May 10, 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review on Saturday 10 May A quiet tussle is going on over China’s ambitions to control all of its neighbouring seas. A united response is needed before China miscalculates. Image: Royal Australian Navy helicopter conducting SONAR dipping operations. Photo credit Defence Images Interpreting China’s unsafe and unprofessional behaviour towards an Australian helicopter last weekend as an issue between China and Australia plays into the narrative from China of bilateral issues. When it comes to this issue, Australia needs to view the forest through the trees. This incident is part of a wider problem – one that as a nation Australia must be willing to acknowledge and address using all elements of its national power, its regional standing and relationships. The endangering of an Australian naval Seahawk helicopter by a Chinese jet fighter in the Yellow Sea is one of a series of aggressive incidents that demonstrate China’s resolve to use reckless, aggressive and dangerous behaviour to make its points about how it perceives its maritime periphery. The incident, which endangered Australian Defence Force personnel, is one of a series of increasing aggressions from China in East Asia and the South China Sea and must be interpreted within this context. Approaching it as a bilateral issue or an individual incident plays into China’s approach of explaining away incidents and normalising the behaviour. This is not the first incident of China’s military assets endangering Australian ships and aircraft. The Australian Department of Defence has released to the Australian public details of two incidents between Chinese aircraft and ships and Australian P8A maritime patrol aircraft in 2022. Both occurred in international airspace, and one was in the Australian Exclusive Economic Zone. And in November 2023, Australian sailors were injured off the Japanese coast when a Chinese destroyer recklessly approached HMAS Toowoomba while radiating its sonar. These are just the incidents that the Australian Department of Defence has chosen to release to the Australian public, based on the experiences of other countries operating in the region. There are invariably more. The United States Pentagon released a series of 200 incidents of “unsafe and unprofessional behaviour” (read close shaves) between Chinese military aircraft and US aircraft in the South China Sea. Many involved the deployment of chaff and flares by Chinese aircraft, just like Australia’s experience. In 2022, Canada also made public a series of incidents where China’s fighter aircraft were flying within six metres to 30 metres of a Canadian maritime patrol aircraft operating in international waters, also working to enforce United Nations Security Council sanctions against North Korea. This aggression is not just confined to naval ships and aircraft. There are numerous instances of China’s coastguard and maritime militia ramming, water cannoning or otherwise harassing government and fishing vessels from the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia. Whilst some of those countries may not choose to overtly publicise the incidents in the way Australia, the US and the Philippines have, there is no denying their occurrence. China’s approach and declarations – such as the nine-dash line, a so-called historical claim to the entire South China Sea as Chinese territory, invalidated by the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal – show that China views the seas surrounding it as an extension of its territory. This is a position at odds with international law, and China’s aggressive approach to asserting this position is at odds with the security of the region, including Australia’s security. The improved diplomatic and trade relationship between Australia and China has done little to mitigate the number of unsafe interactions between China and countries operating in the region. The issue is not about the China-Australia relationship, which China would like us to think it is. It is about China’s claim to control the seas in its vicinity. Viewing it as an Australia-China issue will do nothing to address the wider problem. China’s maritime aggression against countries operating in East Asia and the South China Sea cannot be separated from similar campaigns of cyberattacks and political interference. It is all part of a bigger-picture challenge, and Australia needs to take a bigger-picture approach. To mitigate incidents that put the personnel of the ADF at risk, Australia must demonstrate that it is prepared to respond with its partners and allies to China’s comprehensive campaign in the region. This includes being prepared to use all aspects of diplomatic power, but also economic and informational power in concert with our partners and allies. Responding to one incident will not address the issue. A comprehensive approach is the only way to demonstrate to China that the aggressive assertion of its claims, which put ADF personnel at risk, will not be beneficial in the long term. It is only by doing this as part of an international collective that Australia can hope to avoid a miscalculation by China that leads to a wider regional conflict.

9 May 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Council on Geostrategy's blog Britain's World Image: AUKUS Meeting - President Joe Biden, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese at the AUKUS meeting in San Diego, March 13, 2023. Photo credit: US State Department The AUKUS capability pact, particularly the transfer of submarine nuclear-propulsion technology to Australia, is often framed as a gift; that somehow Australia’s oldest strategic partners, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), are effectively ‘doing Australia a favour’ in helping them acquire nuclear-powered submarines. This false narrative generates significant consternation among defence analysts and commentators. Many of whom look to the upcoming elections in the UK and the US in late 2024 and question whether new governments there could put Australia’s future nuclear-powered submarine plans at risk. Proponents of this mischaracterisation of AUKUS underestimate the nature of the agreement. Not only is Australia paying for the design and acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines under phases two and three of AUKUS Pillar I, but there is much more to this strategic deal than a simple foreign military sales transaction. For the price of supporting the transfer of nuclear-powered submarine technology to Australia, both the UK and US are gaining strategic access to Australia, an almost AU$5 billion (£2.6 billion) injection into each of their respective submarine industrial bases, and for Britain specifically, the ability to share the costs of designing and producing the replacement to the Astute-class nuclear-powered submarine. Arguably, the most significant of these is the access both the UK and US will receive to Australia, and what this means for their respective postures in the Indo-Pacific. Despite the existence of conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific is the ‘pacing arena’ – a region which has become increasingly central to global security. This centrality is driven by three main factors: demographics, dependence of the global economy on the region and the existence of a revisionist People’s Republic of China (PRC). Each of these three elements impact the outlooks of both the UK and the US. While the US’ interests as a Pacific Ocean country are readily apparent, Britain’s interests, even though the British home islands are geographically separated from the Indo-Pacific, are also clear. Moving beyond notions of historical links, as a country still adapting to Brexit, the Indo-Pacific with its growing population, intricate diplomatic structures and economic potential, provides an opportunity for the UK. Britain’s 2021 achievement of ‘dialogue partner’ status of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 2023 accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)  are but two examples of this. The PRC’s revisionist approach to international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, also has clear ramifications for a maritime nation such as the UK. It is within this context which Britain has sought to develop its own toolkit on how it might influence security in the Indo-Pacific. It is evident that following the 2021 announcement of the Indo-Pacific ‘tilt’ that the UK views increased military deployments to the Indo-Pacific as a key element of its toolkit to attempt to shape security in the region. From the 2024 littoral response group deployment to the intended UK-led Carrier Strike Group