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No, protecting Australia’s maritime trade isn’t like the movie Greyhound

4 hours ago
3 min read

Jennifer Parker | 17 November 2026



In a recent article for Crikey , Dr Albert Palazzo argued the Royal Australian Navy cannot protect maritime trade and thus is being set up for failure. The analysis fundamentally misunderstands how maritime trade is protected in crisis, which is not through warships escorting every ship visiting Australia, but rather through a layered maritime strategy that moves from industrial policy through to partnerships and, at the end point, warships and submarines.


But first, why is protecting maritime trade important and exactly what are we protecting? The debate about continental vs maritime strategy is perhaps the oldest in Australian strategic history. Are we defending the land only or also our vital connections to the world? Throughout our history, our dependence on maritime connections has remained constant. From Federation onwards, Australia has recognised that to keep our economy functioning and defend ourselves, ships carrying fuel, food, pharmaceuticals, fertiliser and more must make it to Australia. The statistics are stark: 99% of Australia’s international trade by volume comes by ship.


There is a common misconception about the kind of threat Australia likely faces in future. This is dictated as much by our geography as it is by the changing world order. A large-scale conventional invasion is a far less likely danger than maritime coercion or disruption: being squeezed on the oceans through interdiction of the critical goods that travel through the maritime domain.


So at a time when the world’s oceans are increasingly contested, it makes sense that Australia would design its Defence Force to address this critical vulnerability.


So how do you do it? Dr Palazzo states that 5,841 individual cargo vessels visited Australia in 2024–25. These vessels made 32,142 port calls. Neither number represents the number of ships Australia would need to protect during a conflict. Palazzo, however, mistakenly implies that Australia must protect all of these. This is impossible, so why bother?


Protecting maritime trade is not like the movie Greyhound: it is not about warships convoying tens of thousands of cargo ships to Australia. The Navy is obviously not big enough to do that, and it’s ludicrous to suggest it would need to be.


In a crisis or conflict, you aren’t trying to protect every commercial shipment. Broader maritime trade still matters, but the priority becomes the critical subset called seaborne supply. These are the essential things without which your economy can’t function or your nation can’t fight: fuel, fertiliser, pharmaceuticals, ammunition and other critical supplies.


So it is only this much smaller subset of ships you are protecting.


To protect this much smaller subset, you first understand your dependencies. Where do they come from? What should you make here instead? You mitigate these dependencies through industrial policy, domestic production, diversified supply and stockpiling, reducing the critical things you need to get through the maritime domain.


The next step is pretty simple: where you can, you route ships away from danger. Depending on the threat, a conflict or crisis in our region could see a major shipping route develop south of Australia.


Then, in conflict, you use your warships and submarines to deter, deny or defeat any forces seeking to stop critical seaborne supply from making it to Australia, rather than simply escorting merchant ships. Don’t let the threat and the ship you want to protect be in the same water space.


Throughout all of this, allies and partners contribute to maritime security at every layer.


And if you can’t avoid the risk, then you move to direct protection, including convoy operations.


This isn’t new; Australia did this during World War II. This has always been a consideration for the Navy. After all, we are an island nation.


What is different now is that for much of our strategic history, we relied on our major ally to guarantee this: initially the UK, and then, following the failure of the Singapore Strategy in 1942, increasingly the US. What Australia is saying now is that we need to do more of this ourselves.


Australia does need to invest more in its Navy, and we continue to rely on allies and partners to fill capability gaps. But those gaps are not what Palazzo suggests. Rather, they include our ability to detect sea mines, replenish our planned surface combatant fleet at sea, the limited capacity of our naval reserves and delays in delivering our future surface combatants.


Nor does the fact that we cannot do everything ourselves mean that investing in naval capability is pointless. Australia’s future maritime capability plan goes a long way to ensuring our defence, though gaps remain. But any debate must begin with an accurate understanding of how maritime trade is actually protected.


Dr Palazzo’s argument appears to assume that protecting maritime trade requires the Navy to provide direct protection to thousands of merchant ships. It doesn’t. That’s Greyhound, not maritime strategy

 
 

© 2026 by Jennifer Parker.

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