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- We must be clear about our Red Sea response
January 16, 2023 | Jennifer Parker *originally published in the Australian 16 January 2023 Image: A RAF Typhoon aircraft returns to berth at RAF Akrortiri following a strike mission on Yemen's Houthi rebels. Getty Images. Foreign Minister Penny Wong is visiting the Middle East this week. Presumably by accident, rather than by design, Wong’s visit coincides with the one-month anniversary of the establishment of the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian and comes days after Australia supported the US and British-led strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen. While finding a solution to ending the conflict in Gaza must be the immediate priority for Middle East security, avoiding further flashpoints in the Middle East must also be on Wong’s agenda. The consistent and reckless Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping since November is one of these flashpoints. Two months ago, the Houthi militia began an unrestricted campaign against merchant shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Despite the Houthis’ desire to link this campaign against seafarers to the conflict in Gaza, they have targeted ships linked to more than 50 countries, continuing to target seafarers from across the globe, despite international condemnation. The Red Sea is of course a vital economic trade route, but what is happening in the Red Sea, and the international response, also sends an important message to those who may wish to threaten maritime security and freedom of navigation across the globe, including in the South China Sea. And they will be watching, not only how a minor player in maritime affairs such as the Houthis can have such a dramatic impact on global trade, but also what capabilities the US and its allies and partners respond with. This includes Australia’s subdued response. Personnel and joint statements are important but, in the end, they cannot defend merchant ships or protect seafarers. The US establishment of the allied coalition’s Operation Prosperity Guardian in December in response to Houthi attempts to blockade the Red Sea was an important development, a defensive operation aimed at protecting merchant shipping transiting this critical waterway. The original operation press release flagged 10 participants, which now reportedly has grown to more than 20. Most recently, Singapore has agreed to support the operation with personnel. A key challenge of Operation Prosperity Guardian is the lack of assets to protect shipping, with most participants agreeing only to send personnel support. Notable exceptions to this are Greece and Denmark, which have committed to sending ships, although the timeframe for this is unclear. Sri Lanka also has recently agreed to support the operation and committed to sending a ship to the region, and although what that ship will do and where it will operate given Sri Lankan Navy capabilities is unclear, the sentiment is important. Australia declined to send a ship to support the operation, choosing to support the headquarters with additional personnel instead. Australia was a founding member of the Combined Maritime Forces in 2001. It was also one of the few countries that joined the call to establish the International Maritime Security Construct in response to Iranian attacks on and seizures of merchant shipping during the 2019-20 Gulf crisis, sending HMAS Toowoomba to protect merchant shipping in the Strait of Hormuz in 2020. Given this history, Australia’s decision not to send a ship is sending a message. Defence of shipping and convoy operations are ship-intensive operations; all the goodwill in the world will not protect a merchant ship from an incoming missile. Australia must be careful to avoid the perception that its lack of commitment of a ship to this operation is not interpreted as a lack of capability. That’s a dangerous perception given obvious regional tensions continuing to manifest in the maritime domain, most notably the recent unsafe and unprofessional actions of a People’s Liberation Army naval destroyer towards HMAS Toowoomba in November, resulting in injuries to Australian sailors. With a paucity of ships and a ratcheting up of attacks by the Houthis, the mission in the Red Sea to protect merchant shipping could remain defensive for only so long. Defending one of the world’s busiest waterways was always going to be unsustainable without a transition to offensive action. Following a UN Security Council resolution condemning Houthi actions in the Red Sea, and noting the right of states to defend their vessels from attacks, the US and Britain undertook strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. The US was at pains to highlight that these strikes were not part of Operation Prosperity Guardian, likely because not all members of that operation were supportive of offensive action. While Australia clearly was, the exact nature of the support Australia provided could only have been limited. One month on from its establishment, the future of Operation Prosperity Guardian is unclear. The lack of assets to protect shipping and challenges in destroying the Houthis’ capability, despite US and British resolve, make it difficult to assess when shipping through the Red Sea will return to normal levels. What is clear is that the maritime domain, and freedom of navigation within the maritime domain, will continue to be increasingly contested. Demonstrating not only the resolve but also the capability to respond to those who may wish to threaten these principles will be crucial to protecting Australia’s strategic interests.
- What did Australia's support to US/UK strikes against the Houthi consist of? Hard to say - history of maritime operations in the MEAO gives some insight.
January 12, 2023 | Jennifer Parker *originally published as a Twitter thread here Image: Jennifer Parker and other Australian Defence Force personnel in Bahrain 2022. Authors image. What did Australia’s support to US and UK strikes against Houthi targets consist of? The Australian Defence Minister, Richard Marles has said it consisted of personnel support to the operational headquarters. Australia’s history of operations in the Middle East gives some insights. The Royal Australian Navy has played a key role in maritime operations in the Middle East since almost continuously since 1990 when HMAS Adelaide II deployed to the Middle East Region under Operation Damask. Since its inception in 2001, Australia has supported the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) in Bahrain as a founding member. Australia supported the CMF with an almost continuous rotation of Ships since its inception until 2020 when HMAS Toowoomba completed the last RAN ship rotation in the Middle East Area of Operation under Operation MANITOU. Australia’s commitment to the CMF has also seen Australia command CMF Task Forces 9 times, the last of which was command of the Coalition Task Force 150, in which Australia executed counter-smuggling operations in the maritime domain. Australia has also had a longstanding footprint in the CMF Headquarters based in Bahrain, filling the planning, operations, communications, analysis and administration positions. In 2020 following the completion of HMAS Toowoomba’s deployment to the Middle East Area of Operations, Australia reduced its maritime element in Bahrain to 3-5, but retained the position of CMF Director of Operations which it has held for over 20 years. Following the request to support Operation Prosperity Guardian, under CMF CTF 153, Australia once again increased its footprint in Bahrain, now reported to be 11 personnel. Although it has not been publicly released what roles these additional personnel, Australia’s previous support to International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) gives some insight. During the 2019/2020 Gulf Crisis Australia joined IMSC to protect international shipping from Iranian harassment and attacks in the Strait of Hormuz, Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. In addition to the support of HMAS Toowoomba, Australia’s support consisted of the Director Plans, the Deputy Director plans, air planners, communications planners and crucially maritime trade operators’ expertise. It is likely the additional Australian staff support consisted of these skill sets. Whilst the US has been clear to highlight strikes against Houthi targets were not carried out under CMF, Australian staff in CMF have always had a dual role, supporting not only CMF but also serving as Australia’s liaison to 5th Fleet / US Naval Force Central Command supporting operations as directed by the ADF Joint Headquarters (HQJOC). A role they may have played during the US / UK strikes on Houthi targets on 11 January 2024.