deployment in 2025, the trend is clear. While such deployments are notable, Britain requires a persistent presence to move beyond symbolism and assist in shaping Indo-Pacific security; a difficult achievement given its geographical distance from the region and the reduction in Royal Navy escorts over the last 30 years. Although the need for persistent naval presence is partially realised by the Royal Navy’s permanent deployment of two Offshore Patrol Vessels to the region in 2021, the nature of this capability lacks strategic heft. Enter AUKUS and the opportunity for the UK to have access to Australia’s submarine base, HMAS Stirling, and its enhanced submarine infrastructure under phase one of the capability pact’s nuclear-powered submarine optimal pathway. While details of phase one of AUKUS Pillar I are not exactly clear, the recently released Australian National Defence Strategy outlines the intent for the UK to make ‘longer and more frequent’ submarine deployments to Australia, ‘growing to a mature state’ of ‘up to four rotational US nuclear-powered submarines and one rotational UK nuclear-powered submarine’. The rotation rate of Royal Navy submarines through Australia is also unclear. However, it was certainly considered by His Majesty’s Government a footprint significant enough to prompt the UK and Australia to sign their first ever Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in 2023, despite their long standing historical strategic and cultural links. Similarly, for the US the positioning of four rotational submarines in HMAS Stirling provides dispersal and defence in depth for their Pacific submarine fleet, out of direct range of the PRC’s extensive missile arsenal. But the AUKUS quid pro-quo for American access and posture goes even further. Since the announcement of AUKUS, the force posture initiatives agreed between Australia and the US have increased significantly. Prior to the announcement of the AUKUS agreement, US force posture initiatives in Australia consisted of access to Darwin for the Marine Rotation Forces Darwin agreed in 2012, and the Enhanced Air Cooperation initiative agreed in 2017. Since the signing of AUKUS in 2021, Australia and the US have enhanced the existing force posture initiatives and agreed to an extensive number of new force posture initiatives, including enhanced land cooperation, enhanced maritime cooperation, combined logistics sustainment and maintenance enterprise, P-8A Poseidon rotations, watercraft rotations, bomber rotations, and more. Since the signing of AUKUS, it is clear from the vast number of agreements between Australia and the US, and to a lesser extent Australia and the UK, that a strategically important aspect of the AUKUS transaction is critical access to Australia, a country at the fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific. A fulsome understanding of the nature of the AUKUS capability pact makes it abundantly clear that the transfer of nuclear-powered submarine technology to Australia is no ‘gift’. Beyond Australia’s support for the respective UK and US submarine industrial bases, the access provided to Australia is critical to both countries’ Indo-Pacific posture.

6 May 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review on Friday 2 May Ten years from now, Australia will have its most potent navy in decades. In the interim, it will have the least capable in more than half a century. Image: HMAS ANZAC 11 September 2023. Defence image gallery Last week, the outgoing commander of the United States Indo-Pacific command referred to China’s strategy in the region as a “boiling frog” strategy – gradually increasing the pressure within the region, with the “ultimate” danger under-appreciated. This year has so far been a year of government defence announcements. Many have rightly focused on Australia’s status and vulnerabilities as an island trading nation. A nation whose daily survival depends on the fuel, fertiliser, pharmaceuticals and other essentials that are imported by sea. This maritime awakening has been underpinned by significant announcements on Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, a historical increase to the Royal Australian Navy’s surface combatant fleet and an integrated investment program that pours 38 per cent of Defence’s investment into the maritime domain. From the glossy documents, you could be forgiven for thinking Australia’s naval capabilities have been strengthened in the short term; that our navy can defend Australia’s existential dependence on maritime trade, and project into the region to enact Australia’s strategy of deterrence by denial. The problem with this perception of Australia’s growing naval power is that it is only half true. Ten years from now, when the first Virginia class nuclear-powered submarine arrives in Australia and the new general-purpose frigates and Hunter class frigates are rolling off the production line, Australia will have its most potent navy in decades. In the interim, however, Australia’s naval power will decline and, without a significant readjustment of its naval posture, so will its ability to defend the maritime trade which is the lifeline of its economy. Surface fleet to shrink Despite the increased investment over the decade, the alarming fact is that for the next 10 years Australia will have the least capable naval surface fleet it has had in more than 50 years. The surface combatant fleet, the frigates and destroyers that constitute the backbone of the Royal Australian Navy, will increase to 20 in the 2030s and early 2040s. But before then, Australia’s surface combatant fleet will contract. Most reviews of the Australian naval surface fleet over the past 50 years have recommended that Australia needed 16 to 20 surface combatants to protect its maritime interests. These assessments were conducted before the rapid militarisation of the region, before the persistent pressure of China’s maritime aggression in the South China Sea and before Australia was subjected to China’s economic coercion. Instead of the 16-20 surface combatants, Australia has 11. Before the fleet size increases in the early 2030s, it will substantially decrease. HMAS Anzac, one of only eight Australian frigates, will decommission this month, reducing the surface combatant fleet to 10. In 2026, the fleet will fall to nine– less than half the strength of the surface combatant fleet recommended by 50 years of analysis. During a period of global tension that has been compared to that before World War II, the island nation of Australia will have the least powerful surface navy it has had in more than 50 years. What do we do? How did we get here? It’s a long story that cannot simply be attributed to the current or former governments. It is a story of devaluing naval capability, of delaying decisions and accepting risk where the risk was not fully understood. In many ways, “how did we get here?” is an uninteresting and unhelpful question. The pivotal question for the defence of this island nation is: what do we do about the gap? This is where naval structure, readiness and posture come in. We are a nation dependent on maritime trade, with a 10-year gap in our ability to defend this trade. We must be bold. For the next 10 years, Australia must maximise the potency, operational readiness and posture of the remaining ships in the Royal Australian Navy. Basing a frigate in Singapore or the Philippines would increase Australia’s presence in the contested South China Sea This includes maximising the sea-time of existing nine surface combatants, with alternate crewing and readiness models. Rather than one crew per ship, this may mean multiple crews per ship, something the Royal Australian Navy has previously trialled and other navies such as the Royal Navy are enacting with their forward deployed frigates to the Middle East. But what about the implications for the challenged naval workforce? If it matters, we can make it happen. Historic times call for historic approaches. Boldness has always been Australia’s innate advantage. But we must go further. To maximise our diminishing naval assets, we should take a leaf out of the playbook of our AUKUS partners by permanently forward deploying one of the remaining surface combatants to South-East Asia. Basing a frigate in Singapore or the Philippines would increase Australia’s presence in the contested South China Sea, maximising the potency of Australia’s naval capability during the foreseeable capability gap. In times of historic global tension, our government and our navy must take bold action to maximise the operational effectiveness of our remaining fleet. The lifelines of the Australian economy, and our way of life, may well depend on it.

