28 August 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published with the United States Studies Centre on 28 August Breaking down the figures of Australia’s ambitious nuclear-powered submarine project and debunking the myths of cheaper alternate capability options. Image: Chief of the Nuclear Powered Submarine Taskforce Vice Admiral Jonathan Mead AO, RAN, Minister for Defence Industry, the Hon. Pat Conroy MP, Australian Deputy Prime Minister, the Hon. Richard Marles MP, Minister for Defence Personnel, the Hon. Matt Keogh MP, and U.S Rear Admiral Richard Seif on board United States Navy Submarine USS Asheville during a visit to HMAS Stirling, Western Australia Australian ambition to acquire nuclear-powered submarines is not a new concept. From a strategic, operational and tactical perspective, it makes sense, given Australia’s vast maritime domain and extensive maritime vulnerabilities. Aside from the obvious hurdle of United States support, the question has always been one of opportunity cost, or put crudely, ‘bang for buck.’ Cost of nuclear-powered submarines To address the ‘bang for buck’ question, you must start with the ‘buck’: how much will Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines cost? If yelled into a press pack, you would quickly hear the answer $368 billion — but that answer would be wrong. Cost comes in many forms: impacts on workforce, infrastructure, defence industry and timeframes are all encompassed in the ‘cost’ of the project. But let’s talk monetary cost for a moment — the eyewatering $368 billion initial price tag. It’s tempting to argue that you can acquire a B-21 for just under a billion dollars, 1 yet we are paying $368 billion for 8 submarines. This is an emotive comparison, but it is one that is invariably wrong. For want of a better analogy, its comparing apples and oranges. A key problem with discussion around defence project costs is that the arguments are almost invariably comparing different metrics. To understand cost, it is critical to understand key variables, including the time period it is over and whether the costed amount includes sustainment, infrastructure, workforce costs etc. These are seemingly mundane but exceptionally important issues. So with that in mind — what does the government’s quoted $368 billion dollars cover? Significantly, the projected cost of Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine pathway is not $368 billion dollars — it’s $244.7 billion over a period of 31 years from 2023-24 to 2054-55. 2 The difference between the $244.7 billion and the quoted $368 billion is a $122.9 billion contingency figure, representing 50% of the project. Contrary to the persistent comments that $368 billion dollars is likely an underestimate, it is in fact a deliberate 50% overestimate. Every defence project in the Integrated Investment Program (IIP) is allocated a contingency. Contingency amounts are effectively unfunded reserves that can be drawn on with approval should an ‘unforeseen’ event occur. 3 Think of them as a margin applied for project risk. Most defence projects in the IIP are assigned between 5-10% contingency. DEF 1, the project name for Australia’s plan to acquire nuclear-powered submarines has been assigned a 50% contingency. This means the risk is acknowledged in the funding profile. Contrary to the persistent comments that $368 billion dollars is likely an underestimate, it is in fact a deliberate 50% overestimate. 4 Does this mean that costs won’t change? No — AUKUS is highly complex and the cost estimate spans 31 years, so the notion of identifying the ultimate cost with certainty is laughable. But it does mean that the risk has been accounted for to date. The amount of $244.7 billion accounts for much more than the acquisition of 8 submarines. It includes the whole of program costs — like workforce, infrastructure, regulatory requirements, and the cost of sustaining these submarines and their supporting facilities until 2055. This is important to understand because, when critics argue that Australia should acquire B-21 Bombers at a cost just under a billion dollars an aircraft 5 or a French Barracuda class conventional-submarine at $2.5 billion per submarine, 6 the quoted price for alternative capabilities doesn’t include the cost of the whole program or the cost of sustaining that program. Is AUKUS eating the defence budget? When it comes to cost, long term costs are invariably less reliable. So, whilst it’s important to put the often quoted ‘$368 billion’ dollar figure into perspective, a more accurate assessment is the cost over the near to medium term. Delivery of the submarine optimal pathway is costed at a window of $53-63 billion dollars from 2024-25 to 2033-34, including acquisition, sustainment and supporting infrastructure. 7 The breakdown of this figure is not publicly available, but reportedly contains whole of program costs, including those entailed with both the execution of Submarine Rotational Force West (SRF-W) and the delivery of the first Virginia -class submarine. These 2 capability milestones are significant because they debunk the erroneous claims that AUKUS won’t deliver submarine capability for 40 years. 8 Whilst it’s important to put the often quoted ‘$368 billion’ dollar figure into perspective, a more accurate assessment is the cost over the near to medium term. In response to the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR), the announcement of the AUKUS submarine optimal pathway and the planned expansion of the surface combatant fleet, the current government announced in May 2024 that it would increase the Australian defence budget by $50.3 billion over the decade. 9 The 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU) agreed a defence budget growth profile of 5-6% per annum, which would have equated to an uplift of approximately $716.4 billion over the decade. 10 The uplift in the defence budget announced in May 2024 will provide for defence spending of $765.4, providing approximately an additional $49 billion beyond the DSU growth profile over the next 10 years. 11 The Attack-class submarine program that preceded AUKUS was expected to cost approximately $30 billion over the next 10 years. 12 The nuclear-powered submarine optimal pathway costs an additional $33 billion over the same timeframe. The increased defence budget committed to by the current government more than accounts for the gap between the planned Attack-class spend and the AUKUS submarine optimal pathway. Overall, the AUKUS Pillar 1 spend over the total decade roughly accounts for 7-8% of the defence budget. 13 Defence’s most expensive project, yes — but eating the defence budget? Hardly. This isn’t to say that the defence budget is adequate or increasing in the right timeframe — it just means that AUKUS Pillar 1 isn’t consuming the defence budget. Of course, the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines won’t address all of the Department of Defence’s capability issues — but that’s a different conversation. But are there cheaper alternatives? Well — yes, but not any that would deliver the same degree of capability and control over those capabilities that Australia desires. There has been a plethora of alternatives put forward. Proposed alternatives include outsourcing the functions required of Australian submarines to a permanent UK and US presence, effectively giving up Australia’s ability to operate submarines becoming a “pit stop power”; 14 acquiring 40 conventional submarines; 15 acquiring B21 bombers — the list goes on. Some have suggested ceasing the acquisition of submarines altogether and investing in combatting climate change, healthcare and education. There is neither space, nor the desire to breakdown every proposed alternative here, so I’ll address some key elements. Australia’s 2020 DSU, 2023 DSR and 2024 National Defence Strategy, alongside the strategic documents of Australia’s allies and partners, have one thing in common: a recognition that the world order is changing rapidly and that conflict in the Indo-Pacific, although not inevitable, is increasingly possible. Whilst national social welfare and combatting climate change are incredibly important, they will not protect Australia’s national interests in a worsening strategic environment. On the outsourcing question — it is simply not logical that Australia, an island nation, would outsource its maritime security. There is a reason Australia has established its submarine service 3 times in its history; every time we have considered foregoing the capability it has become apparent that they provide an asymmetric advantage for a maritime nation. There is a reason Australia has established its submarine service three times in its history; every time we have considered foregoing the capability it has become apparent that they provide an asymmetric advantage for a maritime nation. The argument that the current capability plan to acquire nuclear-powered submarines should be replaced with the acquisition of B-21s or additional conventional submarines is a dangerous one. AUKUS, whilst in essence a capability transfer pact, is also central to Australia’s deterrent signalling. The signalling effect of AUKUS cooperation has been palpable, marked by China’s extensive efforts to release misinformation about the pact and lobby the International Atomic Energy Agency to obstruct it. Whatever its risks, right now Australia’s plan to acquire nuclear-powered submarines is on track. 16 Whilst it may not always remain so, changing course without a catastrophic failing of the plan would fundamentally undermine the signalling element of AUKUS and the trust Australia’s AUKUS partners hold in Australia. Submarines provide a vast array of capabilities from intelligence to surveillance and reconnaissance to mine-laying to maritime strike to land-strike to anti-submarine warfare. In the maritime domain they are unrivalled. Whilst acquiring B-21s could substitute some of the strike elements of submarine operations, they would fail to fulfill the remaining functions. Could a series of capabilities address the spectrum of these functions? Maybe. But not with the versatility of submarines and there is no guarantee that a collection of these mythical capabilities would be cheaper. This is not to say that Australia should not invest in long-range strike options such as B-21s, but it should not do so at the expense of submarines. As for the suggestion of a greater number of conventionally powered submarines, a number of challenges make this proposal imprudent. Major impediments would include crewing, industrial capacity to build them or buy them in a strategically relevant timeframe, and most significantly, the likelihood of this being a more expensive approach than the AUKUS pathway. The unique nature of Australia’s maritime domain and the distances and depths involved mean that Australia cannot just operate any submarine, invariably it needs to be larger and more capable than the average conventional submarine. Australia’s operating environment is dramatically different to that of submarine producing countries like Japan and Germany. Let’s remember — Australia went down the path of attempting to acquire 12 conventional submarines from France. This was not orders of magnitude cheaper than Australia’s planned acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. At the time of cancellation, the acquisition cost for the French Attack-class submarine was listed as $90 billion, which did not include sustainment, supporting facilities or a contingency allocation. 17 The life of type sustainment costs until 2080 were quoted as $145 billion, but again this did not include supporting costs such as infrastructure and workforce. 18 The nuclear-powered optimal pathway is costed at $244.7 billion until 2055. The Attack-class fleet of conventionally-powered Barracuda submarines was costed at $235 billion until 2080, but this was known to be an underestimate. 19 With rough maths you can see that increasing an order like this from 12 to 40 conventional submarines would be no cheaper than Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine pathway and clearly unsustainable from a workforce perspective. 20 Capability speed The Attack-class program with all its challenges was due to deliver its first submarine in 2036 and its final submarine in 2054. 21 Under the nuclear-powered submarine optimal pathway, Australia will have Australian sailors and officers operating from HMAS Stirling in US and UK submarines from 2027. This is of course not ideal, as the tasking of SRF-W will not be controlled by Australia. However, from a wider regional perspective, SRF-W will have a net regional effect far earlier than the previously planned 2036 timeframe of the first Attack-class submarine. Under the optimal pathway, Australia will be operating two Virginia -class submarines, with a third on its way, before the first Attack-class submarine was due to be delivered. The optimal pathway will provide a capability quicker than Australia’s abandoned plan to acquire conventional submarines, and most certainly quicker than any new plan could deliver at this point. So, does the current optimal pathway provide ‘bang for buck’? Australian-owned and operated submarines are critical to Australia’s defence as a maritime nation. The current plan, whilst expensive and risky, is presently on track and delivers capability to service earlier than any prior plan. Whilst it is more expensive than the Attack-class project, it is not orders of magnitude more expensive nor is it ‘eating’ the defence budget. At this point in the journey, it certainly does provide ‘bang for buck.’