- Red Sea brigands will test Australia’s maritime strategy
December 18 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Australian 18 December 2023 Image: Jennifer Parker, Combined Maritime Forces December 2022. Department of Defence Images. Over the past month, the Iranian-backed Houthi militia in Yemen has recommenced its attacks on merchant shipping in the Red Sea. Attacks and attempted attacks included the seizure of a British-owned, Japanese-operated merchant ship, reportedly linked to an Israeli businessman, and the militia says it will continue to attack merchant shipping transiting to Israel. That is a significant threat to global commerce given that more than 12 per cent of global trade transits through the Red Sea, as does more than 40 per cent of Europe’s trade with Asia. Australia has been asked to join a US-led maritime coalition to protect traffic through the Red Sea. As an island nation dependent on maritime trade, Australia has very strong reasons to do so. The extent of Australia’s reliance on the international shipping network is often quickly set aside in discussions of what is, or is not, in the nation’s strategic interests. That has left us with an under-resourced Royal Australian Navy. That issue must be embraced if Australia wants to be able to protect itself in an increasingly contested world. The Red Sea attacks put at risk all shipping transiting through this area, not just those heading to Israel. Most recently, the Houthi militia has used uncrewed aerial vehicles and anti-ship cruise missiles against its targets. The Houthis have previously used less discriminate weapons, including floating mines, which generate a risk to all shipping in the area. The waters of the Red Sea are patrolled by ships from numerous countries, including those operating under the Combined Maritime Forces and the International Maritime Security Construct, multinational naval coalitions. Australia was a founding member of both. The Combined Maritime Forces is a 39-nation coalition formed in 2002 to combat non-state threats such as terrorism, and smuggling. The International Maritime Security Construct was established in 2019 in response to Iranian attacks on merchant shipping in the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz, and focuses on state-based maritime security threats in the Middle East. This week’s call from the US for Australia to provide a warship to help protect international merchant shipping in the Red Sea, again raised the question of why would we deploy a warship outside our region? Over decades, Australia has undertaken many military deployments in the Middle East. Each decision was made for its own strategic reasons. From the early 1990s until late 2020 Australia almost continuously deployed warships to the Middle East area of operations. They operated across the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Western Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. These deployments were driven by strategic reasons that included supporting the alliance and generating skills and exposure for RAN personnel in a complex maritime environment. However, the predominant reason is that Middle East maritime security matters a great deal to Australian national security. Ensuring unencumbered shipping through the Middle East and across the Indian Ocean is one of Australia’s key maritime strategic interests. Much of Australia’s unrefined fuel comes from the Middle East, transits across the Indian Ocean into Southeast Asia, is refined and is carried to Australia. The fact that 91 per cent of Australia’s fuel is imported amounts to a significant maritime vulnerability. The European Union is Australia’s third-largest trading partner, behind China and Japan; given 98 per cent of Australia’s trade is by sea, much of this trade with the EU transits through the Red Sea. With the possibility of a regional conflict continuing to increase as a result of China’s aggressive posture towards nations in Southeast and Northeast Asia, calls for the government and the ADF to focus on our immediate region seem sound if taken at face value. But they underplay the importance of any interruption to maritime trade, and the lengthy sea lines of communication that service that trade, on Australia’s security and prosperity. To secure that trade, Australian warships will need to deploy to critical choke-points great distances away. A lack of understanding and acceptance of this reality, and the consequent need for a strong navy with very effective capabilities has contributed to a critical vulnerability to Australia. Australia should again send a warship to protect international shipping in the Red Sea, not because of any romantic obligations to the US alliance or to the international rules-based order – both of which are important – but to protect our maritime strategic interests. No longer can we afford to be blind to our dependence on the maritime domain and what that means for Australia’s security. We cannot draw a neat regional bubble around Australia and say that this is where we will operate our ships, blind to our dependence on those long sea lines of communication. The threat to international shipping in the Red Sea should serve as a wake-up call that Australia needs a clear maritime strategy, with articulated maritime strategic interests and a Royal Australian Navy with enough ships to defend them.
- In the end, it’s just maths: the risks of rhetoric around the defence budget
8 December 2023 | J Parker *Originally published in The Strategist on 8 Dec 23 Image: Department of Defence. ‘This is Australia’s most challenging strategic environment since the Second World War. And looking back to the lead-up to the Second World War provides important lessons about the need to invest in defence.’ Minister for Defence Industry Pat Conroy, National Press Club address, 28 November 2023 Last month, Minister for Defence Industry Pat Conroy took to the stage at the National Press Club to address concerns that Australia’s planned acquisition of nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines under the AUKUS arrangement lacked a social licence. Defending the $368 billion acquisition, Conroy outlined the challenging strategic circumstances Australia now faces. The situation had deteriorated further since the release of the defence strategic review in April 2023, he noted, with war in the Middle East and increasingly unsafe actions of Chinese military aircraft and warships in the South China Sea and Northeast Asia. Despite the geographical realities that are driving Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, many argue that the government lacks public support for such a significant acquisition. That is borne out in the latest United States Studies Centre poll, which indicates that only 49% of Australians support acquiring these submarines. The eye-watering cost hasn’t won the plan many friends in a country experiencing a cost-of-living crisis. With this background firmly established, Conroy gave a commendable defence of the acquisition highlighting the tactical, operational and strategic realities that justify this bold capability direction. The address seemed on point and on the rails until journalist Kym Bergman asked about defence funding. When I asked Defence Minister Richard Marles the same question in September at the ASPI conference, he responded that ‘strategy without money is just hot air’. Bergman noted that ASPI’s budget analysis, The big squeeze, released on 29 May, said core funding for the Defence Department had been reduced at a time when unprecedented demands were being placed on it. ‘Between 2023–24 and 2025–26, defence funding drops from $154 billion to $152.5 billion,’ Bergman said. The minister rejected the assertion, saying: ‘ASPI were picking and choosing between what parts they counted and what parts they didn’t count. I urge you to look at the defence papers. Every year the defence funding goes up.’ His response highlighted the greatest single risk to Australia’s defence: the ‘squeezing’ of the defence budget. The issue that became readily apparent in that response is that the government is still not ready to admit that the defence budget is under extreme pressure at a time when Conroy had stated that investment is needed. Budgets are not a matter of interpretation, or perception; they are simply a matter of numbers and maths. As part of the process of making the numbers work, Defence is compensated for fluctuations in the exchange rate and is forecast to receive $4 billion in compensation over the next three years. This is, of course, not real money; it simply acknowledges the fact that Defence pays more for capabilities when the Australian dollar is low. When you remove the compensation for foreign exchange fluctuations, the real funding of Defence becomes clear. In the March 2022 budget forecast, Defence core funding was predicted to be $154.0 billion for the next three financial years. The budget delivered in May 2023 forecasts $156.5 billion for Defence over the same period. That’s an increase, yes—but it’s not a real increase. When you remove the $4 billion compensation for exchange rate fluctuations, Defence receives $152.5 billion dollars across the next three years. This is a reduction of $1.5 billion for the defence budget over the next three years compared with last year’s forecast. That was highlighted in ASPI’s defence budget brief and confirmed by Defence’s chief financial officer, Steven Groves, in Senate estimates on 30 May. This reduction in forecast defence spending is a matter of public record. The pain of the reduction in budget forecasts of Defence’s core funding is further exacerbated by the doubling of inflation eroding the purchasing power of the defence budget. All of this is happening as additional requirements from the DSR and AUKUS initiatives are squeezed into the budget. The government has forecast an increase in defence spending between 2027–28 and 2032–33 of $30.5 billion, with Treasury indicating a growth in defence spending as a percentage of GDP from 2.05% to 2.30% over the same time. But with wars in Europe and the Middle East, and with the chances of a miscalculation in the South China Sea increasing daily, we must ask ourselves as a nation whether we can wait until 2027–28 for defence funding relief. In May, my co-authors and I wrote in ASPI’s defence budget brief: ‘The strategic context for the 2023–24 defence budget is complex and extremely challenging. There’s currently a gap, and quite a significant one, between the rhetoric of the 2023 DSR and the 2023–24 defence budget (and forward estimates).’ This remains as accurate today as it was in May. Denying the simple fact that the defence budget is under pressure does little to assist the conversation about the stark strategic circumstances we find ourselves in. In the end, it’s just maths.