April 18, 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review 17 April 2024 We need to move towards a wider conversation around national security, mobilisation, and be clear on the vulnerability in our capabilities until the late 2030s. Image: Defence Minister Richard Marles at the National Press Club of Australia in Canberra discussing the first National Defense Strategy and attendant Integrated Investment Program 17 April 2024. The launch of the National Defence Strategy and integrated investment program 12 months on from the Defence Strategic Review hits all the key themes. In many ways, the 2024 National Defence Strategy represents where Australia needed to be in 2020, unlike the Force Structure Plan it does seek to focus the Australian Defence Force and provides funding to support the necessary changes including acceleration of capabilities. Analysts will pull apart the capability and funding aspects over the coming days. At face value, the National Defence Strategy achieves the defence and strategy elements of what it says on the tin, but there are three fundamental issues at the national level. The evolution of warfare and interference short of warfare in the political, economic, cyber and information spheres demonstrates that to defend Australia’s national interests beyond coercion, we must go beyond a defence strategy, and move towards a national security strategy. Conflicts in Europe, the Middle East and our own experience with economic coercion and cyberattacks demonstrate that we need to be able to co-ordinate all elements of national power to affect a strategy of deterrence by denial. This is not only a nice to have, it is a must as we see countries such as China undertaking what in many instances could be considered, political, economic, information and cyber warfare that directly impinge on Australia’s national interests. The National Defence Strategy also avoids the use of the term mobilisation. Confining the issue of preparedness, to purely a military sense. The 2020 Force Structure Plan and the terms of reference for the Defence Strategic Review highlighted the need for mobilisation to be considered. Not only mobilisation of the Australian Defence Force, but more broadly a discussion of national mobilisation. Are we putting the architecture, mechanisms and processes in place to be in a position to mobilise all necessary elements of Australian society should the increasing strategic risk be realised? The National Defence Strategy, much like the public-facing Defence Strategic Review is glaringly quiet on these points. The third and perhaps most stark issue with the National Defence Strategy and its associated integrated investment program is the period of risk from now until the late 2020s to early 2030s. The government is entirely correct in its assertion that it is seeking to reshape the Australian Defence Force into a more lethal, agile force tailored towards a strategy of deterrence by denial. But the key elements of this force, whether it be ships, submarines or the underlying infrastructure will not be in place for some time. In some ways, at the point in which Australia finds itself, this may be unavoidable, as previously mentioned, many of the elements of the National Defence Strategy would have been perfectly appropriate for 2020. This is a quandary not of the government’s making, it is a clear result of the negligence of successive governments and, at times, a disinterested public, but it is a vulnerability that we must now acknowledge and work hard to utilise Australia’s other elements of national power to mitigate. Despite these significant issues, there is much to like about the National Defence Strategy on face value and its associated integrated investment program from a defence perspective. It builds upon the Defence Strategic Review and announcements relating to the AUKUS submarine optimal pathway and surface combatant fleet expansion. In many ways, it seeks to deliver an enhanced, and more lethal, Australian Defence Force to respond to the deteriorating strategic circumstances. It is supported by additional funds, $5.7 billion in the forward estimates and predictions of $50 billion over the next 10 years, addressing the criticism that the Defence Strategic Review recommendations lacked funding. Fleshing out the Defence Strategic Review’s recommendation of a strategy of deterrence by denial, the National Defence Strategy seeks to bolster this approach. Highlighting that to protect Australia’s national interests from coercion in a dramatically deteriorating global order, the Australian Defence Force needs power projection capabilities including long-range strike, cyber and maritime capabilities which the integrated investment program supports with significant investment over the next 10 years. What is not exactly clear, is the full spectrum of projects that have been cut. What is not exactly clear, is the full spectrum of projects that have been cut, delayed or rescoped to support the prioritised integrated investment program. Many of the cuts announced today were announced in the Defence Strategic Review. Navy’s future joint support ship has been cancelled. This capability would have addressed some of the Australian Defence Force’s significant shortfalls in sealift capability to get the Army and its equipment overseas, although likely mitigated by Army’s acquisition of its new littoral vessels. But it does highlight a fundamental shortfall in the ability to the Navy’s auxiliary force, with the cancellation of the joint support ship, the Navy has only two auxiliary vessels to replenish its growing surface fleet with fuel, ammunition, and food at sea. While there are still significant holes in the Australia Defence Force’s capability to resource the strategy of deterrence by denial, to the government’s credit, the National Defence Strategy does go some way to addressing these gaps, and finally is supported by the resources to do so. But we need to move beyond the National Defence Strategy, towards a wider conversation around national security, mobilisation and be clear on the period of vulnerability from now until the late 2030s in our defence capabilities.

