable discussion about allowing PNG citizens to join the ADF, and vice versa, an initiative that could strengthen integration through cultural affinity and mutual understanding. While this is widely expected to feature in the treaty, it carries challenges. A flow of PNG personnel leaving their own defence force for higher paid roles in the ADF would risk undermining Port Moresby’s military capacity. A better path is unit-level integration, such as PNG patrol boats under Australia’s joint headquarters, a model scalable across the Pacific. It is encouraging to see two partners, which have at times taken each other for granted, taking meaningful steps towards closer defence ties. The signing of this treaty represents the most significant upgrade in the relationship since PNG’s independence. While it is unlikely to amount to a full mutual defence pact or a fully integrated force, it is a clear sign that Australia’s regional defence strategy is beginning to bear fruit.

29 August 2025 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Sydney Morning Herald on 29 August 2025 Image: HMAS Sydney transits as part of the double carrier formation, UK Carrier Strike Group, led by HMS Prince of Wales and US Navy’s George Washington Carrier Strike Group, during Exercise Talisman Sabre 2025. (Defence Images) With Defence Minister Richard Marles back from a mysterious trip to the US, the alliance is back in the spotlight, as it has been since the second Trump administration took office. This week we debated whether Marles’ photo with US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth represented a “happenstance” or a “meeting”, an issue that represents the chaos in the Pentagon rather than a reflection on the alliance. Yet beneath the headlines lies a more pressing question: in a crisis, how would we fight together in an Indo-Pacific conflict, are our expectations of roles clear and are they truly in Australia’s interest? I would argue they are not. Australia should focus on complementing US power while retaining the ability to execute key roles independently, from defending Australia and its maritime trade to supporting partners in the Pacific without relying on Washington. After all, as a sovereign nation, Australia alone is responsible for its defence. This debate has sharpened with reports that the Pentagon’s undersecretary of defence for policy, Elbridge Colby, is pressuring Australia to clarify its role in a potential conflict over Taiwan. While suggestions of demands for a formal pre-commitment seem unlikely, especially given Washington’s own policy of strategic ambiguity , it is clear the US wants greater certainty. Australia should want that clarity too. Long a cornerstone of Australia’s military strategy, the alliance has allowed a nation of 27 million to wield disproportionate influence in an era of great-power competition. Despite tensions over the US review of AUKUS and calls for higher defence spending , co-operation between Canberra and Washington has reached levels not seen since World War II, from a surge in force posture initiatives to the growth in military exercises and exchanges. Australia’s 2024 National Defence Strategy notes that “Australia’s alliance with the US is fundamental to our national security and the ADF’s capacity to generate, sustain and project credible military capability”. While true, it prompts a critical question: in a crisis or conflict in the Indo-Pacific, would that power be projected as part of a US-led force, with Australian units integrated into American command, or in a complementary role with clearly defined missions, responsibilities and geographic areas? Who is responsible for defending Australia? This is more than semantics; it goes to the heart of who controls the employment of Australian ships, aircraft and other capabilities, and how we design and operate the ADF. The question of integration of forces versus delineation of forces becomes even more pressing given that, in any Indo-Pacific conflict, Australia would be fighting from its own territory for the first time since WWII. This represents a profound cultural shift, highlighted by Chief of Defence Force Admiral David Johnston, who noted earlier this year that “perhaps finally we are having to reconsider Australia as a homeland from which we will conduct combat operations”. Australia often underscores its reliability by noting that Australian and American forces have fought side by side in every major conflict since the Battle of Hamel in WWI, from Europe to Iraq and Afghanistan. This history can create the impression that operating together is a well-trodden path. At the tactical level, that’s true. But strategically, the conflicts of the past differ markedly from those we may face in the future. Australia built its force contributions to fight and, when required, to sacrifice on distant shores, where the defence of the continent was never in question and Australian civilians were never directly at risk. The only time Australia fought alongside the US with its own defence and civilian population at risk was during the Pacific campaign of WWII. After the fall of Singapore, a vulnerable Australia turned to Washington for protection, placing its forces under US General Douglas MacArthur’s command. While that arrangement proved successful, Australia today is a different nation. It has long since shed the constraints of empire, formalised by the 1986 Australia Act , and now boasts a far more diverse population, with 31.5 per cent of Australians born overseas. Australia in 2025 is far less willing to hand control of its naval, air and land forces and its defence to a US commander, and rightly so. But does Washington see it that way? It’s a critical question, especially with the growing presence of US marines, bombers and submarines on Australian shores, all of which will need protection. The harder truth, however, is that Australia has neither funded nor designed its ADF to independently defend the continent or execute key missions without US support. From a lack of sovereign space capability to limited missile defence and a stretched navy, the gaps are stark. Investment in nuclear-powered submarines and a larger surface fleet is a start, but real sovereignty requires more, a clear strategy and a force design built around Australia’s own defence and regional roles. It should be designed to be supported by the US in our defence, not in support of the US defending us. The Australia–US alliance is, rightly, a cornerstone of Australia’s defence strategy and efforts to deepen co-operation with Washington have been vital. But as states increasingly turn to force to settle disputes, a stronger alliance depends on both partners having a clear understanding of each other’s expectations. Roles and responsibilities must be clearly defined. To preserve its autonomy, Australia must articulate and fund a strategy that clearly delineates responsibilities, rather than continuing to field a force built to be employed under US command, as it has in past conflicts.

