AUKUS is our path to defence self-reliance

17 July | Jennifer Parker

*Originally published in the Australian Financial Review on 17 July 2025

Australia should not sign a blank cheque for the military pact or pre-commit to hypothetical wars, but it is normal for allies to seek clarity on roles as the strategic outlook darkens.

Image: Navy ships from Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom sail in formation during Exercise BERSAMA SHIELD 2025. Defence Images.

AUKUS has dominated headlines since its 2021 launch, and new leaks about the Trump administration “wanting more” have reignited anxieties. Australia should not concede to every US request, but quitting would be reckless. A capable navy, centred on nuclear-powered submarines, underwrites our security and economy.

Former diplomat Peter Varghese may hanker for the pact’s demise, yet that view ignores the blunt military facts of defending an island continent. This is precisely the moment to steady the course on AUKUS, not abandon it.

Rolling “crisis” headlines persist, yet a June poll by the Lowy Institute shows 67 per cent support. Unnamed leaks now claim Washington wants extra concessions.

Canberra should never promise troops for a hypothetical Taiwan war, especially when Washington itself keeps strategic ambiguity. AUKUS matters, but not at any price.

Varghese’s reaction typifies our national knee-jerk. We are spooked by anonymous leaks instead of asking who planted them, how credible they are, or what they really mean. They warrant discussion, not panic.

Australia should not pay any price for AUKUS, nor pre-commit to war, but it is normal for allies to seek clarity on roles as the strategic outlook darkens.

Whatever we think of Washington’s tariff antics, asking Canberra where it stands on regional security is hardly out of order. Remember, Article 4 of that 74-year-old treaty we signed states: “Each Party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.”

“We might bristle at Washington’s blunt tone, but its push for higher defence spending is really a call for greater Australian self-reliance.”

One thing Varghese is right on is that Australia must become far more self-reliant. Our dependence on the United States is not the result of deliberate strategy but of decades of under-investment and delayed decisions that have hollowed out the Australian Defence Force, especially the navy. Since the Cold War, we have leaned on Washington more than either side would have wished.

We might bristle at Washington’s blunt tone, but its push for higher defence spending is really a call for greater Australian self-reliance. They, and every serious Australian military planner and analyst, see that our capabilities lag behind our strategy: the fleet is ageing, missile and drone defences are thin, and the gap between ambition and means is widening.

But Varghese is wrong to claim self-reliance means ditching AUKUS. In reality, AUKUS is the pathway to it.

We rely on the United States well beyond the delivery of three Virginia-class submarines under AUKUS. Our fighter jets, missiles, torpedoes, destroyer combat systems, and secure satellite links all come from America. US leverage over Australia’s defence does not start or finish with nuclear-powered submarines; pretending otherwise misunderstands how our entire force is equipped.

AUKUS is about equipping a maritime nation with the tools to protect its vital interests. If we move past today’s mostly self-inflicted turbulence, we will build the SSN-AUKUS fleet here, develop a sovereign submarine industry, and emerge less, not more, dependent on the United States.

Varghese insists our security is found through “taking advantage of our continental geography”, yet he misreads what that geography means. It is both our shield and Achilles’ heel.

Australia’s vast maritime estate

About 99 per cent of Australia’s trade travels by sea. We are the world’s fifth-largest user of shipping. We import 91 per cent of our fuel, along with fertiliser to grow our crops and almost every high-tech device we use. None of it can be trucked across a land border; it must transit long, exposed sea lanes. In that sense, the maritime domain is Australia’s external life-support system. Protecting it is not optional, it is existential.

Australia’s maritime domain, about 8.2 million square kilometres, actually exceeds its landmass. If we chose to defend only the land with missiles and drones, we would leave that vast sea space, and the lifelines it carries, exposed.

Australia holds barely 50 days of refined fuel; a cut-off would paralyse transport.

Within weeks, civilian flights would be grounded and our F-35 fighters stranded. The exports that bankroll both our economy and any war effort would dry up. True, much of that trade currently goes to China – $219 billion in 2023, or 32.5 per cent of all exports – but iron ore, coal, barley and beef can reach new buyers only if ships can sail.

A strategy that ignores the maritime domain risks throttling Australia’s economy and its defence capability in the same stroke.

Australia’s vast maritime estate demands a strong navy and a submarine capability with reach and staying power, qualities only nuclear-powered submarines provide. Off-the-shelf conventional boats simply lack the endurance; even our enlarged Collins class takes nine days to crawl submerged from Perth to Sydney, surfacing en route and risking detection.

A nuclear-powered boat makes the trip in half the time and stays hidden throughout. In the toughest strategic climate since 1945, the women and men of the ADF deserve nothing less than the best tool for the job.

True self-reliance, as Varghese urges, requires resilience, not knee-jerk panic over every leaked rumour. Australia should not sign a blank cheque for AUKUS or pre-commit to hypothetical wars, yet there is little evidence such demands are even on the table. Allies naturally want clarity on Canberra’s stance in potential contingencies.

If we are serious about standing on our own feet, we must protect the sea lanes that keep the nation alive, and AUKUS, with its sovereign nuclear-powered submarine capability, is central to that task.