April 17 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Australian on 17 April Image: The President of the Philippines Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos While all eyes are on the Middle East, following Iran’s escalatory attack on Israel, the West Philippine Sea must remain a focal point for Australia. If not carefully managed, it is in the West Philippine Sea that conflict in the Indo-Pacific could spark. Iran’s unprecedented attack on Israel reinforces the view that certain states are feeling emboldened to abandon the 1945 UN Charter. This revisionist view on the principles that underwrite global stability is demonstrating that the alliances and partnerships may not be the deterrent they once were. It is in this context Australia must be clear on its support of The Philippines – a message the US appears to have heeded. Last week leaders from the US, Japan and The Philippines took part in the inaugural trilateral leaders meeting. Among the usual discussion points was a clear articulation by the US President as to the nature of the alliance with The Philippines and Japan, stating it was “ironclad”. The emphasis came on the back of a statement from Joe Biden during his bilateral meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, reiterating his “unwavering commitment” to “defence of Japan under Article V of the treaty, using its full range of capabilities, including nuclear capabilities”. Similar statements were made by Secretary of State Anthony Blinken during his March visit to The Philippines, where he emphasised that the US is obligated to defend The Philippines, if its forces, ships or aircraft came under armed attack in the South China Sea. Clarity in the US alliance commitments, particularly over islands China disputes with Japan and The Philippines, is important. With actions such as Iran’s designed to test alliances, a key element of their deterrence effect is the belief by a potential adversary that allies and partners will follow through with their commitments. It is in this vein that Australia must continue to demonstrate to China that it supports The Philippines. Until recent weeks, the Indo-Pacific was in danger of China’s aggression towards The Philippines becoming the status quo. Every month, The Philippines would attempt to resupply its marines at Second Thomas Shoal. Every month, China would attempt to blockade the Shoal with aggressive manoeuvring and use of water cannons against Philippine vessels, incrementally increasing aggression to test the resolve of The Philippines, its partners and allies. The ritual tussle increased in ferocity and severity in the past 12 months, with China’s actions twice resulting in injuries to Philippine sailors. Despite the clear legal position, affirmed by the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal, that Second Thomas Shoal is a low-tide elevation within The Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, responses from its allies, partners and neighbours have at times been underwhelming. Each incident has been followed by ambassadorial level condemnation, and generic statements by prime ministers and foreign ministers about the importance of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the international rules-based order. However, this lukewarm approach by The Philippines’ partners and allies has started to heat up following the latest incident of Chinese aggression on March 23, directly following Blinken’s visit to The Philippines. In that incident, a Philippine resupply vessel was again water cannoned by the Chinese Coast Guard, with graphic imagery released of China’s Coast Guard and maritime militia surrounding a Philippine Coast Guard vessel. This prompted The Philippines President to state that he intended to implement “proportionate and reasonable” countermeasures. While it’s not clear what these might entail – the incident prompted government level statements from many countries including Australia, and execution of a maritime activity between ships from Australia, Japan, the US and The Philippines in the South China Sea on April 7. It has also clearly led to the US finding it necessary to restate its alliance relationship, should there be any be any ambiguity in China’s mind about its resolve to support The Philippines. While it is pleasing to see the increased Australian response to China’s aggression in the South China Sea, it is important that this is maintained and, where necessary, increased. The narrative of diplomatic and trade stabilisation between China and Australia cannot be used to mask acceptance of the status quo of China’s aggression in the South China Sea. In light of the attacks by Iran on Israel, it is important, now more than ever, to ensure there is no room for ambiguity in China’s calculus that Australia supports its strategic partnership with The Philippines and will not allow China’s aggression in the region to become the unremarked status quo. Deterring China from further escalating its actions in the South China Sea is central to deterring conflict in the region.

April 12, 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist on 12 April 2024 Image: Hunter-class frigate: BAE Systems. Almost a year ago, the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) set homework for the Department of Defence, including reprioritising the country’s rolling plan for military capability spending, the Integrated Investment Program (IIP). That update is now nearly due. But we should not assume that the government can address defence funding problems by shifting funds between projects in a spending plan that is already overburdened. There’s a widespread view in the public that Defence wastes money, a view reinforced in recent years by critical Australian National Audit Office reports detailing cost increases for many Australian Defence Force projects. The Hunter frigate program is a well-known example, with the Government citing the $20 billion cost increase as one reason for cutting the project from nine to six frigates. This leads to false assumptions that better fiscal responsibility and prioritisation will free up pots of gold within the IIP. It doesn’t help that the IIP is poorly understood and that Defence engages little in public discourse, whether to justify skyrocketing costs, debunk myths around capability acquisition or highlight its on-budget delivery of most projects. Created in response to a recommendation of the 2015 First Principles Review, the IIP outlines Defence’s funding lines for capability acquisition and sustainment for the coming 20 years. Only two public versions have been released, one in 2016 and one in the 2020 Force Structure Plan (FSP), leaving a public impression that the IIP remains fixed for long intervals. In fact, it is a classified living document, updated twice a year. The updates include reprioritisation. The DSR highlighted the deterioration of Australia’s strategic circumstances, including the ‘the prospect of major conflict in the region that directly threatens our national interest’. Accordingly, it called for a highly integrated, enhanced-lethality ADF. To achieve this, parts of the ADF need to be reshaped, new capabilities must be acquired and some that already in planning need to be accelerated. The DSR gave some indication of those changes, but the vast majority have been left as homework for the department. The first instalment of the biennial National Defence Strategy (NDS), to be issued with the IIP update, will hopefully reveal more details. While many of the DSR’s recommendations were welcome, the handbrake on its success was the government’s position that the review’s changes of approximately $19 billion must be cost-neutral within the forward estimates—from 2023-24 to 2026-27. Although the recently announced replacement and expansion of the Royal Australian Navy’s surface combatant fleet is expected to come with a $1.7 billion uplift in the forward estimates, this doesn’t address the broader requirements of the DSR or NDS. Fiscal relief for the defence budget is not due until 2027-28, with an uplift of $30 billion to be provided from then until 2032-33. A cost-neutral DSR implied some combination of two things: some of the announcements were at least partly factored into the IIP already, and some projects in it would need to be cancelled or amended. Indeed, some cancellations and amendments were made public when the DSR was released, but many were not. The DSR made plain that the IIP was under significant pressure. Unfunded announcements had been pushed into it since the 2020 FSP without going through the prioritisation process. The 2016 white paper recommended that the IIP carry 20 percent overprogramming, meaning that for each year the programmed spending would be a fifth higher than available funding. That was based on the historical observation that there will always be some projects that slip. It’s a sound budgeting mechanism, but the DSR revealed that the IIP was actually carrying 24 percent overprogramming. And changes called for in the DSR have probably added to that. To address the funding pressure, the DSR recommended that ‘lower-priority projects’ should be stopped or suspended and that ‘funding should be released by the rebuild and reprioritisation of the IIP’. While reprioritisation within the IIP makes sense in our changing strategic circumstances, the problem is that it has been the go-to bucket of money for some time. The Defence funding envelope was set in the 2016 white paper, so almost every capability change since then has resulted in reshuffling of existing IIP funds. In the last couple of years, such initiatives as the Australian Signals Directorate’s uplift of $11.5 billion for the Redspice program and the $38 billion investment in Defence workforce growth have wreaked havoc on the IIP, resulting in the cancellation, reshaping or shaving of projects. The likely result is that, despite the DSR’s recommendation to generate additional capability funding through removing the IIP’s low-hanging fruit, it is unlikely that there is any low-hanging fruit left. Considering the IIP pressure described in the DSR and the need to fund such efforts as Redspice and Defence workforce growth, the overall acquisition and sustainment program is clearly at significant risk. Defence Minister Richard Marles has already signalled that the IIP to be released in coming weeks will show significant cuts to projects. While talk of reprioritisation and greater fiscal responsibility is easy to sell to a public that’s unfamiliar with the IIP, repeated pillaging of what has likely become a bare bones capability program is risky in a time where our strategic reviews say we should be strengthening preparedness. We must not imagine that there is a pot of gold at the end of the IIP rainbow. Defending the country simply demands a real uplift of funds, and Defence needs to explain publicly why this matters, otherwise we will be piling more risk onto the capability program at one of our greatest times of need in nearly 70 years.