- What will the RAN’s fleet look like in 2035? Indo-Pacific 2023 offered options
14 November 23 | Jennifer Parker Image: Department of Defence. Australia is often accused of ‘sea blindness’ and a lack of appreciation of the need for a strong navy to protect our vital maritime trade routes. It was reassuring that last week’s biennial Indo-Pacific exposition in Sydney delivered a confluence of ideas from defence personnel, industry and academics on the future of maritime capability in Australia and the region. Within the exposition was the Royal Australian Navy’s Sea Power Conference, on the theme ‘Fleet 2035: Sea power and the future of maritime warfare’, where it was noted that the future structure of the surface combatant fleet remains unsettled despite an eight-month defence strategic review (DSR) process and five-month independent analysis of surface capability. The analysis was delivered to the government in late September and it was anticipated that decisions on the surface fleet’s structure would be made public this year. However, the government has indicated that the outcomes will not be known until early 2024. The 2016 defence white paper planned for recapitalisation of the RAN, but uncertainty remains about the viability of the choice of nine Hunter-class frigates and 12 Arafura-class offshore patrol vessels. Debate has focused on whether either program can deliver as promised. The Hunter program was the subject of a highly critical Australian National Audit Office report, and while the first of the Arafura class was launched in 2021, it’s yet to be commissioned into operational service and that program has been listed as a project of concern. Perhaps gaining more traction is the debate over whether either program will deliver the capability required to meet Australia’s strategic circumstances. The DSR authors clearly believed that these vessels did not meet the need for an enhanced-lethality surface combatant fleet consistent with a larger number of smaller surface vessels. Given that the government is yet to answer the question of what the fleet should look like in 2035, some industry representatives took it upon themselves to do so. Defence companies put forward options to meet the DSR intent that the fleet should consist of Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants. Among the new contenders were light frigates from TKMS and Gibbs & Cox, a subsidiary of Leidos. Both presented designs to address the DSR’s call for Tier 2 ships. TKMS, which produced the MEKO 200, the reference design for the RAN’s current Anzac-class frigate, delivered a design for a third-generation multi-purpose frigate, the A210. The 4,700-tonne design sought to answer the DSR’s call for enhanced lethality with 32 vertical launch system (VLS) cells, 16 cannisters for naval strike missiles (NSMs), a directed-energy weapon with power plant, a mission bay for uncrewed surface vessels (USVs), a towed-array sonar and plans to integrate Australia’s CEAFAR radar. Gibbs & Cox offered a 3,700-tonne (similar to the Anzac) design for an Australian light frigate based on the new Taiwanese light frigate. The design has a similar strike capability to the MEKO A210 with 32 VLS, 16 cannisters for NSM, capacity for a close-in weapons system (CIWS) and a hangar to embark the MH-60R helicopter. Although both are interesting propositions, it seems unlikely that the surface combatant fleet decision would embrace a new designer at this difficult stage. The current surface combatant plan already relies on extending each Anzac frigate by nine years which, given the state of the class highlighted in the 2019 ANAO report, seems unlikely. Any decision on the surface fleet will therefore need to ensure delivery of vessels in the early 2030s as currently planned, or perhaps earlier. There will be limited appetite to introduce further risk with a new ship designer. One exception is, perhaps, an AUKUS Pillar 3 covering shipbuilding, which could be a worthwhile consideration now the US is back in the frigates game. Seeking to address concerns that the Hunter frigate lacks firepower, BAE Systems Australia showcased a design for an evolved Hunter with the number of VLS increased from the 32 in the current design to 96, akin to the firepower of a US Arleigh Burke destroyer. It was suggested that could be increased to 128 should the 5-inch gun not be required. By any stretch that’s a dramatic increase for the Hunter design. Of course, this would come with a cost. The 2023 ANAO audit highlighted concerns about the weight of the Hunter design, so the addition of a further 64 or 96 VLS would appear to be challenging. To accommodate the extra weight, BAE has said the USV mission bay, towed array or other anti-submarine warfare systems would be removed from the evolved Hunter, but it would still have 85% commonality with the current Hunter class. The Hunters were always intended to be delivered in batches, and BAE says this change would have a negligible risk to the schedule if it’s delivered in batch II (ships 4–6). There are significant benefits in retaining the same shipbuilder/designer and commonality of systems, and the hull. While that could reduce the risk in delivering a more lethal fleet, questions would remain about the plan’s viability and cost. It’s unlikely that such an expansion of capability would be feasible within the current Hunter project costs, already predicted to be beyond $45 billion. Perhaps seeking to address all aspects of the surface fleet discussion, Navantia, which designed the RAN’s Hobart-class destroyers, Canberra-class landing helicopter docks and Supply-class replenishment vessels, produced three designs. Consistent with the company’s previous offerings, they included both a corvette and a destroyer option. Navantia’s Tasman-class corvette is based on the Alpha 3000 design built for Saudi Arabia with the same tonnage as the Anzac class. It has increased firepower with 16 VLS, room for 16 NSM cannisters, a 57-millimetre main gun, CIWS, USV mission bay and the Australian CEAFAR radar. Navantia announced that it would lock in Australian shipbuilding partners by joining with CIVMEC and Austal to deliver six corvettes to the RAN. Seemingly in response to corvette critics—though the Tasman class is the size of an Anzac frigate—Navantia also unveiled a design for an Alpha 5000 frigate at 4,550 tonnes with 32 VLS. That’s about half the tonnage of a Hunter frigate but would have double the VLS capability of the Tasman-class corvette. Navantia’s final design was for a ‘Flight III’ destroyer to address the RAN’s Tier 1 requirements. Based on the Spanish F110 design, the 10,200-tonne destroyer has 128 VLS cells in two 64-cell segments, a 127-millimetre main gun and two CIWS. It reportedly has drone-swarm and anti-drone-swarm launchers. With the surface combatant recommendations now in the government’s hands, it’s difficult to forecast which, if any, of the options on offer at Indo-Pacific 2023 might be selected. It’s clear that with the Anzacs nearing their expiry date there will be limited appetite to introduce further risk into the shipbuilding program. This must make the BAE and Navantia bids compelling, with existing relationships and commonality of systems key elements in de-risking the decision. Of course, there’s always the option of aligning with American shipbuilding programs now that the US is back in the frigate game, so perhaps an AUKUS Pillar 3 based on shipbuilding is worth considering.