27 August 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Australian on 27 August 2024 Image: Indonesian Defence Minister and President-elect Prabowo Subianto with the Prime Minister of Australia, The Hon Anthony Albanese MP and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, the Hon Richard Marles MP speaking at a press conference at Parliament House in Canberra. Source: Defence Images In recent years the defence relationship between Australia and Indonesia has developed significantly, with a range of more complex activities occurring between the two countries. The enhancement of the relationship will shortly culminate in the signing of a treaty-level Defence Cooperation Agreement, one Richard Marles labelled as “profoundly historic”. The Indonesia-Australia defence relationship is critical to Australia’s defence. Geography is an unalterable truth. When Australia looks north, it sees Indonesia. But when Indonesia looks north it doesn’t see Australia. The relationship is important, but it will never be as close as Australia would wish. Australia must understand the constraints of the relationship, work within these constraints and avoid representing it as something it is not. In the joint media statement last week Anthony Albanese and Marles spoke of “strong defence co-operation” and “strengthening interoperability”, while Indonesian President-elect Prabowo spoke of “more Australian participation in our economy” and Australian assistance in “agriculture, food ­security”. The difference in language between the two countries is important. It is symbolic of the differences in how both partners view the relationship. Dramatic fluctuations have been the hallmark of the relationship since Indonesia’s independence, and will remain a feature of the relationship. Both countries have a very different strategic focus, alignment, outlook and development priorities. Efforts like the DCA can help to smooth out the bumps in the relationship, but they will not fundamentally change it. The agreement joins a long list of defence-related strategic deals between Australia and Indonesia, commencing with the ill-fated 1995 security agreement. That arrangement committed the partners to consult in the event of “adverse challenges to either party or to their common security interest”. In many ways, this, the first treaty of its kind ever signed by Indonesia, was “profoundly historic”; the DCA, while significant, is less so. Indonesia cancelled the 1995 agreement in light of Australia’s 1999 United Nations-endorsed International Force East Timor intervention. The cancellation of the 1995 security treaty is not a blip in the history of the relationship, but an example of the limits of a relationship between two countries with different strategic priorities. These priorities have been on show since the landslide election of the outward-looking Prabowo. Prabowo, who will assume the role of Indonesian president in October, chose to visit China in his first international visit since the 2024 Indonesian election. It would have been much quicker to hop on a plane to Australia. Prabowo’s symbolic visit to China was followed in July by a visit to Russia, his fourth in four years. During his visit, Prabowo sought support from Putin to help Indonesia develop a civil nuclear industry, while requesting that Russia’s Defence Minister, Andrey Belousov, provide technology to develop Indonesia’s defence industry – a sentiment that would not have been lost on Australian politicians and officials at the May Shangri-la dialogue in Singapore. In his speech to the audience, Prabowo avoided condemning the illegal Russian invasion of the Ukraine. Indonesia is fiercely non-aligned, and while it courts close friendships with its neighbours like Australia, there will always be limits to the strategic depth of the relationship. Indonesia is desperate to develop its infrastructure and broader economy. This was made clear in the joint press conference announcing the completion of negotiations of the Defence Cooperation Agreement. While Australia talks defence, Indonesia talks development. Australia must recognise the realities of the relationship and avoid overreaching or trying to push Indonesia too far on operationalising the security relationship. It is perhaps Australia’s desire to operationalise the defence relationship that has historically resulted in limited success, despite the plethora of defence-related agreements between the countries, high-level talks and military exercises. Australia is of course right to court a closer defence relationship with Indonesia. Indonesia’s geographic position makes it central to Australia’s security. Not only does two-thirds of Australia’s maritime trade pass through the Indonesian archipelago, so would any prospective adversarial naval task group or air threat. Short of conflict, co-operation with Indonesia is critical to Australia’s ability to deal with a vast spectrum of civil threats, from irregular migration to terrorism. Even before the completion of negotiations for the DCA, the Indonesia–Australia defence relationship had reached a high point in recent years, with a greater number of exercises conducted between the two defence forces. No better case study exists for this than Exercise Keris Woomera, a bilateral amphibious activity that includes complex air, land and maritime training between Australia and Indonesia as part of Australia’s Indo-Pacific Endeavour regional deployment. The defence relationship between the two countries has grown substantially in recent years, and the signing of the new DCA will give it a renewed vigour. Australia and Indonesia should be proud of these achievements. But Australia must remain cognisant that Indonesia matters more to Australian security than Australia does to Indonesian security. Australia must recognise the strategic limits of the relationship, listen to what Indonesia says its focus is and work within those boundaries to avoid pushing it too far and overestimating the nature of the defence relationship.

22 August 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Strategist on 23 August 2024. Image: HMAS Darwin replenishing from USNS Richard Byrd in the Arabian Sea in 2014. Photo credit: Department of Defence Australia must become more active in the western Indian Ocean, not least because the country’s fuel supplies depend on tanker traffic through the region. The Royal Australian Navy has operated in the western Indian Ocean consistently for more than a quarter of its history. Those operations have spanned a spectrum of tasks from counter-piracy, counter-narcotics and counterterrorism to support to both Gulf Wars in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. The nature and persistence of such operations is often attributed to Australia–US alliance responsibilities or the need for operational experience. However, the overarching reason is that western Indian Ocean maritime security directly affects Australia’s national security. While maritime operations in the region are understandably not Australia’s primary focus, ignoring the region and its impact on national security may have significant consequences as the Indian Ocean becomes more contested. Maritime operations and capacity building in the western Indian Ocean must be factored into Australia’s maritime strategy. Since the articulation of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept in the 2013 Defence White Paper and the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, Australia has limited its Indo-Pacific imagination to the eastern Indian Ocean. That focus has been reinforced repeatedly since then, including in the recent National Defence Strategy (NDS) . The NDS defines Australia’s primary area of military interest as ‘the immediate region encompassing the Northeast Indian Ocean through maritime Southeast Asia into the Pacific’. A primary focus on the northeastern Indian Ocean makes sense for many reasons. The obvious ones are the importance of the oil and gas reserves on Australia’s northwest shelf, Australia’s northern approaches and the ‘general proximity’ argument. The Malacca Strait between Singapore and Indonesia, and the Sunda and Lombok straits through the Indonesian archipelago, are central to Australia’s maritime trade dependencies . In a time of crisis or conflict, any direct threat to Australia beyond missile and long-range bomber attacks would likely transit through the northeastern Indian Ocean, although not exclusively. The Australian Defence Force and the current and previous governments have actively sought to bolster the defence presence in the northeastern Indian Ocean. This has taken the form of naval diplomacy through the Indo-Pacific Endeavour regional engagement activity and the bolstering of facilities in Australia’s Indian Ocean territories. The Cocos (Keeling) Islands have become a focus: a significant investment is being made to upgrade the airstrip there on West Island to support Australian P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft, and there has been talk of potential deployments of the Australian Army’s new HIMARS missile launchers there for maritime strike capability. This emphasis has been underwritten by the new era of maritime patrol aircraft diplomacy , including visits to the Maldives and a suite of new defence attache appointments. The focus on the eastern Indian Ocean is extended by the expansion of Australia’s naval base in Rockingham, Western Australia. The base HMAS Stirling will not only play host to Submarine Rotational Force–West from 2027 and Australia’s nuclear-powered submarines; it will also inevitably be host to Australia’s expanding surface combatant fleet, albeit in the 2030s. In many respects, Australia’s increased emphasis on the eastern Indian Ocean is realising what Kim Beazley hoped for with his 1987 two-ocean Navy strategy . However, Australia’s Indian Ocean defence engagement cannot be confined just to the eastern Indian Ocean or subscribe to an artificial line drawn south from India in its conception of the Indo-Pacific. There are several reasons for this, from population growth in Africa to Australia’s important trade relationships with the European Union, Australia’s third-largest trading partner. However, the most compelling and strategically significant is Australia’s fuel supply. Australia imports 90 percent of its fuel . Any interruption to the fuel supply would have dramatic and immediate effects not only on the Australian economy, but also on Australia’s ability to defend itself. F-35 fighters would not be able to fly, and HIMARS launchers could not be moved around the country, to name but two of the effects. In conversations about Australian fuel supply across the Indian Ocean, it is common for concerns to be dismissed by pointing out that Australia imports most of its fuel from its north. In June 2024, the top three exporters of fuel to Australia were South Korea, Singapore and Malaysia . But there is a catch: those imports are of refined fuel, because all but two Australian oil refineries have closed. South Korea, Singapore and Malaysia all import most of their crude oil from the Middle East, so any interruption to the crude-oil supply across the Indian Ocean will directly affect Australia’s fuel supplies and its national security. While many countries in the region are also vulnerable, Australia’s vulnerability is twofold. Australia’s fuel needs to cross the Indian Ocean twice, first as crude oil from the western Indian Ocean to the Malacca Strait to be refined in Asia, then through the Indonesian archipelago back into the Indian Ocean as refined fuel to be imported into Australia. Australia’s fuel supply is but one obvious example of why Australia should care about maritime security in the western Indian Ocean. While there have been calls for Australia to bolster its fuel-supply resilience , policies developed to do so will not have an effect in the near to medium term. The western Indian Ocean is increasingly a contested maritime domain, not only as a result of increased piracy and Houthi attacks on shipping, but also because China is gaining a foothold in the region. In 2017, China established a base in Djibouti and has since invested in ports across the western Indian Ocean. In the event of a crisis, it is not a stretch to think that Australia’s fuel supply would be directly affected. While the claim has been made that Australia relies on its partnerships and alliances to ensure maritime security in the western Indian Ocean, that’s not entirely accurate. Australia has relied on partners and allies, in concert with its independent operations, to ensure maritime security in the western Indian Ocean, as evidenced by the near 30 years of continuous Australian naval deployments to this region. Given the implications for it of western Indian Ocean maritime security matters, Australia must become more active in this region through semi-regular deployments of ships and aircraft and through investment in capacity building. This will ensure presence, build relationships in the region and grow the Royal Australian Navy’s fluency with operating in the region—a baseline of familiarity that would be essential to surging operations in the event of a crisis. Australia is correct to prioritise the northeastern Indian Ocean in its military calculus, but that prioritisation should not mean that the western Indian Ocean is ignored. It’s time for Australia to incorporate a greater presence in the western Indian Ocean into its maritime strategy.