24 March 2024 | Jennifer Parker and Peter Jones *Originally published by the Center For Maritime Strategy on 24 March 2024 Once again, as the current Houthi-attacks on merchant shipping in the confines of the Red Sea show, navies must be able to effectively operate in littoral waters. Late last year two former Royal Australian Navy officers Commander Jen Parker and Vice Admiral Peter Jones wrote an Occasional Paper for the Australian Naval Institute on the RAN’s experience in the littoral and what lessons can be drawn from it. Here is a précis of that paper. Image: HMAS Anzac Bombardment of the Al Faw Peninsula, 21 March 2003. Defence images. Littoral operations are invariably complex and are the most challenging for navies. The unique challenges of the littoral can constrain naval forces and increase their vulnerability to ever more lethal offensive capabilities such as land-based maritime strike, uncrewed surface vessels, uncrewed underwater vessels, and uncrewed aerial vehicles. Littoral operations not only demand a prominent level of Combined and Joint interoperability, but also stress the need for an integrated approach to operations. The development of missile and uncrewed technologies are not only increasing the complexity of littoral operations, but they are also extending the range of what would traditionally have been considered the littoral. This has been notable in the Ukrainian employment of explosive uncrewed surface vessels in the Black Sea against Russian vessels throughout 2023, where the ranges of the capabilities employed are extending the influence of the shore into the sea, and subsequently the range at which surface vessels can be held at risk by land based on land launched threats. Despite the technological developments expanding the complexity and range of the littorals, there is much to be learned from analysing historical experiences in littoral operations. Australia’s experiences in the littoral are extensive. They began with its first amphibious operation in German New Guinea in 1914. In World War II its ships operated on the Tobruk Ferry Run with the British Mediterranean Fleet and then with the US 7th Fleet in a series of amphibious operations in the western Pacific. The RAN also operated in the littoral in the Korean and Vietnam wars and more recently with the US 5th Fleet in the Middle East. These operations yielded five key lessons. The first is that naval forces must become attuned to the littoral environment they are operating in. One aspect of this is situational awareness. The littoral is complex. The number of contacts to detect, track and most importantly identify can be overwhelming. This is asset intensive to do. Likewise, learning the patterns of movement and trade takes time in theatre. Another aspect is environmental. Ships, aircraft, and their crews all take time to adjust to the prevalent weather conditions. The second factor falling out of that is that commanders must be prepared to adjust or even develop new doctrine and tactics for the specific operation. Some additional equipment may also be needed. Back home, Defence Departments must also expect this to occur and be agile enough to support the added demands of their deployed forces. Third, is the importance of weapons and sensors being developed with littoral operations in mind. As mentioned, due to the proximity of land, shallowness of water and reduced reaction times, the demands on systems and their operators is at its the most intense. Fourth, is the importance of force cohesion. Littoral operations often see a disparate mix of air, sea and land elements being brought to the fight. There is an imperative to work seamlessly together to maximise combat power. The insertion of liaison officers into the command organizations often acts as the oil to reduce friction. Regarding naval task groups, it is highly desirably to develop a cohesion and team ethos to gain a synergistic effect of its combined capabilities. The ultimate point is one that is often lost. It is the importance of unit training and professionalism. The internal organisation of ships can come under stress, and it is vital for a ship’s company to be well prepared and led. This of course harks back to the 1938 observation of Captain Francis Pridham RN who wrote, “A ship is either efficient, smart, clean and happy, or none of these things. They go hand in hand, or not at all.” A focus on these five factors provides the key ingredients for effective operations in the littoral.