13 August | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in Lowy's The Interpreter on 12 August 2025 Image: HMAS Sydney during Exercise BERSAMA SHIELD 2025 (Defence Images) Maritime trade is Australia’s lifeline – in times of peace, crisis or conflict. Without ships bringing in the fuel, fertiliser, ammunition, and other critical supplies that keep our economy running and our defence viable, Australia would quickly run out. Yet Sam Roggeveen, arguing in The Interpreter , “ Why Japan’s Mogami frigates can’t protect Australia’s trade ”, joins a long line of advocates for a continental defence approach, underplaying the importance of protecting maritime trade. This view seeks to wish away Australia’s vulnerabilities rather than confront them. To adopt such a view would be a costly strategic error. Roggeveen makes three key claims: first, that the newly announced plan to acquire Mogami frigates from Japan would leave Australia with ships unacceptably vulnerable against a highly capable adversary; second, that trade routes themselves are too long to protect; and third, that the effort is not worth it. Theorists have often argued that surface combatants such as frigates and destroyers are increasingly vulnerable to the proliferation of missiles and now uncrewed capabilities, including aerial vehicles and surface vessels. Most have never operated a warship combat system or fired a missile. While vessels operating closer to the coast are indeed exposed to a greater range of threats , lessons from recent naval warfare quickly debunk notions that frigates are now unacceptably vulnerable against a capable adversary. In both the Russia-Ukraine war in the Black Sea and the challenge of Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, ships with well-prepared, well-trained crews , effective radars, modern combat systems and layered defences remain highly effective . Notably, despite firing hundreds of missiles and UAVs at US and European warships, the Houthis have yet to achieve a hit on a warship . This is why a wide range of nations, including China , continue to invest heavily in them. In seeking to dismiss the challenge of protecting Australia’s maritime lifelines, Roggeveen overlooks the fundamentals of maritime trade protection. While he doubts the upgraded Mogami’s ability to safeguard Australia’s trade, he ignores that protection comes from a system of capabilities: ships, submarines, satellites, and processes such as naval control of shipping, evasive routing, and alliances. Australia’s new frigates are a key part of that system, capable of providing close protection when required, but this is often unnecessary when broader sea control , that freedom of maritime manoeuvre, is maintained. The term sea lines of communication often creates the false impression that maritime trade routes are like fixed highways on land. No such permanence exists – routes are fluid, not fixed . In peacetime, merchant shipping follows the most direct routes to save time and fuel. But as the Houthi attacks on merchant vessels have shown, ships will take longer, less direct routes to avoid threats and costly war-risk insurance. Protecting Australia’s maritime supply is less about defending a single route than safeguarding the ships themselves. Protection need not be absolute along the entire route; it must be applied where and when the ship is at risk. Roggeveen argues that Australia’s enormous landmass and dispersed major ports make blockading trade “a massively costly enterprise for an adversary”. Yet an adversary would not need to stop access to every port. Targeting key shipments across the Pacific and Indian oceans would quickly deter ships from trading with Australia. That task becomes far easier if Australia abandons maritime protection altogether, as Roggeveen’s continental strategy proposes. It is not all 29,000 ships that visit Australia each year or every port that needs protecting, but a much smaller, vital subset. It is the critical seaborne supply , the essential goods without which the nation could not sustain a war. It is the portion of maritime trade that finances the war effort and enables the nation to fight, and potentially win, the conflict. And it is the critical seaborne supply for partners and allies, such as Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea, of energy, food, and other essentials. Roggeveen’s answer is to stockpile goods and accelerate the renewable energy transition. Both are worthwhile objectives, but neither removes the need for seaborne supply. As I have noted elsewhere, the first step in any effective maritime strategy is strategic resilience , reducing the volume of goods that must be protected. But Australia is not, and will not become, self-sufficient to the point where it can eliminate reliance on sea supply. Stockpiling critical goods is valuable in reducing what needs to cross the ocean, but it only buys time. Without the ability to replenish stockpiles in a contested environment, Australia’s capacity to resist in a major crisis or conflict would be strictly limited. So, protecting maritime trade is about identifying which elements will be essential in a conflict or crisis, then reducing dependencies and implementing robust port protection measures. This should be complemented by maritime trade routing plans to avoid threats, diversification of trading partners to minimise exposure to high threat areas, and a theatre-wide approach combining sensors and capabilities to achieve sea control at the time and place required. If necessary, and only as a last resort, a convoy system with escorts, similar to that employed for coastal and some Indian Ocean shipping in the Second World War , could be reintroduced. Protecting critical elements of maritime trade is not optional for Australia, it is a matter of national survival.