- An Australian maritime strategy: resourcing the RAN
30 October 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Strategist 30 October 2023. Link to original here Image: Department of Defence. As a country ‘girt by sea’, Australia must enunciate a clear maritime strategy that recognises the scale of its maritime territory and responsibilities, its dependence on trade for its prosperity and the increasing value of activity in the maritime environment. In a highly interconnected world, we face fundamental vulnerabilities from the realities of our geostrategic situation, and we must be able to defend our national interests. In my ASPI report, An Australian maritime strategy: resourcing the Royal Australian Navy, released today, I argue that the Royal Australian Navy lacks the resources to adequately protect Australia’s vast maritime interests. This isn’t unique to our time: maritime strategists have long lamented that, despite being uniquely an island, a continent and a nation, Australia struggles to understand the central importance of a maritime strategy to our defence and security. The underappreciation of Australia’s dependence on the maritime domain and its significance for our prosperity and security has consistently produced a RAN that’s overlooked and under-resourced. Some argue that the AUKUS agreement shows that capability is driving strategy. But to develop a coherent force structure, strategy must drive capability. It’s important that the RAN’s structure and capabilities are driven by a strategy that’s clear and responsive to the circumstances outlined in the 2023 defence strategic review. Many of our partners, including the US, the UK and India, have recognised that and published public maritime strategies, but Australia’s maritime strategy is less clear, and the term itself is conspicuously absent from public strategic documents. A maritime strategy isn’t simply another domain strategy: the defence of our national interests is inherently maritime in nature. To ensure maritime security, the RAN relies on a backbone of 11–12 major surface combatants. The major surface-combatant fleet consists of eight Anzac-class frigates and three Hobart-class destroyers. All have capabilities in anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-air warfare (AAW) and anti-surface warfare (ASuW). The structure has remained relatively constant for more than 50 years, despite recommendations from multiple reviews that the fleet should have 16–20 ships. While the methodology behind recommendations for an expanded fleet isn’t clear, the context is relevant. Reviews in the 1970s and 1980s were conducted during the Cold War when the possibility of a ‘hot war’ was real. Throughout the 1990s and the 2000s, many policymakers believed that the era of state-on-state conflict was over. However, in the past 20 years, the power balance in the Indo-Pacific region has changed dramatically, and since 2022 Europe has faced the possibility of a major war. By 2020, China’s military modernisation and its coercive and aggressive behaviour in the region, along with dramatic advances in technology, prompted the Australian government to abandon the assumption that it would have 10 years’ warning of a major conflict to strengthen the Australian Defence Force. But this significant change in strategic thinking, reinforced by the 2023 review, hasn’t brought relevant changes to the RAN’s structure, specifically to the major surface-combatant fleet. A review has been undertaken but its results aren’t yet public. While Australia’s planned acquisition of eight nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS to replace our six conventional submarines is important, it doesn’t represent a major structural change or significant expansion of the RAN. The program will significantly increase the capabilities of the RAN’s submarines, but not the overall capability of the fleet designed over 50 years ago. In my report, I examine whether the bipartisan thesis of a structural change in Australia’s strategic circumstances, articulated in the 2023 review, also requires a structural change in and an expansion of the RAN. I argue that both a larger and balanced surface-combatant fleet and a review of the RAN’s structure are needed. The review should consider bold changes, including reconsideration of a fleet auxiliary, a coastguard or forward basing of assets to support the workforce requirements of an expanded fleet. The report looks mainly at the structure of the surface-combatant fleet. As the government examines the recently completed surface fleet review, I make eight recommendations for its consideration. I argue that the status quo of 11–12 major surface combatants is insufficient for Australia. That was the case even when the force was structured around the concept of 10 years’ warning time. The problem has become more acute given the strategic competition and the capability and size of potential adversaries, particularly China, as recognised in the 2023 review. I agree with past reviewers’ recommendations that 16–20 major surface combatants are needed. The increased number must provide a range of operational effects in a balanced fleet. In this missile era, the planned number of ASW-oriented, multi-purpose Hunter-class frigates should be reduced. I argue that having nine would result in even an expanded fleet being biased towards ASW, with limited ability to field an adequate number of missiles per tonne across the fleet. That would have impact on its ASuW and AAW capabilities. The scope and length of the report don’t permit consideration of Australia’s naval shipbuilding enterprise or the industry policy of continuous naval shipbuilding, although both must be considered in the expansion of the surface-combatant fleet. I don’t suggest what additional vessels should be acquired, but options include increasing the number of Hobart-class destroyers, modifying the Hunter class, or aligning with the US future frigate (Constellation class) or future destroyer program (DDG(X)). These possibilities all come with their own benefits and unique challenges. The surface-combatant fleet can’t be viewed independently of broader maritime capabilities, including sealift, mine warfare and civil maritime trade operations, all of which will need to be enveloped in a clear and coherent maritime strategy. Although those capabilities aren’t considered in this report, their interrelated nature highlights why maritime strategy should be driving maritime capability. Australia’s security and prosperity are intimately linked to the maritime domain, and yet our defence strategy—current and past—doesn’t clearly articulate a maritime strategy. Articulation, production and understanding of Australia’s maritime strategy are essential to deter conflict in the region, and an expanded fleet is required in case deterrence fails. There’s bipartisan understanding and acceptance that our strategic circumstances will continue to change. That requires structural change of the RAN, not only acquiring a small number of nuclear-powered submarines—with opportunity and substantial risk—but bolstering the surface combatants which are the backbone of any force for achieving sea control and power projection. This will be challenging and will require sweeping reviews of the wider RAN structure to crew and support that capability, hence the suggested consideration of a coastguard, a naval auxiliary or task groups at different readiness levels. This can’t be delayed. Tinkering around the edges of the ADF and RAN structures will provide neither the necessary deterrent effect nor the capability to defend Australia’s interests should deterrence fail. The dramatically reduced strategic warning time is itself a warning that we must act.