9 March | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review 9 March 2024 China intruded into this week’s ASEAN summit with fresh clashes at sea. It’s dangerous not to acknowledge the real source of the risk. Image: Filipino and Chinese crew members eyeball to eyeball in the South China Sea this week as their vessels collide at the Second Thomas Shoal. Getty A key step in preventing conflict is acknowledging the risk. Former Australian prime minister Paul Keating’s assertion this week that Senator Penny Wong’s speech highlighting the risk of a conflict was intended to be “rattling” for China is wide of the mark and dangerous. Although China’s behaviour in the region was not directly mentioned in the major keynotes or the leaders’ statement at the ASEAN-Australia special summit held in Melbourne this week, the topic was omnipresent. Reinforced by the images of Tuesday’s bullying behaviour from Chinese Coast Guard vessels towards vessels from the Philippines. A coincidental incident, or perhaps signalling from Beijing to the leaders attending the summit. Either way, China’s actions on the seas and in the skies above the South China Sea are undermining key principles of international law. Principles that have underwritten both Australia’s and the region’s recent peace and prosperity leading to what Senator Wong rightly characterised as the “most confronting circumstances in our region in decades” – a point Keating seems to gloss over in his erratic critique of Wong. A conflict in the region would be catastrophic. If Australia were to be involved, which may well be unavoidable, such a conflict would result in the significant loss of life of our servicewomen and men. It would also generate a fundamental shift in the average Australian’s way of life as Australia’s maritime trade is restricted. It is in this vein that conflict prevention was rightly a major theme of the Australian foreign minister’s keynote speech at this week’s ASEAN-Australia special summit. Unsafe interactions How might conflict in the region arise? There are several flashpoints, but one of the most urgent is the growing number of incidents between ships and aircraft in the region, driven by displays of aggression and unprofessionalism from China’s military ships and aircraft. This was made plain in the 2023 release of Pentagon imagery documenting nearly 200 unsafe interactions between US and People’s Liberation Army Air Force pilots between September 2021 and October 2023. Australian ships and aircraft have also been subject to this behaviour. It was just under two years ago that a Chinese fighter jet deployed metal fragments in the form of chaff into the engines of an Australian maritime patrol aircraft. Less than six months ago a Chinese destroyer aggressively approached HMAS Toowoomba, injuring two of its sailors whilst Toowoomba conducted diving operations. These reckless actions could lead to a miscalculation. In the media surrounding this week’s ASEAN-Australia special summit the president of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos jr has been front and centre. On the topic of a conflict in the region, Marcos has been clear that a regional conflict could arise by accident, a miscalculation with significant unintended consequences. Marcos’ words in a television interview on Monday night were almost prescient, as on Tuesday imagery once again emerged of Chinese Coast Guard ships aggressively blockading Philippine vessels within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. Like clockwork, China again ramped up its aggressive actions in the West Philippine Sea attempting to stop a contracted Philippine resupply vessel from reaching Second Thomas Shoal. The dangerous manoeuvres resulted in a minor collision between Chinese Coast Guard and Philippines’ Coast Guard vessels. Compounding the aggressive tactics, two Chinese Coast Guard Vessels directed water cannons onto the much smaller wooden resupply vessel, shattering the bridge windows and causing minor injuries to four crew members on board. Thankfully the injuries were minor, but what if they had been more serious? Could this have been the spark that ignites a regional conflict? ‘Preventive architecture’ So how do we avoid an accidental incident between ships or aircraft sparking an unintended regional conflict? Australia and ASEAN can do this by working to establish measures of incident avoidance and crisis management. As Senator Wong articulated we must work to establish a “preventive architecture to increase resilience and reduce the risk of conflict through misunderstanding or miscalculation”. Marcos made similar calls seeking a direct communications line with China to manage crises as they emerge. Confidence building and preventive mechanisms like those effectively employed between the United States and Russia during the Cold War are crucial to avoiding an accidental escalation. However, this work must be underpinned by the effective implementation of Australia’s deterrence strategy. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review highlighted the essential nature of statecraft to Australia’s strategy of deterrence. This week’s ASEAN summit was in many ways a good example of adept statecraft complementing Australia’s defence strategy, but to ensure effective deterrence we must go further. In responding to China’s continued aggression in the vicinity of Second Thomas Shoal, we must employ a similar escalation in diplomatic responses. This week’s incident – the overt aggression of two Chinese Coast Guard vessels water cannoning a wooden Philippines resupply vessel – calls for a higher level of response. Whilst there were many positive takeaways from this week’s ASEAN-Australia special summit, the timing of the Chinese Coast Guard incident, the lack of acknowledgement of the incident or reinforcement of the 2016 arbitral tribunal in the leaders’ statement, albeit largely expected, leaves a shadow over the summit. It is time for Senator Wong to directly address China’s actions this week. To reduce the risk of regional conflict arising because of a miscalculation between ships and aircraft, not only must we focus on increasing the risk reduction architecture in the region, but we must underwrite our strategy of deterrence by clearly articulating that China’s aggression towards the Philippines this week was unacceptable.

21 February | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review 21 February Image: HMAS ANZAC, Royal Australian Navy It is a historic day when the government has finally agreed to support an enhanced surface combatant fleet capability for the Royal Australian Navy. Australia has a proud history of defending our nation, but our maritime history is often missing from this discourse, a strange omission for an island nation. In the announcement of the enhanced naval surface combatant fleet capability, Australia took a large step forward in acknowledging the realities of our geography and of our strategic circumstances. Following much conjecture, an eight-month Defence Strategic Review, a five-month independent analysis and four-month government deliberation, we finally know the planned future of the Royal Australian Navy’s surface combatant fleet. The RAN currently has 11 major surface combatants, eight Anzac class guided missile frigates and three Hobart class air warfare destroyers. While this is not the entirety of the RAN’s surface fleet, these surface combatants are the ships that provide the RAN’s defensive and offensive maritime capability, its frigates and destroyers. Until yesterday’s announcement, the ageing Anzac class ships had been scheduled to be replaced by nine vessels from the troubled Hunter class frigate program. A largely expected outcome of the review team’s recommendation has been to reduce the Hunter class frigate program from nine vessels to six. Although the detail is yet to follow, the timing of the build also appears to have been spread out with the final of the six being delivered in 2043. Although there has been significant criticism that the Hunter class is not a capable vessel, this criticism largely undersells the need to have towed sonar array capable anti-submarine warfare ships as part of a balanced naval force. Australia took a large step forward in acknowledging the realities of our geography and the realities of our strategic circumstances. The big change in yesterday’s announcement was the decision to acquire 11 multipurpose frigates, multipurpose meaning that they can operate across the full spectrum of naval warfare from combatting submarines, to surface ships, aircraft, missiles and likely uncrewed capabilities. Of course, the type of frigate this will actually be is unclear as Defence will undertake a competitive evaluation process, but the contenders have been narrowed down to options from Germany, Spain, the Republic of Korea and Japan. What we do know is that this will be a frigate anywhere between the size of a 3500-tonne Anzac class frigate, which is a light frigate by all intents and purposes, to something closer to 5000-6000 tonnes with at least twice the amount of missile capability of an Anzac class frigate. The size is important because a general-purpose frigate will need the capability to operate in a range of different warfare scenarios. The second surprise announcement, although perhaps it shouldn’t have been, was the decision to acquire six large optionally crewed surface vessels (LOSV), in concert with the United States. This is largely code for joining the current United States large uncrewed surface vessel program, one that the United States has been pushing as a solution to their dwindling naval fleet size. The proposed concept for these vessels is that they will be designed with significant missile capability and teamed with the Hobart class destroyers or Hunter class frigates to enhance the number of missiles that can be put to sea in a naval task group. Whilst this is not an existing capability, it is certainly a naval concept of operations that the United States has been toying with for some time. To many, it was likely intriguing that the Government stressed in yesterday’s announcement that this capability would be crewed, despite it being developed to be an uncrewed capability. The emphasis on crewing was likely to combat any concerns raised with the legal status of lethal autonomous vessels, which is yet to be resolved under international law. The LOSV capability is not expected to commence delivery until the mid-2030s, and there is a lot of water to pass under the bridge, so to speak, between now and then. Pending the evolution of the technology, international law, and the concept of employment it is highly likely that this capability will operate in our navy in an uncrewed fashion, despite yesterday’s announcements. The final capability change was the decision to reduce the size of the Arafura Offshore Patrol Vessel fleet from 12 to six. Another troubled naval shipbuilding program, it has never been clear where the Arafura sits in the navy’s concept of operations. Its crew size in the 40s makes it inefficient for constabulary operations and its lack of armament and survivability make it unable to be used in the event of crisis and conflict. This is not to mention, of course, that there are clear engineering issues with the vessel, with the first of class launched in 2021, but introduction into the navy’s fleet appearing to be delayed indefinitely. While it was too late to scrap this vessel, with two in the water and five in build, there is perhaps a missed opportunity to offer this vessel for sale to a regional partner to boost their maritime capabilities in countering China’s aggression in the South China Sea. For 50 years reviews of the surface combatant fleet have been calling for a larger navy to defend Australia’s extensive maritime interests. It is indeed a historic day that the government has agreed to support this capability, but there are significant challenges to be addressed, including the development of the workforce to build and crew these vessels. And it must be acknowledged that for the latter half of the 2020s we are accepting a significant risk, with a reduced and degraded surface fleet. Of course, we have been here before, when the 1987 white paper based on the 1986 Dibb review agreed to an increase of the naval surface combatant fleet. Hopefully, this time we stay the course. To defend Australia, we will need to. Although there is a long way to go, perhaps we are finally becoming a true maritime nation.