Jennifer Parker | 9 August 2024 *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review on 9 August 2024 2024 AUSMIN moved away from defence announceables. But progress on many of the key initiatives is yet to deliver tangible operational results. Image: The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, the Hon Richard Marles MP, and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon Penny Wong, joined their counterparts US Secretary of State, Antony J. Blinken and US Secretary of Defense, Lloyd J. Austin III ahead of the 34th AUSMIN Photo Credit: Defence Images The unremarkable communique issued following the 34th Australia-US Ministerial consultations ( AUSMIN ) could be interpreted as a stagnation in the relationship. In many ways it highlights the strength of the relationship and an increased alignment in strategic thinking. However, the pressure will now be on at 2025 AUSMIN for the watershed of announcements in recent years to start delivering. 2024 AUSMIN moved away from defence announcements, towards updates on ongoing commitments. But progress on many of the key initiatives is yet to deliver tangible operational results. Successes include the rotation of US bombers and other aircraft through Australia, which is slated to increase. Increases in the US marine rotational force capability and integration with the Australian Army are also a success. What is lacking is progress on upgrades to northern bases and Australia’s Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Enterprise (GWEO). The downplaying of AUKUS in the communique could be interpreted as an attempt to take the heat of the AUKUS debate in Australia, which has reached a fervour pitch, at times devoid of facts. But more broadly, it represents a comfort level between the four principles of AUKUS pillar one. But the pressure will ramp up in coming years to deliver the infrastructure groundwork in preparation for phase one – the rotation of US and UK submarines through Western Australia. The detailed comments on China, the Middle East and Russia make clear the level of strategic alignment. But the priority should be completion of Australia’s upgrade of its northern air-base infrastructure, which the US clearly sees as central to its ability to project force from Australia in the event of a crisis of conflict. The rotation of US aircraft through Australia’s northern air bases is another success story. But as the communique highlights, progress is still ongoing to upgrade RAAF bases Darwin and Tindal, with site surveys being undertaken of several of the remaining northern air bases. The issue here is that upgrades to the northern air bases were a key feature of the 2012 Defence Force Posture Review and the 2020 Force Structure Plan (FSP). While enhancing infrastructure in the north is complicated by workforce and resources, the lack of progress in 10 years clearly shows a lack of investment and prioritisation. Australia’s fledgling GWEO Enterprise gets more of a focus in the 2024 communique and was clearly a major discussion point. Another feature of the 2020 FSP, this is critical to sustaining the fight in the event of a conflict and likely crucial to the US’ clear plans to project from Australia in the event of a crisis or a conflict. The challenge here too is insufficient progress, partially as this requires US support. Australia after all operates predominantly US weapons. AUSMIN 2023 indicated the US was focused on providing this support, and AUSMIN 2024 takes the conversation further. There is a commitment to streamlining co-operation on missile and uncrewed aerial vehicle technologies, shadowing agreements on the production of the army precision strike missile in Australia, and a re-statement on their focus on co-production of the army’s guided multiple-launch rocket systems in Australia by 2025. But even this is symbolic. To make sure Australia’s GWEO Enterprise achieves its strategic objectives, it will need to expand to producing more complex and readily used missiles such as the anti-ship and anti-air missiles used by the navy. As the Red Sea has taught the countries who chose to send ships, these expensive missiles are depleted quickly in a modern conflict. AUSMIN 2024 represents more than a decade of hard work to rapidly enhance the defence relationship between the US and Australia. In many ways, 2024 represents a high point in alliance achievements. But this should not give rise to a false sense that the outcomes are where they need to be. For AUSMIN 2025, announcements need to transition into more accelerated outcomes for the alliance to be prepared to deal with the rapidly evolving strategic circumstances.

22 July 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review on 22 July 2024 The Houthis have been remarkably persistent in disrupting global trade. But there is a deeper strategic cost to Australia as well. Image: HMAS Hobart conducts a replenishment at sea with JMSDF Hamana while conducting Operation Argos in the East China Sea as part of a Regional Presence Deployment. Over the weekend, Israel struck back at the Houthis in Yemen after a fatal Houthi drone attack on Tel Aviv. But it is the Houthi’s persistent and indiscriminate targeting of merchant ships in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean that Australia should be most concerned about. It hurts Australia’s national interests, and it’s time to do something about it. Seven months ago, the Houthis, a terrorist organisation based in Yemen, commenced an illegal blockade on the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, a strategic waterway connecting Europe and Asia. Australia’s continued refusal to contribute a ship to protect shipping in this area or interdict weapons from Iran supporting the Houthis sends a concerning signal to state and non-state actors who seek to interfere with maritime trade. It’s a dangerous message to send by a maritime nation dependent on maritime trade. Over the past seven days, Houthi attacks on shipping have intensified with three vessels hit by a combination of explosive uncrewed surface vessels, uncrewed aerial vehicles and ballistic missiles. It is time for Australia to send a ship to the Red Sea and a message that in an increasingly contested maritime domain, it intends to defend the maritime trade and innocent seafarers that keep economies such as its own functioning. The Houthis initially claimed that their attacks were directed only towards ships linked to Israel, or en route to Israel. That category was later expanded to the United States and the United Kingdom. However, in practice, their attacks have been indiscriminate, at times even attacking vessels en route to their backer, Iran. In the initial months of the attacks, many nations scrambled to provide support to the vessels transiting through this strategic waterway. The United States, Australia’s closest ally, requested that Australia send a support ship. The Australian government declined , stating that it preferred to focus on its immediate region. Ships from the Netherlands, Greece, and Germany among others flocked to the region to protect shipping. Ships from Japan, South Korea and India maintained their continued presence in the region to support counter-piracy operations. It is clear the Australian navy has capability problems decades in the making. Australia has increased its Defence Force personnel in the region to support the operations protecting ships in the area and has nominally supported US and UK strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen, although the exact nature of this support is unclear. But the lack of a Royal Australian Navy ship is a glaring omission. It is clear the Navy has capability problems decades in the making. Despite a recent independent review team recommending that it needed to expand, the Navy has shrunk this year with the decommissioning of HMAS ANZAC, one of its 11 surface combatants and its two replenishment vessels seemingly out of action. The diminished fleet is further pressured by the need to upgrade its surface combatants – pressures further compounded by the need for a presence in South-East Asia and support to Operation Sovereign Borders, which detects and intercepts irregular migrants en route to Australia. These challenges will plague the Royal Australian Navy for years to come, but even without these problems, governments need to make decisions about scarce resources. Australia should prioritise the deployment of a Navy ship to the Red Sea for three key reasons. These waterways matter to Australian trade. There have been reports of Australian exports of livestock being stranded at sea, imports of consumer goods from Europe being delayed by the extended trip, and further delays due to increased congestion in Singapore. After all, the European Union is Australia’s third-largest trading partner. Second, and more important than the disruption of trade is the message Australia’s absence sends to state and non-state actors in an increasingly contested maritime domain. Australia’s stated strategy is one of deterrence by denial, that is deterring would-be adversaries from interfering with its national interests. Deterrence requires three elements: capability, intent and credibility. The freedom of international maritime trade is at the core of Australia’s national interests , and failing to send a ship fundamentally undermines a deterrence strategy, bringing into question Australia’s capability and credibility in the maritime domain. Thirdly, as well as the strategic justification for sending a ship, such a deployment would also provide unrivalled benefits to Royal Australian Navy personnel in understanding how their untested systems, weapons, tactics and procedures perform against the Houthis’ missiles and drones. Countries that have deployed vessels to the region have gained invaluable information on how their systems, tactics and procedures will fare in an operational environment, including a Danish frigate, which reportedly experienced critical failures with its radar and combat management systems and had to return home. It is better to gain this experience and understanding now against the Houthis, than in a conflict involving a much more competent and credible adversary. And let’s not forget, we no longer have strategic warning time – the chances of the ADF’s women and men having to defend against these threats on a greater scale are increasing. When Australia declined to send a ship to the Red Sea in December last year, the government probably thought the Houthi attacks on shipping would be a short-term phenomenon. But despite international condemnation and strikes from the US and the UK on targets, the Houthis have displayed an unexpected persistence and resilience to hold international shipping at risk. This strategic waterway is an area that matters to Australia, as does the country’s credibility and capability when it comes to protecting maritime trade. It’s time for Australia to send a ship to the Red Sea.