- Australia must act fast on joint patrols with the Philippines
13 October 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Interpreter 13 October 2023. Link to original version. Australia “recommitted” two months ago. The Philippines is waiting, China is watching – and so is the region. Image: Ted Ajibe/AFP via Getty Images Enrique Manalo, Philippines Foreign Affairs Secretary, made his feelings clear. “During our discussions,” he declared on Tuesday, standing alongside his Australian counterpart Penny Wong during a visit to Adelaide, “I emphasised that the West Philippines Sea, South China Sea remains of foremost regional concern”. “As maritime nations,” Manalo went on to say, “the Philippines and Australia share a commitment to preserving freedom of navigation and overflight and upholding the rule of law in our common waters”. It was a reminder, if one was needed, about the ongoing danger from China’s aggressive behaviour in these crucial waters. Since August, tensions between the Philippines and China have continued to increase. And perhaps it was also a subtle signal that Australia needs to quickly operationalise its commitment to joint patrols with the Philippines, despite the effect that might have on its improving relationship with China. In August, footage emerged of a Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessel blasting a Philippines vessel with a water cannon as it attempted to resupply troops stationed aboard the grounded BRP Sierra Madre on Second Thomas Shoal. Shortly afterwards, Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles visited the Philippines and announced that Australia was “recommitted to planning bilateral joint patrols”. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese reinforced this pledge to the Philippines in September when the two nations signed a strategic partnership. HMAS Toowoomba and HMAS Hobart will spend three months in South-East and North-East Asia on a “regional presence deployment” But this week, Wong would not be drawn on the timing, only that “the intention remains, as the leaders announced, for a joint sail in the West Philippines [Sea], in an appropriate maritime location as yet to be announced.” However, since August, tensions between the Philippines and China have continued to increase. The Philippines recently removed a barrier installed by the CCG around Scarborough Shoal, which lies within the Philippines exclusive economic zone, and this month China further attempted to interfere with the Sierra Madre resupply mission. For Australia, delays in following through on its undertaking for joint patrols could impact on its regional credibility. Clearly aimed at deterring China’s aggression, the choice of the term “joint patrol” is significant in its symbolism. At its heart, a joint patrol is simply two countries agreeing to sail their ships together through an agreed location for a defined period, arguably with a degree of joint operational planning underpinning the arrangement. The terminology was clearly chosen in the context of the Australia–Philippines relationship to signal an operational element to the engagement beyond simple maritime exercises. It is in the operational nature of a “joint patrol” that the announcement conveys the strength of the two countries’ commitment. Conducting joint patrols with the Philippines presents a difficult policy decision for Australia as it seeks to smooth ties with China in the lead-up to a potential visit to Beijing by Anthony Albanese. But the operational aspect also has complexities for Australia. The security threat such patrols would be designed to combat is aggressive activity by China’s CCG and what has been dubbed its maritime militia. To be effective, these patrols would need to take place in contested areas subject to the recent tensions. If they are not undertaken in a contested area of significance then the pledge of joint patrols, and the operational support that is perceived to underpin them, will likely do little to influence China’s activities in the area. Areas in which Australia and the Philippines could undertake such patrols to achieve maximum effect include Reed Bank, which has promising energy fields, and Second Thomas Shoal, the site of the Sierra Madre, a Second World War-era vessel in poor condition that is likely to break apart. Both were subject to the 2016 Arbitral tribunal ruling that Reed Bank “is an entirely submerged formation that cannot give rise to maritime entitlements” and that Second Thomas Shoal is a “low-tide elevation and as such generate[s] no entitlement to maritime zones”. The significance being that they constitute part of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, denying any legal claim to these features by China. Manalo also made the point following his talks with Wong “to thank Australia for its continuing support for the 2016 arbitral award on the South China Sea.” In recent weeks, HMAS Hobart and Toowoomba deployed for three months to South-East and North-East Asia on a “regional presence deployment”. The two-ship task group is soon to be joined by HMAS Stuart. Although the Department of Defence website does not list the Philippines among the countries this task group will operate with, the vessels’ planned proximity to the contested areas begs the question of whether this presents an opportunity to act on Australia’s commitment to joint patrols. Obviously conducting joint patrols with the Philippines presents a difficult policy decision for Australia as it seeks to smooth ties with China in the lead-up to a potential visit to Beijing by Anthony Albanese. But if Australia does not act on its promise in a meaningful timeframe, the credibility of its pledges of support to regional partners will be undermined.
- With delay of fleet review, RAN must be prepared to fight with what it has now
27 September 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 27 September 2023. Link to original version. Image: Department of Defence. Defence Minister Richard Marles has announced that decisions on the surface combatant fleet review will not be made public until 2024. This analysis was an outcome of the defence strategic review, which recommended that the government direct ‘an independent analysis of Navy’s surface combatant fleet capability to ensure the fleet’s size, structure and composition complement the capabilities provided by the forthcoming conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine’. As I have written, it’s difficult to understand how Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines changes the surface combatant fleet structure requirements. However, the Royal Australian Navy’s surface fleet, including its combatants, has deep issues in an era of little to no strategic warning time of a major conflict in the Indo-Pacific. The review is essential but its scope should extend far beyond the make-up of the surface combatant fleet. Because Australia is a maritime nation, many of our vulnerabilities manifest in that domain. It will be argued that this review of the backbone of the Australian Defence Force’s maritime operations is one of the most significant in recent years. So how did we get here? What are the key considerations? And what does the delayed decision mean? Many a naval officer or maritime strategist laments that Australia has long failed to understand and insure against its maritime vulnerabilities through investment in an adequately sized and armed RAN. The current surface combatant fleet consists of eight Anzac-class frigates and three Hobart-class destroyers. The Anzacs comprise over 70% of the surface combatants but they are rapidly ageing. HMAS Anzac was commissioned in 1996 and has been in service for nearly 30 years. It was to be withdrawn in 2024–25 but, with its sister ships, it’s now expected to be in service for an additional nine years because of delays in building its replacement, the Hunter-class frigates. Ageing frigates are expensive to sustain at the best of times, but it’s likely that the Anzacs are in an even worse state with sustainment having a significant impact on the navy’s capability budget. A damming 2019 performance audit of the frigates by the Australia National Audit Office found that: ‘The Anzac class has experienced degradation of the ships’ hulls and sub-systems, with successive reviews and performance information highlighting the link between lack of conformance to operating intent/requirement, reduced platform life and reduced sustainment efficiency.’ The frigates are intended to be upgraded through the transition capability assurance program, but they’ve had hard lives and there’s a question mark over whether all eight can be extended for an additional nine years. Not only must the review urgently address the state and age of the Anzacs, it must also grapple with the cost blowouts, delays, and limited missile capability of the replacement Hunter class. The second challenge is what to do with the navy’s Arafura-class offshore patrol vessels (OPVs). The RAN currently shares the burden of constabulary operations with the Australian Border Force. Many have advocated that duties such as fisheries and border protection patrols should be given to a coastguard, but in the near to medium term these constabulary operations will remain with the RAN. The OPV was designed to replace the much smaller Armidale-class patrol boat. The 2009 defence white paper stated that: The future Offshore Combatant Vessel will be able to undertake offshore and littoral warfighting roles, border protection tasks, long-range counter-terrorism and counter-piracy operations, support to special forces, and missions in support of security and stability in the immediate neighbourhood. This increased capability will also ensure that major surface combatants are free for more demanding operations [emphasis added]. If the OPV is purely to undertake constabulary tasks, then the size of the vessels and associated crewing burden is too large. If it’s intended to ‘ensure major surface combatants are free for more demanding operations’, then its armament and survivability are too low. The reality is that the review doesn’t need to look at the surface combatant fleet structure because of the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, but as the result of an ageing and inadequately structured surface combatant fleet. The first issue is what to do with the ageing Anzacs. There are clear challenges in sustaining them despite the planned upgrades. With the Hunter class due in the 2030s, it’s fair to question if all eight Anzacs can last that long given the ANAO’s assessment of their condition—and can the Hunter class be delivered on time and at a reasonable cost? Perhaps more significant is the question of whether the Hunter is adequate for our geopolitical circumstances. The ANAO audit likely hammered a nail into the coffin of the target number of nine Hunters, and the government’s decision to delay the release of the review until 2024 may indicate that this project will be reduced in size or abandoned. The first Hunter is scheduled for delivery in mid-2032. If the program is abandoned or reduced in number, and if all the Anzacs can’t be sustained until the early 2030s, how will the gap be filled? What replaces those nine planned frigates is crucial. The answers are not easy or readily apparent. But I would suspect the front runner may be the US Constellation-class frigate, which is based on the Italian Fincanteri FREMM design. When Australia opted for the Hunter class, the US had decommissioned its Oliver Hazard Perry frigates (also operated by Australia) and was seemingly out of the frigate game. However, the challenges associated with its littoral combat ship program resulted in the US Navy returning to frigates as an important capability—hence the Constellation program. The FREMM was an early contender for Australia’s future frigate before the Hunter was selected. The Constellation class has a 32-cell vertical launch system for missiles. The Hunter has been criticised for having the same number. But the US is considering adding Tomahawk cruise missiles to the Constellation. At 7,300 tonnes, the FREMM displaces 2,700 tonnes less than the Hunter design, with scope for capability growth. The argument that the RAN needs the firepower of more destroyers has been well made by numerous commentators. The delay in announcing the surface combatant decision may also mean that the Arafura project will be reduced or ceased. The challenge here is that the project is well into production. The first ship is due to be commissioned in 2024, the second vessel is being fitted out, and the keel has been laid for the fifth. Could they be produced with greater armament, or sold to regional navies? Both are possibilities. But that would raise the question of what would replace the OPVs on constabulary operations. The Armidale patrol boats are already being decommissioned. Perhaps the answer is the Cape-class patrol boat, which the RAN rushed into service following issues with the sustainability of the Armidales. An expansion of the Cape fleet would require half the workforce of the Arafuras. The Capes would be purely used on constabulary operations, rather than the 2009 white paper’s aspiration for OPVs to supplement the major surface combatants. And so, we wait. The review’s recommendation’s will be known next year and will likely be aligned with the release of the national defence strategy. There are significant decisions to grapple with, and it’s likely that none will come without requiring additional funding. As time creeps on in an era of no strategic warning time, and as capability reviews continue, the sobering thought is that the ADF and RAN must be prepared to fight tonight with the fleet they have now.
- Time to re-establish the Royal Australian Fleet Auxiliary?
13 September 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 13 September 2023. Link to original version. Image: M. Evison/Wikimedia Commons. On 14 December 1944, the Royal Australian Fleet Auxiliary freighting tanker Bishopdale was in the Philippines in San Pedro Bay refuelling Australian and Allied forces when it was attacked by a Japanese kamikaze aircraft. Able Seaman Gunner Stuart Savage opened fire but, despite the efforts of the defensively equipped merchant ship’s gunnery team, the dive bomber hit the forward mast and then struck the bridge, causing significant damage and fatally wounding Savage and two of his shipmates. The story of the Bishopdale and the fleet auxiliary is little known, but perhaps it’s time to reinvigorate the construct to support the future Royal Australian Navy. Australia hopes for peace, but it cannot be blind to the need to prepare for the possibility of conflict. The 2023 defence strategic review stated: [F]or the first time in 80 years, we must go back to fundamentals, to take a first-principles approach as to how we manage and seek to avoid the highest level of strategic risk we now face as a nation: the prospect of major conflict in the region that directly threatens our national interest. That’s a stark warning that a major conflict could commence in our region with little to no time for preparation. In ASPI’s 2023–24 defence budget brief, I identified gathering the necessary workforce as the greatest risk to the Australian Defence Force’s future planning. That sentiment is highlighted in the DSR, which acknowledges the workforce issues and notes that the RAN ‘faces the most significant challenges of the three services’. Defence’s 2023–24 budget gave the size of the RAN in 2022–23 as 15,253 personnel with a goal of 16,980 by 2025–26. However, the navy was already 495 personnel lower than forecast in the 2022–23 budget. Despite the best recruitment and retention aspirations, it is unlikely that the ADF and the RAN will reach the workforce growth target set in March 2022. Yet the future RAN will need more submariners to support the growth in crews required by the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines and the potential growth required in surface vessel crews pending the outcome of the surface combatant fleet review due in late September. It’s clear that structural reform will be an essential part of preparing the ADF and the RAN for the risk of conflict outlined in the DSR and the establishment of a civilian-crewed fleet auxiliary could be a key part of this. The dramatic reduction in Australia’s merchant fleet over the past decade means that this alone won’t solve the RAN’s personnel challenges but, among other structural reforms, it may assist. Both the UK and US operate naval fleet auxiliaries consisting of logistics and sea-lift vessels crewed by civilian mariners. The RAN’s auxiliary vessels, which include the supply ships HMAS Supply and Stalwart and the landing ship dock HMAS Choules, are crewed by uniformed naval members but could be converted to civilian crewing. In fact, when the Choules was purchased from the UK, it served with the Royal Fleet Auxiliary as RFA Largs Bay and was therefore operated by a civilian crew. The crew of the Choules is 158, but as the Largs Bay the core crew would have been 60 to 70, half the number the RAN uses to operate the same vessel. While the core crew of an RFA Wave-class tanker used to replenish the Royal Navy fleet is approximately 80, the complement of the RAN replenishment vessels, the Supply class, is approximately 170. Of course, they are different classes of vessels so it’s not an easy comparison, but the broader point is that civilian fleet auxiliary vessels generally much leaner crewed than RAN auxiliary vessels. The re-establishment of a fleet auxiliary could also provide synergies with the increasing number of Australian Defence Vessels operated by the Department of Defence, including the Pacific support vessel ADV Reliant launched in 2022. Additional benefits could include a reduced training pipeline for auxiliary crews, opportunities for expansion of the RAN reserve force, bolstering of the RAN’s relationship with Australia’s merchant industry and of the merchant industry’s skills, the ability to scale up in a time of crisis or conflict, and commonality across the ADV fleet. The generation of a new fleet auxiliary wouldn’t be straightforward, but it’s exactly the kind of bold structural change the RAN will need to consider to crew the fleet of the future. The structure of the ADF and the RAN remain relatively unchanged despite the clear risks outlined in the DSR. In an era of reduced strategic warning time, bold decisions are necessary and risk must be accepted to gain strategic and operational advantage. Re-establishing the Royal Australian Fleet Auxiliary is an option worth considering.