5 August 2025 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Conversation on 5 August 2025 Image: The Maritime Self-Defense Force's Mogami-class frigate Niyodo sails at an undisclosed location in this image released Tuesday. | ADF Defence Minister Richard Marles has announced that Japanese shipbuilder Mitsubishi Heavy Industries has been awarded a massive contract to build three new frigates for Australia’s navy. The deal is worth a reported A$10 billion . There are two reasons this deal is so significant. The first is it enhances our naval capabilities. This is the first government in at least the past 50 years to push through such a significant expansion of Australia’s surface combatant fleet (meaning frigates and destroyers). Under the government’s plans, we will be operating at least 20 surface combatants by the 2040s. The second reason it’s so significant is because of what it says about our relationship with Japan. Our strategic relationship has clearly evolved over the past ten years. In 2022, our two nations signed a joint declaration on security cooperation , which can be read as a quasi-alliance. Now, this decision to purchase the new Mogami-class frigates really shows how much we trust Japan in terms of its industrial capability and its ability to support our shipbuilding needs. Our troubled surface combatant fleet The current state of our surface combatant fleet is parlous. We only have ten surface combatants, which is half as many as analysts have said we need . That is meant to decrease to nine next year, when HMAS Arunta is decommissioned. The Australian National Audit Office did an audit of the sustainment of our ANZAC-class frigates in 2019, which found the ships were not in a good state. The hulls had been degraded because they had been run so hard. And the reason they’d been run so hard is because we didn’t have enough ships. So, this deal with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries means we have a concrete plan to replace some of them. There’s still an issue with the time frame, though. We’re expecting to receive the first ship from the Japanese in 2029, with two more by 2034. That’s asking a lot of the current ANZAC-class ships. There’s a real question about whether they can actually make it that long, or if we will need to decommission even more in the latter part of this decade. The reason we have this time frame gap is because you can’t build ships overnight. In 2009, we identified a need to replace the ANZACs, and we didn’t make a decision on a new ship until 2018 when we selected the Hunter-class frigates. These new ships are being designed and built by BAE , a UK company. The first Hunter frigate is expected to be operational in 2034. That’s a huge time gap between the decision to go with BAE in 2018 and actually having our first ship. We were initially meant to get nine Hunter-class ships, but that number was reduced to six last year when an independent analysis team recommended acquiring a number of new multipurpose frigates instead (the Mogami frigates now coming from Japan). We don’t know exactly when the Hunter frigates will all be delivered. But even once we have them, it will also be difficult to integrate two different types of frigates (the Hunters and Mogamis) into service at the same time. There won’t be a lot of commonality between the two types of ship. The government should be pushing Japan to see if we can possibly get the Mogami frigates any earlier. And we should be talking to BAE about doing the same. The one major flaw in this whole process is the failure of successive governments to take a broader look at Australia’s naval capability needs. The independent analysis led by retired US Navy Vice Admiral William Hilarides last year should have been directed to do this. We’ve solved one problem now with the surface combatants, but other issues remain. We’re playing a game of whack-a-mole. Risks with the Japan deal There are also a range of risks with the new deal. One is that the new Mogami ship doesn’t actually exist yet. We’ve ordered an upgraded Mogami, based on a new design. Japan has even said Australia could get one of the upgraded ships ahead of its own navy . This risk is mitigated, however, by Japan’s fantastic track record in building ships. The second risk, which is significant and should not be underestimated, is that Japan does not have experience in exporting complex military equipment overseas. Japan has never exported a new warship to another country. And what complicates this further is that Australia has historically been quite a demanding shipbuilding customer. Some believe a reason for the challenges we’ve experienced with the Hunter-class frigates is partially because we’ve made a lot of changes . Lastly, the strategic relationship between Australia and Japan is bigger than shipbuilding. It has rapidly evolved because our national security interests are aligned. The danger with this frigate deal is that it could damage our relationship if something doesn’t go right. So, we need to proceed carefully to make sure this doesn’t happen.