4 July 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review on Friday 5 July The “optimal pathway” may not run exactly to plan, but the risk is known, is being managed, and all three partners have demonstrated their commitment to the process. Image: Collins Class Submarine at Henderson Marine Complex, Western Australia. Photo credit: Defence images The Australian Financial Review ’s James Curran’s Questioning AUKUS series launches a broadside against the $368 billion project to acquire nuclear-powered submarines amid claims that the ambitious plan “is a mess and risks leaving Australia with no submarine capability”. Curran’s investigation series fails to present a catastrophic failing of the “optimal pathway”. There is risk, but managing risk is a key element of any complicated defence project and has been acknowledged upfront by the current and former governments, alongside Defence. Although the series has many issues, two points warrant immediate challenge. The first is the characterisation of the United Kingdom’s ability to support AUKUS and the second is the proposal of the so-called “Plan B”. AUKUS is a critical project for the UK, and Australia needs the UK’s support for it to succeed. Curran is right to highlight the stresses on the UK submarine industrial base, and UK officials have consistently highlighted that the production of its replacement ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) is its priority, followed by AUKUS. Currently, the UK operates four SSBNs commissioned during the 1990s. These submarines are critical to its defence strategy, as they are the sole arm of its strategic nuclear deterrent. The UK’s ageing Vanguard submarines are being replaced by four Dreadnought class vessels. The construction of three of the four is under way, and the first is expected to be operational in the early 2030s. Despite Curran’s assertion that the delivery timeframe has not been updated in six years and might have slipped, the 2022-2023 UK Ministry of Defence annual report lists the Dreadnought program as on track for delivery in the early 2030s. As much as the replacement of its nuclear deterrent is rightly the top priority for the UK, the AUKUS SSN is also crucial to the UK’s nuclear strategy. To have a submarine-based nuclear deterrent capability, you need to have nuclear-powered attack submarines to protect it (SSNs). Deeply invested party Not only is the UK’s AUKUS SSN given its SSBN protection role at the core of the country’s defence strategy, but also the partnership with the UK and Australia will alleviate some of the pressures on the former’s submarine industrial base. The significance here is that the UK is a deeply invested party to AUKUS Pillar 1. It is at the core of their defence strategy. It is tempting to jump to the counterargument that there is nothing in this for Australia, and that it is being used to prop up the submarine industrial base of the UK. Not true. The UK is essential to Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines for several reasons. The UK was critical in convincing the US to allow the technology to be transferred and remain a critical balance to any changing US political whims. A bilateral arrangement for the transfer of nuclear-powered submarines is more easily abandoned than a trilateral one that includes an invested partner such as the UK. And let’s not forget, that the UK’s nuclear deterrent is also a critical part of NATO’s deterrence strategy. The UK’s involvement in AUKUS complicates any potential future exit strategy by the US – think of it as insurance. Curran’s investigation series appears to promote a nuclear-powered submarine pathway “Plan B”. The point that is ignored in the platforming of a “Plan B” is that the “Plan B” carries with it greater risk than the “optimal pathway”. The “optimal pathway” has been heavily consulted and agreed upon at the highest levels of government and defence in all three AUKUS partners. Its endorsement by all three partners is an important risk-reduction measure in itself. Untested Plan B The so-called “Plan B”, which relies on Australia being supported to build the US’ close-hold Virginia class submarines in Australia within the next decade is untested and – based on Australia’s difficult journey of attempting to obtain a licence to produce US missiles under its Guided Weapons Enterprise – is simply unlikely to gain agreement and support in the near to medium term. More importantly, although the “optimal pathway” is complex and hence unlikely to run exactly to plan, there is no evidence to date of a catastrophic failing of the pathway, nor the development of a level of extreme risk that cannot be managed. This is not to say this won’t manifest in future; none of us has a crystal ball, but there is no such indication to date. Without a catastrophic failure of an element of the “optimal pathway” or the generation of an unmanageable risk level, any knee-jerk reaction of Australia to change the pathway within two years of its announcement would disastrously undermine confidence in its commitment to AUKUS Pillar 1 and probably drive its AUKUS partners to question its ability to support the ambitious project. It is simply nonsensical to abandon an agreed plan with known risk, which is being treated, for an unconsulted plan with significant risk, without a reason or catalyst. Debate on AUKUS is important. Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines will not go exactly to plan – you simply cannot predict the next 34 years. But right now, the risk is known, it appears that it is being managed, and all three partners have demonstrated their commitment to the process. The measure of success here is not whether the “optimal pathway” hits every milestone exactly on time; rather, it is whether 10 years from now, Australia is operating a nuclear-powered submarine capability. At present, there is no strong reason to believe this won’t be the case.

*Published in Australian Foreign Affairs Issue 20 Feb 24 June 2024 | Jennifer Parker * *Originally published in Australian Foreign Affairs Issue 21 Image: Los Angeles-class submarine USS Annapolis (SSN 760) arriving alongside Diamantina Pier at Fleet Base West, HMAS Stirling, WA. Photo credit: Defence Images The decision to acquire nuclear- powered submarines represents a significant milestone in Australia’s defence capability. Both the cost and the transition to a nuclear- powered capability in a country without a civilian nuclear industry warrants robust debate. There are pros and cons associated with the acquisition decision and its associated ‘optimal pathway’. The core of the debate really centres on two elements. Is the opportunity cost of Australia’s acquisition of nuclear- powered submarines worth the monetary and other costs? And can the risk be managed? On these two points, reasonable arguments can be progressed on either side. Unfortunately, White’s well- written, 46- page article does not progress the debate. White’s argument, framed entirely in the negative, appears to misrepresent facts, to take liberties with assumptions represented as fact and to misunderstand key aspects of submarine employment and the requirements of a nation such as Australia that is an island dependent on maritime trade. An 800- word rebuttal cannot engage with all the issues within the piece, but I hope to encourage readers to cast a careful eye over its arguments. Here I focus primarily on some of the many problems with White’s interpretation of maritime strategy and operations. White is correct to suggest that Australia needs to articulate a strategy on which capability decisions are based, as I argued in my 2023 report, An Australian Maritime Strategy: Resourcing the Royal Australian Navy . However, he misunderstands essential elements of maritime strategy. For example, he suggests that an alternative to the acquisition of submarines could be to ‘focus our defence closer to home, relying on a shallower but denser defensive shield’. The obvious flaw in this argument is that Australia is a maritime nation: 98 per cent of our trade passes through the maritime domain, and 91 per cent of our fuel is imported, including all our aviation fuel to support the Royal Australian Air Force’s F- 35 operations, inevitably required to support White’s suggested ‘shallower defensive shield’. Why would an adversary attack Australia, when our trade – or, more accurately, our critical seaborne supply – is left undefended and ripe for the picking, as White suggests would be prudent? As the famed maritime strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan highlights, ‘wars are won by the economic strangulation of the enemy from the sea’, particularly wars against island nations. White’s misunderstanding of maritime strategy is underpinned by erroneous assertions that the defence of seaborne trade is no longer feasible. The explanation given for this bold but unjustified and unqualified statement is that ‘technological trends' have made ships of all kinds easier to find and hit’. Of course, as we have seen in the Red Sea, the proliferation of uncrewed explosive surface and aerial vehicles alongside anti- ship cruise missiles has increased the complexity of operations for warships in the littoral environment, which is the area of sea that can be influenced by threats from land. But unlike the Russian experience in the Black Sea, efforts of the United States and other allies and partners show that a well- defended ship with a well- trained crew can defeat these capabilities. As offensive capabilities evolve, so do counter-capabilities. This is the historical dance of naval warfare. Quick to dismiss the value of nuclear- powered submarine operations, White suggests that the only argument put forward to support the need for Australia to acquire nuclear- powered submarines is the protection of maritime trade. It is not. The presence of unlocated nuclear- powered submarines significantly complicates an adversary’s calculations and serves as a deterrent. White’s dismissal of the role of nuclear- powered submarines in the protection of maritime trade again misunderstands the fundamentals of maritime strategy and maritime operations. White suggests that eight submarines cannot protect the ‘over 17,000 voyages to Australian ports from overseas’ and that submarines are ‘very effective for attacking ships " but " not at all suited to defending them’. On the former: Australia does not need to protect all ships that visit Australian shores, it only needs to protect essential seaborne supply, comprising the fuel, ammunition and critical supplies that make up a much smaller subset of these voyages. On the latter: of course submarines will not be escorting ships along key trade routes. One look at Australian geography would show that carefully positioned submarines in the vicinity of key chokepoints would put at risk any adversary seeking to hold Australian seaborne supply at risk. The length of this piece only permits a surface- level summary of some of the flaws in White’s case against the delivery of AUKUS Pillar 1, of which there are many. While there are strong arguments for and against Australia’s acquisition of nuclear- powered submarines, White’s logic misunderstands the capability, its employment and the basic tenets of maritime strategy, and so must not be allowed to proceed unchallenged.