- Strategy must drive the RAN’s surface combatant fleet structure
16 August 2023 | J Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 16 August 2023. Link to original version. Image: Department of Defence. The structure of the Royal Australian Navy since its inception has been determined by trading off capability, cost and workforce. Long lamented by naval historians and practitioners alike has been the view that Australia’s maritime strategy, or lack thereof, has been shaped by a continentalist conception of the nation, culturally and strategically. When the average Australian thinks of the military and its sacrifices, they think of Gallipoli or the battles on the Western Front. They don’t tend to think of the loss of HMAS Perth in 1942 with 400 crew in the Sunda Strait some 2,500 kilometres from Darwin, or of the loss HMAS Sydney in 1941 with 645 crew 290 kilometres west-southwest of Carnarvon. This sea blindness has arguably shaped investment in the RAN and its structure. But it shouldn’t be overlooked or misunderstood that failing to adequately resource the navy could result in the loss of an Anzac-class or a Hobart-class surface combatant—and its crew—within hours of a conflict commencing in the region. That is what ‘no strategic warning time’ means. So, where are we today? The world has evolved. We increasingly see foreign warships operating aggressively in our region. A war is raging in Europe. Successive Australian defence white papers in the 2000s and the 2020 defence strategic update and force structure plan all recognise the real possibility of conflict. All highlight the strategic importance of the maritime environment to Australia and our increasing reliance on seaborne trade, which equates to about 40% of GDP. That figure grossly undersells the relevance of maritime trade—91% of our oil is imported and we rely on it to keep the country going. Our economy also relies on undersea cables for communications and transactions, including within our banking systems. And yet, despite our reliance on the maritime environment and the deterioration of regional stability, the answer to most questions about the RAN’s surface fleet structure for over 50 years has been 11–12 surface combatants. There was a notable deviation in the 1987 white paper’s recommendation for 16–17 surface combatants, but that was never followed through. The only dramatic changes have been the replacement of the Kanimbla-class amphibious transport ships with the Canberra-class landing helicopter docks and the retirement of Australia’s aircraft-carrier aspirations. The 2023 defence strategic review recommends a strategy for Australia’s defence of deterrence by denial, but what does that mean for a maritime strategy? How does the Australian Defence Force determine what it means for traditional concepts of sea control, sea denial and power projection? The answer is not entirely clear. There are some clues in remarks by government ministers, and if they are interpreted correctly and in context they are alarming. In the wake of the AUKUS partners’ announcement of Australia’s pathway to acquiring nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines, Defence Minister Richard Marles said they were a ‘capability which would give any adversary pause for thought about disrupting the trading routes to Australia and the way in which we connect to the world’. He also said: ‘The way you need to think about what submarines do is really less about patrolling that massive coastline, which you would need a lot of submarines to do. It’s about the question mark that you place in an adversary’s mind.’ While that may be true, the moment deterrence fails (and there’s no guarantee it won’t) we still must be able to protect Australia’s seaborne trade—or, as the late James Goldrick more accurately pointed out, Australia’s seaborne supply. That requires, at least in part, the execution of localised sea control and power projection. While submarines can assist with that function, they can’t achieve the required tasking. Australia’s maritime strategy must include elements of maritime and naval tasking (which are not entirely the same thing) to achieve power projection and elements of sea control along our sea lines of communication. This includes the Coral Sea, the Java Sea where both HMAS Perth and HMAS Canberra were lost in World War II, and even the western India Ocean. Getting there, and providing persistence, will require a reach greater than the 6,000-nautical-mile range of a stereotypical corvette. As highlighted in the recent call for an overarching strategy addressing maritime security, ensuring maritime security requires the execution of a large spectrum of maritime tasks of which protection of trade is only one. But it’s an important one that requires a significant blue-water capability. While the dual constraints of cost and workforce will of course prohibit a Mahanian view of ‘total command of the sea’, a realistic approach is needed to achieve localised sea control and power projection to secure Australia’s seaborne supply. In articulating its maritime domain force structure priorities, the 2023 review states that the navy ‘must be optimised for operating in Australia’s immediate region and for the security of our sea lines of communication and maritime trade’. It then highlights that, as a consequence, immediate investment priorities for the maritime domain include ‘the acquisition of a contemporary optimal mix of Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants, consistent with a strategy of a larger number of smaller surface vessels’. There arises the challenge. Be it a consequence of insufficient armament, endurance, flight deck capabilities, speed—the list of comparative metrics goes on—Tier 2 surface combatants (however that designation may be defined) will not be able to meet this tasking. Nor will they be able to complete a number of other tasks required in Australia’s implied maritime strategy. They will, however, be able to complete many other maritime security tasks currently performed by the patrol boat force. I tend to agree with Rowan Moffitt’s assertion that the 1986 Dibb review intended the Anzac-class frigates to be a Tier 2 capability. The patrol boat’s planned replacement, the offshore patrol vessel, is underarmed and slow for the current context, and Peter Dean makes a valid point that replacing the OPV with a corvette may be beneficial. But the core of the challenge is that the surface combatant fleet needs to be expanded beyond ‘the answer is always 12’. How that is to be done is a different question to whether Australia should acquire corvettes or not. Based on the three-to-one ratio often used to indicate force availability, 12 surface combatants, of which four are likely to be available for operations at any time, can’t provide the degree of localised sea control and power projection required to protect Australia’s sea lines of communication. This doesn’t mean that the real cost and workforce constraints aren’t important. They are. It does mean that Australia and the ADF must find a way to mitigate these issues. That will require a separate, dedicated discussion. The ADF must receive more funding if the government intends to meet the challenges set out in the defence strategic review, as discussed in ASPI’s 2023–24 budget brief. This will enable the expansion of the RAN’s surface fleet, among other priorities. And we must think differently about the navy’s workforce challenges. The discussion about recruitment and retention, while important, won’t address the structural changes required to crew a fleet designed to protect Australia’s national interests. The answer to this vexed question may include a coastguard, a naval auxiliary, a system of readiness levels, a rehash of the reserves—the list goes on. The point is that the answer to the problem of how many surface combatants we need is not perpetually 11–12, and difficult choices will need to be made to ensure the required structure is identified, funded and crewed.