2 February 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Lowy Institute's The Interpreter on 2 February 2024 Image: US Navy Australia’s view of the Indo-Pacific generally stops at Sri Lanka and the southern tip of India. But this regional conceptualisation leaves out the western region of the Indian Ocean. This may perhaps stem from a realist’s recognition of capability and capacity constraints – but equally, as the recent campaign of Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden has demonstrated, security in the western Indian Ocean has an impact on Australia. The plight of stranded sheep and cattle that had been bound for export to the Middle East is only one obvious example. The maritime security challenges in the western Indian Ocean are diverse and complex. From the dramatic impact of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing to the consequences of rising sea levels, maritime terrorism, and piracy. However, two common threads are evident – the need for enhanced maritime domain awareness, and the limited capabilities to respond to the threats when detected. While Australia may have a capacity issue in engaging in maritime security in the western Indian Ocean region, there are options to leverage existing projects and relationships to improve maritime domain awareness.. The Quad has already set out an ambition for an Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) project, which was announced at the 2022 leaders’ meeting in Tokyo. This initiative provides a vehicle for greater Australian engagement in assisting with maritime security challenges in the western Indian Ocean. An additional data feed is particularly helpful in the detection of “dark shipping” operating without the use of location transponders. The stated purpose of IPMDA is to create a “technology and training initiative to enhance maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific region and to bring increased transparency to its critical waterways”. It amounts to sharing data as a public good. As the Quad traces its roots back to the provision of humanitarian and disaster relief support in the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, IPMDA makes sense as an initiative for the grouping with the potential to assist maritime security in the region. A risk to IPMDA is the seemingly limited progress of the project in the western Indian Ocean region, where it could make a real difference to maritime security. There has been limited official detail on the ambitious project to provide near real-time data in the maritime domain through what appears to be the resourcing of commercial arrangements through public-private partnerships. At the last Quad leaders' meeting, on the sidelines of the 2023 G7 summit in Hiroshima, it was highlighted that IPMDA was in its initial phase, with pilots occurring in the Pacific, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. The Quad partners have not officially released where the IPMDA pilots are occurring but it is likely to be in the Information Fusion Centre, Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) in Gurugram India, the Singapore Information Fusion Centre, and alongside the Forum Fisheries Agency in Solomon Islands. It has not been rolled out to the western Indian Ocean, where there appears to be little awareness of the IPMDA project. The initial focus of IPMDA is the delivery of satellite-based radio frequency data. This satellite capability allows for the detection and classification of ships by data emitted by radar or communications equipment. This additional data feed is particularly helpful in the detection of “dark shipping”, that is ships operating without the use of location transponders known as the Automatic identification System, or AIS. Monitoring radio frequency data is a technology that advanced militaries have commonly used, but one that has been off limits to smaller nations due to its cost. The ability to integrate this data into existing maritime monitoring systems such as the US-funded Seavision, which is commonly used in the western Indian Ocean, would prove a significant asset. Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has awarded a contract to the company Hawkeye 360 to provide satellite radio frequency data and training to the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency. Australia’s investment has been further supported by a United States US$12.2 million contract to Hawkeye to provide further data analytics and training in the Pacific in Southeast Asia. For the next phase of the project, Australia should support a roll out of IPMDA through the provision of radio frequency satellite data to the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre in Madagascar and the Regional Operations Coordination Centre in the Seychelles. This would significantly enhance the monitoring capacity in the western Indian Ocean region, which in turn enhances Australia’s maritime security as an Indian Ocean coastal state.