21 June 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review on 21 June 2024 The officer second in charge of the Royal Australian Navy will shortly rotate, opening the way for a historic first appointment of a female. Image: HMA Ships Adelaide and Canberra sail in formation at sunrise before entering Sydney Harbour. Photo Credit: Defence images The Navy and the broader Australian Defence Force have undertaken significant cultural change in the last 30 years, with much to be proud of. When I joined the Navy in 2002 as a teen from rural Australia, women had only served at sea in permanent positions for just over 10 years. In 2002, several roles in the Navy were still prohibited for women, and while women were consistently serving at sea in 2002, a female had never commanded an Australian Navy surface combatant, let alone served as the deputy chief of Navy. Inclusivity for women in the Navy has been a long, hard road, with progress built on the back of many resilient and persistent naval sailors and officers, both male and female, and some inspired senior leaders who sought to challenge the status quo. Twenty-two years on, in 2024, the Navy has achieved many milestones, with all branches now open to women, and females now commanding ships at sea and establishments ashore, albeit not yet at the same rate as their male counterparts. In some ways, this progression has been ahead of much of our immediate region and impressive by world standards. Although it must be acknowledged that in some areas, it has been behind some of Australia’s Five Eyes counterpart navies. Notably, the United States, which appointed their first female chief of naval operations in 2023. While it would be easy to list the many achievements in increasing diversity in the Australian Navy, gender diversity in the Navy’s hierarchy remains an area that requires progress. Not only is it an issue for those young women joining the Navy who aspire to the top positions, as they should, but also an issue for the normative behaviours we seek to shape in the region and beyond. The rotation of the deputy chief of Navy without a named replacement represents an opportunity. An opportunity for the Navy, the ADF, and Australia more broadly to move the journey forward by finally selecting a woman to the position. From my vantage point, having left full-time naval service after more than 20 years, there are several well-credentialled candidates at the one star and two-star ranks, with both the experience and leadership to step into the role of Navy’s second-in-command. The Australian Army will soon promote its third female three-star general, and has already had a female deputy chief of Army and commander Forces Command. The appointments of the then-major general Natasha Fox as the deputy chief of Army and major general Susan Coyle as the commander Forces Command provided not only insights into these prominent leadership roles, but also provided role models for a significant portion of the Australian Army. Not only women within the Australian Army, but those who represent the more diverse ends of the scale than the traditional appointees to the Australian Defence Force’s senior leadership. While the Navy appointed its first female two-star admiral in 2011, a surgeon-general and its first female warrant officer of the Navy in 2019, most of Navy’s key senior leadership positions are yet to be filled by women. In the last Defence annual report, the Navy had 18 admirals, only four of which were female. Notably, even though traditionally most admiral positions are filled by warfare officers, the Navy has never promoted a female warfare officer to the rank of admiral. Very few have ever been promoted to one-star despite female warfare officers having served at sea for more than 30 years, just as long as many of the Navy two-star admiral cohort have been in service. There will, of course, be many criticisms of this call to seize the opportunity and appoint a woman as the deputy chief of Navy. There are some who will never be swayed on these points. The first repechage to the call will be that we should select our top Navy leadership based on merit. The natural prolongation of this argument is that the right woman will get there when the merit is presented. Given women have served in the Navy for quite some time, and at sea in the Navy for over 30 years, a further prolongation of this merit argument is that the women who have gone before have not had “sufficient” merit – when stated as such, you can see how ridiculous the merit argument becomes. There have been clear barriers in the past. Of course, there will be some who argue the very existence of this article is an example of the increasing wokeness of defence discourse. I would challenge that much of this commentary will come from many who have never served. The selection of a female deputy chief of Navy will not address all the remaining barriers to inclusivity, but it is an opportunity that if seized, would demonstrate a commitment to addressing the issue and moving forward as a navy and as a nation.

8 June 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Australian on 8 June 2024 Image: HMAS Warramunga. Defence Images Australia is an island nation that is hugely dependent on the maritime domain, yet where is our overall maritime strategy? Incredibly, we have no comprehensive plan for this and the gaps are ripe for exploitation. The vast majority of our international trade passes through our ports, most of our internet passes through subsea cables, our exclusive economic zone is the third largest in the world, and our search and rescue area is enormous. Protecting Australia’s strategic interests in the maritime domain is therefore a massive challenge. Every recent government announcement on defence, including the recent fanfare around increases to the defence budget, has highlighted the need to protect our sea lines of communication, our maritime trade. Given the importance of this, you’d be forgiven for thinking Australia has a comprehensive maritime strategy for dealing with threats, especially at a time when they are increasing. Yet Australia does not have one, despite the fact 20 years ago the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade tabled an expansive report on the subject. That report’s 14 recommendations included that the government release a national security strategy, clearly articulate Australia’s strategic interests, review its reserves, conduct an independent review into Australian shipping, and outline the role of merchant shipping. Yet many of these recommendations were not followed up. Two decades later, our dependence on maritime trade and subsea cables has increased while the threat to our strategic interests also has increased. There also have been advancements in technology, including uncrewed underwater vehicles that provide opportunity and create risk for our maritime strategic interests. Despite the maritime domain accounting for the 38 per cent of investment in Defence’s integrated investment program across the next 10 years, there are clear gaps in Defence’s ability to protect it. Maritime strategy should not only address the military elements tasked to the Australian Defence Force and the Royal Australian Navy but also the civil elements including infrastructure protection, maritime safety and dealing with illegal fishing and irregular immigration, among other challenges. While Australia released a civil maritime strategy in 2022, there are several problems with it. Despite the dependence of Australia on its subsea cables for its internet, they are not mentioned once in this civil strategy. Unaccountably, issues relating to maritime safety and pollution also were omitted from the strategy. The relationship between Australia’s civil and military maritime elements is confused and unclear. In the event of conflict, for example, who is responsible for defence of Australia’s ports? The RAN will not have capacity. How often are RAN frigates, destroyers and amphibious platforms being pulled from military tasks to look for irregular migrants while the Indo-Pacific maritime situation deteriorates in the face of Chinese aggression? Again, these are just a few examples of the issues – there are many. Now, 20 years on from the parliamentary inquiry into Australia’s maritime strategy, it is time to revisit the conversation. The Joint Standing Committee into Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade should once again take a comprehensive look at Australia’s maritime strategy and the structures that are required to protect Australia’s strategic interests against evolving maritime threats. The global and regional trends are clear – we don’t have another 20 years to get this right.

