To strengthen defence, Canberra and London must turn good will into actual capability

8 May 2025 | Jennifer Parker

*Originally published in Leading Britain's Conversation on 8 May 2025

Image: Defence Minister Richard Marles will meet again with his British counterpart Grant Shapps Mar 24. Defence Images

The September 2021 launch of the AUKUS partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States did more than pave the way for Australia to obtain nuclear-powered submarines.

It signalled a turning point: the three longstanding partners see deeper collaboration on cutting-edge military capabilities as essential preparation for an increasingly contested global order.

The reasons are obvious. Long before the current US administration’s position on Ukraine, rhetoric in support of Russia, and the opening salvos of what could become a global trade war, two broader trends had already put both the United Kingdom and Australia on the back foot.

First, an increasing number of states are willing to use armed force to settle disputes. Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine is the clearest example, but conflict is also flaring across the Middle East, tensions have spiked recently in South Asia, and China is exerting growing military pressure on Taiwan while harassing Philippine government and fishing vessels inside the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone in the South China Sea.

Secondly, while war’s brutality endures, its conduct is changing fast: drones now roam land, sea and sky, artificial intelligence speeds decision-making, and ballistic and hypersonic missiles dominate the battlespace.

Together, these trends require Australia, the United Kingdom and other like-minded partners to be ready to defend their vital interests with force—and to accelerate technological upgrades to stay battlefield-relevant.

These dynamics gave rise to AUKUS. Pillar I will deliver nuclear-powered submarines for Australia while expanding United Kingdom and United States shipbuilding capacity; Pillar II binds the three nations to develop the next wave of capability—hypersonics, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence and other battlefield enablers. Yet AUKUS alone is no panacea. Elements of Washington’s change in approach to Ukraine, Russia and NATO show why Canberra and London should also strengthen complementary partnerships and widen the circle of technical defence cooperation.

Their shared history, industrial synergies and broadly aligned strategic outlook make Australia and the United Kingdom natural partners for deeper collaboration beyond the formal alliance with the United States.

With both the United Kingdom and Australia boosting defence spending, the scope for deeper technical collaboration is expanding. April’s deal between their defence science and technology agencies on future weapons systems is a promising start, but the partnership can—and should—go much further to strengthen each nation’s capabilities and defence industries. It must be ambitious, to meet the deteriorating strategic circumstances at pace.

How do we achieve this between Australia and the United Kingdom? Make it a priority. Strip away red tape, share risk and start building together beyond submarines. Joint production lines for uncrewed underwater vehicles, uncrewed aerial vehicles, shared test ranges for hypersonics, and a security framework that protects intellectual property without throttling collaboration would give both nations sharper teeth at lower cost and create jobs at home. Bilateral collaboration of this degree will only help to underwrite AUKUS collaboration and mitigate some of its risks.

If Canberra and London can turn good will and intent into actual capability before the decade ends, they will prove that determined middle powers need not wait for Washington’s lead to safeguard their interests—and Europe and the Indo-Pacific will be safer for it.