Jennifer Parker | 9 February 2024 *Originally published in The Strategist 9 February 2024 Image: HMAS Voyager (II) crew 1962, Australian War Memorial Tomorrow marks the 60th anniversary of the loss of the Royal Australian Navy destroyer, HMAS Voyager (II), which sank 20 nautical miles south-east of Jervis Bay. Of the 314 crew of Voyager, 82 were lost that night in Australia’s worst peacetime military disaster. Many more lives were altered forever. We are a maritime nation and yet our maritime history is often forgotten. We must remember the loss of Voyager on the night of Saturday 10 February, 1964. The destroyer was escorting HMAS Melbourne (II), Australia’s last aircraft carrier, as it carried out flying operations. Both ships had recently emerged from refits. Voyager was the ‘plane guard’, positioned 1000-2000 yards off Melbourne’s port quarter to recover the crew of any aircraft that might ditch. Following a series of manoeuvres, Voyager ended up out of position on Melbourne’s starboard bow and was required to resume her station. How and why Voyager ended up in this position remains unclear 60 years on although there are many theories. In truth, we will never know as most of the bridge team were lost that night. Presumably attempting to resume her station, Voyager was seen to alter to starboard away from the carrier, and then back to port towards it. The 3,600 tonne Voyager crossed the bow of the 20,000 tonne Melbourne. There was little time to react and despite attempts to avoid the collision in the final seconds, the two ships collided at 20:56. Melbourne’s bow struck Voyager aft of her bridge, severing the ship. Voyager’s bow passed down the port side of Melbourne, sinking within 10 minutes of the collision. A recovery operation was immediately launched by Melbourne, which was joined by several vessels from HMAS Creswell, in Jervis Bay. Many stories of heroism emerged from the hellish night. Midshipman Kerry Francis Marien survived the collision but left the relative safety of his life raft and was last seen swimming towards the rapidly sinking bow of Voyager to search for survivors struggling in the water. Chief Petty Officer Jonathan ‘Buck’ Rogers was trapped in the forward section of the bow. Realising he was too big to get through the small escape hatches, Buck took charge of trying to help the 50 sailors trapped with him to escape. And when escape was no longer possible, he was heard leading those trapped there in prayers and hymns. There are many stories of heroism from that night, of the brave men of the Royal Australian Navy rising to the occasion to save the lives of shipmates and friends. Stories that we know, and stories we will never know. In the years that followed the loss of Voyager, the national conversation was dominated by the controversy. The incident was followed by two royal commissions and many theories and books on how and why such a horrific peacetime loss of life could occur. It is of course important to understand why Voyager was lost and where accountability lies. Whilst we should never lose sight of the many hard lessons learnt, on the 60th anniversary we should focus our thoughts on the brave sailors who died and those who survived but whose lives were never the same. The sea is a perilous place, it does not recognise a distinction between wartime and peacetime. Every time our naval ships set sail, they put themselves at the mercy of this unforgiving environment. For centuries the oceans have rallied against those who seek to tame it, and operating in this environment will always be dangerous. Preparation in this domain for the possibility of conflict requires the women and men of our Navy to practise the operations and procedures that they will rely on in wartime. There is always risk, and they embrace it daily. When we think of our military heroes we talk of those on the Kokoda track and the trials of Gallipoli and the Western front. They all rightfully deserve a place in the collective memory of our nation and remind us of what war really means, especially in this time of global tensions that permeate all aspects of international and national security. On the anniversary of the Voyager’s loss we must also remember the brave men lost in peacetime as they trained to defend their country. They too are our heroes, and they died in the service of our nation.

6 February | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review 6 February 2024 Image: Defence Images The federal government has compared our circumstances to those in the lead-up to World War II. Australians are faced with wars in Europe and the Middle East, and tensions in the South China Sea and north-east Asia that may spill over into conflict. Amidst these generation-defining global challenges, the Australian Defence Force is struggling to upgrade and crew its capabilities. It needs a bigger budget and it needs more people. But, more importantly, it needs to convince the public why they should care about these issues. Protecting Australia’s strategic interests and our national way of life requires not only a capable Defence Force, but also a strong defence debate and a public that is brought along for the journey. Despite the critical importance of an informed debate, and an informed Australian public, risk aversion has largely removed the ADF from this debate. That’s different from our AUKUS partners in the United Kingdom and the United States. Not only is it rare to see senior defence leaders speak candidly about the challenges we face in an unscripted way, but the conversation is largely stifled at all levels. Defence members seeking to publish or comment on defence-related issues are largely undermined by defence policies, or a rigid interpretation of these policies. A direct comparison between the defence-related websites and publications in the United States and Australia shows American officers and enlisted personnel routinely engage in debates about the future of their nation’s defence. In Australia, this is rare. The removal of ADF personnel from the national defence conversation is partially a product of the increasing restrictions placed on them by successive governments of both parties over the past few decades. But it’s also the product of self-censorship and risk aversion within the organisation. The paralysis created by the concern with being perceived to have said the wrong thing, being perceived to have spoken before the government, or offered an opinion at odds to the government has shut down debate. The apolitical nature of the ADF should not be interpreted as it having no voice on defence issues. It should, and it must. A key principle of Australian society is that the ADF is subordinate to the government of the day. It is, of course, essential that defence is seen in this light and is viewed as apolitical. The current Chief of Defence Force clearly takes this seriously, by removing himself and fellow senior officers from the background of a 2019 interview with the then minister for defence, as Christopher Pyne took a series of questions on political issues. A symbolic, but important, action. But the apolitical nature of the ADF should not be interpreted as Defence and its members having no voice on defence issues. It should, and it must. In 2015 another former defence minister, Kevin Andrews, commissioned a report on Australian attitudes to defence by an expert panel external to the department and the ADF. A key finding was that “enhanced public awareness was needed on defence roles and missions, how it performs these tasks and the underlying policy rationale”. The panel found the Department of Defence needed to be less risk-averse in its approach to communications and agreed to work with the department to address these issues. Since 2015, subsequent defence policies including the centralisation of communications management and the rigid implementation of that policy have further stifled defence communications – not only Department of Defence communications with the public, but also defence debates on capabilities, policies and ideas within its own ranks. In an interview in January the prime minister highlighted that defence spending was likely to be a focus of the 2024 budget, stating “you can’t defend Australia with a press release, you need assets”. While there is no denying the truth of this statement, it’s not a case of convincing the government or the Canberra elites that defence funding is necessary, it’s about convincing the Australian public that this should be a spending priority. The public does not want to hear this from the government, or from academia, but from Defence. This is what the 2015 panel of experts clearly told us. Despite cynicism about defence capability overspends, the Australian public is largely trusting of our women and men in uniform. Time and time again these are the uniforms they see when they experience personal disaster in fire and flood. The Department of Defence needs to be communicating with the public about what the threat is, and what we need to do to combat the threat. This isn’t only our senior leaders, but all levels of defence. Presumably there are senior leaders in the ADF who would welcome the ability to speak more candidly about the challenges. If this is true, maybe it’s time for the government to allow this. Absent from this conversation, the public’s education on defence is through the “gotcha” moments of Senate Estimates or the sensational headlines designed to gain clicks on the armed forces’ capability and workforce woes. In this environment, without engagement from Defence it will be difficult to convince the Australian public why defence matters, why they should be trusted with larger defence budgets and why they should send their children to join the Defence Force.