3 June 2024 | Cathy Harper *Originally published in the Melbourne Asia Review Image: Melbourne Asia Review. Image credit: NASA/Flickr. Geopolitical disruptions to global shipping supply chains have recently been felt due to the conflict in Gaza and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Concerns have been sharpened by the assaults by Houthi militias on commercial shipping through the Bab al-Mandab Strait at the entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, disrupting the 12 percent of global trade that passes through those waters. Disruptions to global shipping have also occurred due to COVID-19 and a drought affecting the Suez Canal. Maritime Asia is a major transit route for international trade. But the South China Sea, which is between China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam, is hotly disputed territory and China’s claims in the area have led to increased tension with the US. Jennifer Parker is an Expert Associate at the National Security College, Australian National University and an Adjunct Fellow in naval studies at the University of New South Wales Canberra. She also served for more than 20 years with the Royal Australian Navy. She spoke with the Managing Editor of Melbourne Asia Review, Cathy Harper. What are some of the lessons learned so far in relation to maritime supply chains in relation to the current conflicts in the Red Sea and the Black Sea? Some recent lessons will be enduring. We had the Tanker War in the Persian Gulf, which was part of the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s and which severely impacted the price of oil. We had the Gulf crisis in 2019-2020, where Iran attacked a number of ships, and we’ve seen it again, on a different scale and in different waterways. There are three key lessons that I would highlight. The first, is that as the world becomes more unpredictable, traditional trade routes will be challenged and reliability, including delivery times, will be challenged. We’ve have been pretty lucky—as maritime trade has expanded and as the world became more globalised there haven’t been really significant disruptions to maritime trade. We’ve been able to rely on the fact that, by and large, the system’s there, it works, and it adjusts to certain shocks, such as piracy off the coast of Somalia that in 2008 really started to ramp up to 2011. But shipping trade adjusted—ships took a wider arc around Somalia and avoided the high risk area. It was pretty resilient. What we’re seeing now is that in different areas are on a different scale maritime trade will be interfered with and that impacts on reliability. My second point that is that despite the fact that we are seeing that maritime trade will be interfered with, we are also seeing that maritime trade is resilient. We saw this through the COVID-19 pandemic. There were initial shocks and shortages, but it did adjust. I think the best example of this is what’s occurring in the Red Sea, where we’re seeing a number of ship companies stating that they will not transit through the Red Sea, but they’re adjusting around the Cape of Good Hope. It’s adding transit time and therefore fuel costs. With 10 to 14 days transit time, some people are estimating about a million dollars in fuel costs, but it is adjusting, and those fuel costs are less than the war risk insurance costs that are skyrocketing for ships going through the Red Sea. What I want to draw out from that, is we need to do some thinking about how future adaptation might occur and what the impact might be. For example, I would say, the increasing number of ships going around the Cape of Good Hope and going towards the Somali coast is probably increasing their vulnerability to the surge in Somali piracy. Until last year, we would have said that Somali piracy had finished. The last attack was in 2017 and there’s some doubt about whether that was really a piracy attack. We’ve seen the resurgence coinciding with the Houthi attacks in November and there’s a whole bunch of reasons for that resurgence and probably ships taking different routes which can be targeted is one reason. We need to understand what the impacts might be. We also need to understand the impact of things like war risk insurance, which is finally reaching general parlance again (war risk insurance was something that impacted Australia during World War II when we had the government looking at subsidising war risk insurance) and to how much that actually dominates where ships will operate, especially now, since so many ships fly under flags of convenience. Flags of Convenience is where shipping companies will register under a country that either has cheaper registration fees or is unlikely to really enforce some of their obligations under the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or other Conventions. We know that the majority of the world shipping is flagged to Panama, Liberia and the Marshall Islands. We need to understand how some of those impacts of wars and insurance will make it adjust. I think it’s likely that shipping companies will not go through the Red Sea because of the risk to their crews and also because of the significant cost of war risk insurance. The third point is that countries see interference with maritime trade and shipping as a way to send a strategic message. That that has a lot of implications for how Australia and other countries in the region should view their dependence on maritime trade. If you look back to the 2019-2020 Persian Gulf crisis, there were lots of issues wrapped up in that, but at the heart of it was that Donald Trump was the US President and he pulled out of the JCPOA (the Iran nuclear deal). Iran saw interfering with shipping as a way to send a strategic message and we see that again in the Red Sea. I don’t think the Houthi’s actions in the Red Sea are all about the Gaza conflict. I think their actions are more about sending a significant message about where they see their role in the Middle East. From an Australian perspective we need to think about what happens if a potential adversary, such as a state in the region, thinks that there is a way to send Australia message by interfering with our trade. We need to accept that shipping could be interfered with and we need to understand the impact of that. Could you talk a little more about the main points of geopolitical tension in the Indo-Pacific that might cause significant disruptions to maritime supply chains? The first thing is, what is classified as the Indo Pacific? It sounds really obvious: the Indian and Pacific Oceans and everything in between. But different countries classify the Indo Pacific differently. For example, the Houthi are undertaking attacks in the Gulf of Aden which is broadly on the edge of the Indian Ocean. France would view that as being of the Indo-Pacific because it’s the Indian Ocean. India would also regard that as part of the Indo-Pacific. Australia has a really confined view of the Indo-Pacific, which is unhelpful when you think about maritime connectivity. The Australian government and Australian academics tend to talk about it as cutting off at the southern tip of India. We don’t tend to think about the western Indian Ocean, which is where piracy is increasing at the moment, for example, as part of the Indo-Pacific. Certainly, the government’s definition of the Indo-Pacific when stated does not include the western Indian Ocean, which is why when the request came through to send a ship to the Red Sea, the deputy prime minister said at the time that it’s outside of our main area of focus. There are a number of potential flashpoints. I think that the most urgent and the most concerning is China’s aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea. For example, there’s some recent significant footage of two Chinese coast guard using a water cannon on a very small wooden Philippine supply vessel. As much as that aggression has kind of become the status quo in the last 12 months, it’s very clear that the Philippines is not happy with that and the President of the Philippines clearly stated that they intend to develop a series of countermeasures to respond to China. Since that statement, we’ve seen maritime cooperative activity in the South China Sea between Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and the US. The visit by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to the Philippines in March reaffirmed that they consider issues in the South China Sea coming under the treaty with the Philippines and that they would respond in the event of an attack. In terms of flash points that could impact maritime trade and supply lines, it’s a big one because 60 percent of the world’s maritime trade goes through the South China Sea. There’s not been any threat to shipping yet, but if tension escalated into a conflict it would have a significant impact in terms of ships diverting around the area of risk. I think ships being attacked is probably less likely because of how dependent China is on maritime trade. Of course, there’s also the Taiwan issue and whether that would evolve into a conflict. If so, it would obviously have an impact on maritime trade in the region, but I would say probably potentially less of an impact than a significant event arising from a dispute between the Philippines and China which I think would involve all of the Chinese artificial islands in the South China Sea that have been militarised becoming legitimate military targets; so it would expand quickly. Also, there are obviously the continued issues on the Korean Peninsula. In the last 12 months, North Korea has fired more missiles than it has in the last five years or 10 years. It’s often the thing that you’re not expecting that causes a conflict, so as much as we’re focused on South China Sea tensions boiling over there’s a list of other things that could happen. It would be interesting to get your critical evaluation of the actions of the US and its allies, because China’s usually portrayed generally in the West as the aggressor. When we talk about what’s occurring in South China Sea, we need to be clear with terms. When we talk about maritime jurisdiction, as established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a nation doesn’t have full sovereignty over things like Exclusive Economic Zones or Contiguous Zones, they have a balance of rights and obligations, depending on the zone. When you talk about the Exclusive Economic Zone, the coastal state that claims that Exclusive Economic Zone has a right to the use and regulation of the resources within that zone, such as fisheries and energy. I think it’s dangerous when you talk about the term ‘sovereignty’, but the challenge is that China does think about it as sovereignty, even though in 2013 a tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration was clear that China’s position on the ‘nine dash line’—its claim over the South China Sea—has no standing in international law. As much as China would say this goes back thousands of years, there’s actually not a lot of evidence of that. China has never articulated exactly where the nine dash line is, so if the Philippines wanted to negotiate with China in terms of their claims, it makes it difficult because no-one knows exactly what their claims are. In contrast, if you wanted to know where Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone was, you can find the exact GPS coordinates of what Australia claims. Why hasn’t China been specific? China has also declined to specify what it claims within the nine dash line and so I think it sees benefit in ambiguity. As I said, there is a mix of rights and obligations depending on the zone. China has never explained whether they view the nine dash line as their Exclusive Economic Zone, or perhaps whether they view it as their territorial sea. In terms of the international law question, the Arbitral Tribunal has dealt with China’s historical claims, and it was very, very clear that it has no claim in international law and even if there was an historical claim, it has been superseded by the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, to which China is a signatory and played an active part. There are two reasons China is so intent on it. I’m not a China specialist but a lot of academics who write on China says that when China looks out towards the South China Sea it has a land-centric view of security. It sees parts of the South China Sea as an extension of China, which you can see it in terms of the graphics on the maps they produce. This has increasingly become the case, I think, because China also sees its vulnerabilities in that area in terms of defence so it makes sense in terms of trying to claim the South China Sea from a defence standpoint. You can understand the logic, not the legal claims, but the logic behind building up shoals into artificial islands and putting capabilities such as surveillance and electronic warfare missiles on them. There’s a clear logic and rationale, I think, to what China is doing in the South China Sea. There’s always been territorial delimitation disputes between China and Vietnam and China and the Philippines, but this has increased as China has felt more vulnerable. There’s also a huge economic argument as well, relating to resources in South China Sea being incredibly important such as hydrocarbons. I think the rationale and the logic is understandable, but doesn’t have a foundation International law. There is a significant overlap between China’s nine dash line and the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone at a place called Reed Bank, an undersea mountain rich in hydrocarbon. China is excluding Philippines fishing vessels from being at Reed Bank and also excluding the Philippines from seeking to explore oil and energy from there. The Philippines is running out energy supply and it needs to very quickly find another way to support its energy needs from within its pretty rich Exclusive Economic Zone. It wants to develop areas around Reed Bank, but China doesn’t want it to. Would China deliberately disrupt maritime supply chains to see what happened? I don’t think it’s out of the realm of possibility, because when you think about the fact that when China didn’t like what Australia said about COVID-19, China undertook economic coercion against Australia. Interfering in maritime trade could be just an extension of that. But we need to remember that China is also heavily dependent on maritime trade, because something like 60 percent of China’s trade goes through the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea. A general interference with maritime trade in the South China Sea would impact China’s economy and China would not start randomly attacking ships because it’s just not in their interests to do so. What I think is more likely is a very targeted interference, such as a blockade on supplies going to Taiwan, which would be hugely escalatory but not outside of the realm of possibility; so boarding, detaining, or interfering with certain shipping heading to Taiwan or certain parts of the Philippines. There is also an argument that if China did not like something that Australia was doing, given how dependent Australia is on maritime trade, then they could interfere with Australia’s maritime trade. This wouldn’t happen in the short term, but if there was a significant event, Australia’s vulnerabilities are in the maritime domain. Somebody else coined this expression that if you think about Australia as a living organism its organs are outside its body, its vulnerabilities are outside of its physical geography. It would be very easy to target shipping coming to Australia. I also think that if they wanted to send a message with a military focus, they could send a Chinese task group to sit off our oil platforms on the Northwest Shelf. Could you talk a bit more about what an actual conflict would be on shipping supply chains and the consequences? It is heavily dependent on what the genesis and nature of the conflict, because the only reason it interferes with shipping is if the shipping companies perceive that there is a risk. If you look at the Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel in April there’s not a direct risk to shipping. There are certain types of conflicts where it potentially does have a direct impact on shipping. If we had a wide-ranging conflict in the Indo-Pacific, being very much a maritime construct, one of the things you’ll start to see is shipping routes change mainly due to concern about risk and the cost of war risk insurance. Dr Richard Dunley has recently talked about how Australia’s trade comes from Southeast Asia and so instead of it being north-south trading through the Indonesian archipelago it would quickly diversify east-west, India and the US. Patterns would change and I think we would see the potential development of a southern route around Australia. Ships don’t currently take the route around southern Australia because it’s too long and costs to much. But if they’re trying to avoid conflict in the South China Sea and they’re not going to a Southeast Asian country, then it becomes more attractive. From a defence perspective this creates more vulnerabilities to the south of Australia. There could be change in relation to who nations trade with and the routes ships take. If there was a wide-ranging conflict in the Indo-Pacific where ships were targeted and if there was a conflict that Australia was involved in ships might be targeted because that’s one of Australia’s major vulnerabilities: political, cyber and maritime. No-one would send a battalion to land on Cape York or something like that, it’s just not feasible because the terrain is so difficult. Certainly, the targeting of certain sites with missiles is possible. If Australia were engaged in a war in the Indo-Pacific then we could expect to see missile or drone strikes into places like the military facilities in the vicinity of Alice Springs, certainly into where we have our F35s based, and certainly into our naval bases if China or another adversary had capability within range. In the lead-up you would see significant disinformation and cyberattacks on infrastructure, and you would see interference with trade because if Australia can keep going in a conflict then the US can use Australia as a base to project forward, which happened in WWII. Bearing in mind that 91 percent of Australia’s fuel is imported and the International Energy Agency specifies that in normal peacetime a country should have 90 days fuel reserves and Australia currently has a lot less than that. Australia doesn’t have the fuel reserves and we don’t have the ammunition reserves. We can grow crops to feed ourselves, but we are heavily dependent on imported fertiliser. There are a lot of things there that could be interfered with to shut Australia down. How can states individually and together make maritime supply chains more resilient? Regardless of the chances of a conflict in the region, which is not probable, but it is increasing, there are a number of other things that we’ve learnt. COVID-19, for example, generated supply chain shock and showed that resilience, or preparedness, is important. From an Australian perspective, one of those things is understanding exactly what we import that is critical to our economy. I’m not sure that we actually know and I think that became obvious during COVID. The second thing is working out how we either generate increased stocks of the critical imports, or we diversify supply chains. In terms of the increased stocks, the most obvious one for Australia is its energy supply. I don’t think this is talked about enough—if there was an interruption to that supply chain for many reasons we would really struggle. These things are applicable to many nations. There’s also the conversation about whether things like the US-led Indo Pacific Economic Framework can make the region more integrated and thereby develop confidence and reduce the chance of conflict. That’s an argument that some people put forward and I would have subscribed to it a couple of years ago, but I think that the war in Ukraine and Russia’s illegal actions there demonstrate that economic dependence is not something that will necessarily prohibit a country from taking military action. Are other countries in the region doing that work? I get the sense that some other countries are trying to understand what they are dependent on and become more resilient and more diversified and encouraging other countries to do so. For example, in the trilateral meeting between the US, Japan and the Philippines some of the vulnerabilities of the Philippines were examined, including energy and infrastructure and the US has agreed to provide some support, but we will have to see if that actually happens. Another example is Vietnam—countries that used to have goods produced in China are looking to Vietnam as an alternative, but it needs to become more of a focus. One of the reasons that it’s not, is that there is not a general sense in the region of the likelihood of a conflict. I’m not convinced that a lot of people believe that conflict in the region, which would be catastrophic, is possible. But if the events between Iran and Israel show us anything it shows us that increasingly states do not abide by the UN Charter and they act in an unpredictable way. Neither the US, or China or the Philippines want a conflict, but I think people put more faith in the architecture of the international system to de-escalate things than they probably should. Another example is that the UN body that for 14 years had overseen sanctions on North Korea was recently disbanded, which didn’t get a lot of attention, but it’s was really important. Interestingly, Australia has sent a ship to a regional presence deployment which includes Operation Argos which is the enforcement of sanctions against North Korea, but the body overseeing that has now officially been disbanded because Russia would not support its renewal in the UN Security Council. Russia did that because the body had released a report saying that Russia is actively breaching sanctions in North Korea. I’m optimistic, but the chances of a conflict in the region are increasing and I don’t think our responses for risk reduction are effective. What we’ve seen from the Black Sea and the Red Sea is that maritime trade doesn’t just stop because of conflict, but we need to understand better how it might change and evolve.

31 May 24 | Jennifer Parker & Grant Wyeth *Originally published in the ANU Policy Brief on 31 May 24. While the Government’s recent National Defence Strategy notes the many opportunities available to Australia in the Indian Ocean, security risks to Australia’s west are likely the main driver of Defence’s sharpened focus on the region, Jennifer Parker and Grant Wyeth write. Traditionally, Australian foreign policy has focused on the Pacific Ocean as its primary source of opportunity and threat. This is intuitive, considering our population is overwhelmingly on the east coast, and it reflects both the economic boom that has transformed Northeast Asia in recent decades and Australia’s historical experience resisting Japan in the Pacific during World War II. But Australia is widening its vision – as it must. This is the theme of a new paper that outlines pathways for strengthening Australia’s Indian Ocean engagement. Consolidated in the recently released National Defence Strategy (NDS), Australia’s designated ‘immediate region’ now includes the Pacific, Southeast Asia and the Northeast Indian Ocean. This is an enormous area to prioritise for a middle power of limited resources. Casting its eyes westward, Australia has made India the centre of its Indian Ocean engagement. Building habits of trust and cooperation with the emerging great power has been seen as imperative to prepare for a world where India will play a far greater role. And of course, India’s massive population and growing market power present undeniably attractive opportunities for Australia. This has also meant seeing India as a vital partner in national defence. As China has increased its military reach in the Indian Ocean, with a base in Djibouti and heavy investment in the region’s ports, India and Australia are coming to see themselves as the ocean’s natural custodians, with closely aligned interests. Australia’s NDS endorses this growing alignment – and, implicitly, India’s vision of itself as the primary security provider for the Indian Ocean region – when it says that Australia “will continue to support India’s key role in the region,” and describes India as a “a top-tier security partner.” This is the culmination of a relationship between India and Australia that has rapidly evolved in recent years, driven by a desire to move beyond tokenistic gestures and achieve complex, practical defence cooperation. From joint maritime patrol operations in April 2022 to the first ever visit of an Indian submarine to Australia in September 2023, this collaboration has been strengthening over time. Again, the NDS approves. It says Defence “aims to achieve a deeper level of defence cooperation with India through ‘practical multilateral and bilateral’ cooperation, whilst promoting increasing connectivity across both defence industry and information sharing.” This willingness to forge practical defence relationships in the Indian Ocean also extends to the northeast, with the NDS emphasising the need to “regularise” the Australian Defence Force’s presence in countries along Australia’s key maritime trade routes, including Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. The strategy’s emphasis on the Indian Ocean is couched in terms of increased “competition for access and influence” across the region. It acknowledges attempts to dominate sea lanes and strategic ports, and the ever-present danger of tension and miscommunication between India and Pakistan. China’s border incursions into India were also mentioned. It’s evident then that while the NDS sees the Indian Ocean region as fertile ground for collaboration, it also hosts potential risks for Australia’s maritime security. It’s possible that this perceived vulnerability is the primary driver of the strategy’s strong sentiment towards the region, and – perhaps unlike previous strategic documents – that it may well be followed by action. However, vulnerability on Australia’s western flank shouldn’t be understood as only resulting from geostrategic competition. The NDS also notes the non-traditional maritime threats present in the region. Poverty and disadvantage within Indian Ocean states could give rise to social tension and instability, which can spill over into sea lines of communication in the form of piracy and irregular migration. The effects of climate change further complicate these human security risks. The Australian Navy already engages purposefully with Sri Lanka on issues of irregular migration, with Rohingya asylum seekers from Myanmar and refugee camps in Bangladesh their most pressing concern. Last year was the deadliest year at sea in almost a decade, as Rohingya refugees attempted maritime voyages towards Southeast Asia. In March 2023, dozens drowned when their vessel capsized off the west coast of Aceh in Indonesia. In the coming decades, power will continue to shift, both to and within the Indo-Pacific. As human security issues worsen and China expands its presence in East Africa and the western Indian Ocean islands, Australia will need to reconceptualise where its areas of interests lie, even within the Indian Ocean region. While Australia’s current focus is on the northeast Indian Ocean, it should view the Indian Ocean as a single strategic theatre. It must make the whole region a priority, and lay the groundwork now by building relationships throughout the Indian Ocean.

28 May | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review on 28 May 2024 It is not an alliance of mutual obligation. It is not a commitment to supporting the US in a conflict over Taiwan. It is a technology capability pact. Image: Defence images. os Angeles-class submarine USS Annapolis (SSN 760) arriving alongside Diamantina Pier at Fleet Base West, HMAS Stirling, WA. Australia’s planned acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines is undoubtedly ambitious and certainly risky. But the frequent negativity among Australian commentators is detached from the reality of the success to date of the plan’s progress, and the wider strategic reasons for the project. Over a year on from the announcement of the “optimal pathway” for Australia to get its submarines, and the agreement is largely on track. So far, it has hit every major milestone, the latest being the announcement of the partners who will build and sustain the submarines. This doesn’t mean it will stay on track. But it is time we stopped jumping at shadows and acting so insecure as a nation. Discussion in the media of Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine acquisition has taken on an odd fervour. It often centres on “gotcha” reporting that frequently misinterprets signals from our AUKUS partners. This approach is unhelpful. It should lead Australians to ask when they stopped believing in themselves as a nation. Why are we so convinced that acquiring the world’s best submarine capability in an era of heightened global tensions is beyond Australia’s abilities? Why don’t we think the women and men who will be asked to put their lives on the line in a conflict deserve a submarine in which they are more likely to survive? Among the litany of criticisms, there is a spectrum of positions that range from former politicians and academics seeking to defend their legacies, to the assumption that it is just easier to assume that something that is justifiable but risky is not going to work. There are many valid concerns around the opportunity cost and risk. Do the strategic circumstances justify such a massive acquisition? What are the risks of Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine project failing? So, it is important to lay out some facts. AUKUS is a technology capability pact It is not an alliance of mutual obligation. It is not a commitment to support the US in a conflict over Taiwan. It is a technology capability pact that aims primarily to support Australia in the acquisition of the world’s most technologically advanced submarines. There are, of course, other elements that have now been grouped under AUKUS Pillar II, but its genesis is in Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. Australia may already be obliged to be involved in a conflict over Taiwan, but this is not because of the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. What is the strategic justification for this capability? The world, and more specifically the Indo-Pacific region in which we are located, is changing dramatically. While comparisons to the 1930s are almost always unhelpful, what we do know is that states such as Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, which seek to challenge the existing global “rules-based order”, are feeling emboldened. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But this is also happening in the Indo-Pacific; China’s regular aggression towards the Philippines within that country’s exclusive economic zone is one example. The rapid acceleration of China’s military modernisation alongside its demonstrations of military power in the waters and air off Taiwan, the militarisation of the South China Sea through China’s artificial islands with their missile batteries, surveillance radars, and the near-constant cyberattacks, are others. The list goes on. These changes do not mean conflict in the region is probable. But the barriers that have prevented it are eroding. They include the United Nations Charter and UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, underpinned by a US capability advantage in the region. This deterioration does increase the likelihood of conflict, and therefore the risk to Australia and its strategic interests. Investment in a defence force that can respond to regional aggression that impacts on us is a central part of the deterrence strategy outlined in the Defence Strategic Review. Investment in capabilities that would cause China to think twice about impinging on Australia’s interests is essential to conflict prevention. Should Australia’s deterrence strategy fail, then having a capable defence force to respond and protect Australia’s strategic interests is essential. Think of it as our insurance policy. So, there is a clear strategic reason for bolstering Australia’s defence capabilities. The best investment? Why are eye-wateringly expensive nuclear-powered submarines the most effective investment to, first, deter aggression, and then to defend Australia if the deterrent fails? The first point is that this is not a one-size-fits-all approach. The government is investing in the delivery, and potential acceleration, of many capabilities that bolster defence, including missiles, ships, and cyber capabilities while enhancing its application of diplomatic statecraft within the region. Whether the government is investing enough, given the greater risks of conflict, is a longer conversation. Australia’s strategy is not solely contingent on submarines. But it’s correct to say that the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines is the most complex, and the most expensive. So, why nuclear-powered submarines? It’s not, as some commentators have suggested, to supplement US forces in a conflict over Taiwan, or to support a strategy of deterrence by punishment that would enable Australia to launch cruise missiles into the Chinese mainland. While theoretically capable of this, neither of these explanations make much sense when you think about the numbers of nuclear-powered submarines Australia is acquiring. Three in the 2030s, and potentially eight in the 2040s. The discussion about Australia acquiring nuclear-powered submarines is not new, but it has become more urgent due to the strategic circumstances. The nuclear-powered submarines discussion began in Australia in the 1960s. The key to it is that Australia has a vast maritime domain and is heavily dependent on maritime trade. Australia’s geography means that we need to be able to position our limited number of submarines quickly and leave them on station longer to protect our maritime trade. Submarines, especially nuclear-powered ones, have many roles from intelligence collection and surveillance, to hunting other submarines, hunting ships, and striking land targets with missiles. Their versatility is part of the allure. When you think about Australia’s vulnerabilities, its dependence on maritime trade to keep the economy going is one of its biggest. Would our maritime trade be interfered with should China ever choose to teach Australia a lesson? This is not a far-fetched scenario, as interfering with Australian trade is exactly what China attempted to do with its campaign of trade coercion against Australia from 2020 to 2022. It makes sense that in a crisis or conflict, Beijing would take the same approach. And remember, China has numerically the largest navy in the world with more than 350 ships, including over 70 submarines, to enforce such action Australian nuclear-powered submarines with their speed, endurance and ability to remain submerged for lengthy periods dramatically changes the calculus for any country seeking to interfere with Australia’s maritime trade. Nuclear-powered submarines can position faster to respond and generate greater uncertainty in a potential adversary’s mind as to where they might be operating, and the danger they might pose. The speed and stealth involved in nuclear-powered submarine operations mean that their impact is disproportionate to the number of submarines we might have. The ability to reduce the risk of interference with Australian maritime livelihood, and the ability to make an adversary stop and wonder about the safety of their own trade at the hands of Australian submarines, is a significant advantage. Although we have significant maritime vulnerabilities, so does China, with more than 60 per cent of its trade coming via the sea. Opportunity comes at a cost The acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines comes with significant costs, not just financial. There are workforce implications, and implications for Australia’s defence industrial base. Because of the lack of a nuclear industry in Australia, and the nature of the agreement, there is a high dependence on the US submarine industrial base for the delivery of three Virginia-class, nuclear-powered submarines in the 2030s, and the UK to provide the design and deliver the self-contained nuclear reactors that will power the AUKUS submarine in the 2040s. But we are already largely dependent on others for the majority of our high-tech defence capabilities. This isn’t much of a change. But why can’t we do this with conventional submarines, and accept a higher degree of risk. Conventional submarines are slower and have less endurance. That means you need more of them to achieve the same effect, though it can be achieved. The greatest issue is that conventional submarines need to snorkel, coming to just below the surface of the water and raising a hollow mast to respirate their diesel engines while they recharge the batteries they use for running fully underwater. The faster they manoeuvre, the more frequently they need to do this. When they do this, they are subject to detection. Detecting conventional submarines in this period of vulnerability will be greatly assisted by artificial intelligence, which helps surveillance operators pick out the sound and visual traces from background noise. Not only are conventional submarines increasingly likely to be detected, but we must remember that detection puts at risk the lives of the crew. In the event of conflict, detection for a submarine means almost certain sinking, and escaping from a submarine is not often a realistic prospect. When you consider the increased likelihood of conflict in the region, the ability of potential threats such as China to interfere with Australia’s essential maritime trade, the ability of submarines to influence this outcome by either deterrence, or disproportionately engaging an adversary’s maritime capabilities, coupled with the likelihood of a conventional submarine being detected and sunk while trying to do this with a significant loss of Australian life, the strategic reasoning becomes clear. Often missed in the conversation is the deterrent impact of the AUKUS agreement itself, an impact that should not be understated. The fanfare surrounding the original announcement in 2021 and the announcement of the nuclear-powered submarine optimal pathway in 2023 were staged specifically to send a message to China. That message was that China’s aggression in the Indo-Pacific region had reached such a level that the US, supported by the UK, were willing to transfer their most sensitive technology to Australia. Something they had declined to do in the 1960s. A strategy of deterrence is built on three key principles: capability; credibility; and communication. The signal which came just from the formation of AUKUS is in many ways just as important as the nuclear-powered submarine capability itself. When commentators and the media express alarm about the demands of a submarine industrial base, they miss the point that AUKUS is not just about the capability. It is equally about the communication and credibility that underpin deterrence. Should the US withdraw from AUKUS following a return of Donald Trump, or because their own submarine construction program is lagging, they would be fundamentally undermining their own strategy of deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. In a region of states now hedging their bets, a failure by the US to deliver on their AUKUS promises would see them lose all influence within the region, and the strategic competition for the western Pacific itself. It’s not that AUKUS is too big to fail, but there is much more at stake for the US than three Virginia class submarines. When viewed in this light, Australia should not be so nervous. When it comes to AUKUS, it’s time for Australia to believe in itself. Our value proposition in this deal is significant. We are not simply being gifted submarine capability. We are an essential element of the US deterrence strategy. The plan, despite its risk and complexities, is on track, and the Australians who put themselves in harm’s way deserve a capability that increases their chance of surviving.