- Not just another naval exercise: Malabar’s vital messaging
10 August 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 10 August 2023. Link to original version. Image: Department of Defence. US President Theodore Roosevelt once said, ‘A good navy is not a provocation to war. It is the surest guaranty of peace’. Those poignant words were uttered in 1902 but they have a distinct relevance to the era in which we find ourselves now. In 2007, the Royal Australian Navy’s guided missile frigate HMAS Adelaide executed manoeuvres in the northwest Indian Ocean alongside two aircraft carriers, INS Viraat and USS Kittyhawk. While naval exercises are a common part of an Australian ship’s program, this exercise was particularly important. The Adelaide’s manoeuvres alongside ships from India and the US represented Australia’s inaugural participation in Exercise Malabar. Australia’s recent defence strategic review clearly outlined a strategy for deterrence by denial. There’s a genuine debate to be had on whether this concept is scalable to an appropriate maritime strategy for Australia. That was eloquently canvassed by pre-eminent Australian maritime strategist, the late James Goldrick, in a 2021 piece titled ‘Sea denial is not enough: an Australian and Indian perspective’, coauthored with Sudarshan Y. Shrikhande. Their argument is compelling and makes it clear that sea denial is unlikely to be a sufficient maritime strategy for Australia. But the Royal Australian Navy does play a crucial role in this nation’s deterrence strategy. Effective deterrence is often considered to be underpinned by the three Cs—communication, capability and credibility. Maritime tasks are generally grouped into three broad areas, military, constabulary and diplomatic. Naval exercises such as Malabar, which gets underway off Australia tomorrow, represent an important element of the naval diplomacy task, one that remains a consistent obligation of navies the world over, whatever the geostrategic context or technological advances. Within this context of deterrence communication, capability and credibility, naval diplomacy comes to the fore in Exercise Malabar. Malabar originated as a bilateral exercise involving just the US and India in 1992. Conducted at irregular intervals, it had a renewed focus following the US entry into the global war on terror, after which it became a regular exercise. Following the inaugural Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2007, Exercise Malabar moved to the Bay of Bengal and incorporated Singapore, Japan and Australia. Building on its participation in the multilateral Indian-led Exercise Milan, the RAN’s engagement in Malabar in 2007 signalled an increasing maritime focus between the two Indian Ocean neighbours. The 2007 iteration of Malabar sparked objections from China regarding the location and growth of the exercise. In 2008, the then prime minister, Kevin Rudd, stopped Australia’s participation in the exercise following a meeting with the Chinese foreign minister. Australia’s withdrawal from this key aspect of the Quad clearly struck a nerve with India. Australia spent many years trying to rejoin the exercise, but those efforts were reportedly regularly rebuffed by India. In 2015, while on a visit to India, the then defence minister, Kevin Andrews, reiterated Australia’s willingness to rejoin the exercise. But no invitation was forthcoming. Japan joined the exercise in 2015, and in 2018 Tokyo expressed support for Australia’s inclusion, but to no avail. The consistent rejection of Australia’s efforts to rejoin Malabar came despite the establishment in 2015 of a bilateral exercise between Australia and India, AUSINDEX, and India’s inclusion in the Australian-led major multilateral Exercise Kakadu. In the week in which Exercise Malabar is due to commence its first ever iteration of the exercise located in Australia – the history of this exercise is important. It’s more than just another naval exercise. Australia’s withdrawal from the exercise, and India’s subsequent reluctance to allow it to rejoin, were clearly linked to China’s perception of both the exercise and the Quad. In 2020, Australia rejoined the exercise during a significant period of economic coercion from China and has been an annual participant in the three iterations since. Significantly, the 2020 exercise was executed in the Bay of Bengal—where it was held just before China’s original objection. It has since been held in the Philippine Sea, the East China Sea, and now off the coast of Australia. Both the location and the very fact that Australia is participating are important. Despite the tumultuous history of Australia’s involvement in Malabar, this communicates a clear message that the Quad countries have the capability and, through the regularity and complexity of the exercise, the credibility to work together. This is essential to the defence strategic review’s deterrence strategy. Naval diplomacy and a credible RAN underpin this. Investing in our defence force, and particularly our navy, as Theodore Roosevelt remarked so long ago, is the surest way to guarantee a peaceful region.
- Effective anti-submarine warfare requires much more than submarines
7 August 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 7 August 2023. Link to original version. Image: Royal Australian Navy. On the night of 31 May 1942, my grandfather was a young boy hiding under the kitchen table as Sydney went into a panic. The Pacific War, a distant thought to many Sydneysiders, had come home. The accommodation ferry HMAS Kuttabul had been torpedoed in Sydney Harbour by a Japanese submarine. And 21 lives—19 Australian and 2 British—had joined the statistics of the mounting war dead. Australia intimately knows the risk that adversary submarines left unchecked can pose. Fast-forward to 2023, and the Indo-Pacific has been in the midst of a submarine arms race for more than 10 years. In 2019, 75% of the world’s non-US submarines operated in the Indo-Pacific region. That statistic alone makes it clear that the Australian Defence Force requires an effective anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability. Long the poor cousin of the spheres of maritime warfare, ASW has entered the general consciousness of Australian defence analysts as an important component of undersea warfare. The AUKUS announcement brought it to the fore with the decision that Australia would acquire nuclear-powered submarines with the assistance of the US and the UK. Nuclear-powered submarines perform a multitude of tasks, including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; long-range strike; covert insertion of special forces; minelaying; and anti-submarine warfare. In many ways, submarines are the most versatile maritime platforms in a modern navy’s order of battle. That’s a point not lost on Australia, as it works to avoid a capability gap between the retirement of its ageing Collins-class submarines and the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines. It’s also not lost on a number of countries in the region. For example, it’s expected that China’s current order of battle of 66 submarines will grow to 76 by 2030. It is in this context that the defence strategic review states that the immediate investment priorities in the maritime domain include a fleet consisting of ‘Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants in order to provide for increased strike, air defence, presence operations and anti-submarine warfare’. ASW also gets a hit out as a priority in the air domain, with the DSR stating that the air force must be able to maintain ASW as a domain priority. All of this indicates that the revised ‘focused force’, as directed by the DSR, will include an enhanced ASW capability. In some ways that has already been borne out, with the news that the Royal Australian Navy will acquire an expeditionary version of the US Navy’s surveillance towed array sensor system (SURTASS- E), a containerised towed array with a passive and low-frequency activity capable of being deployed on a multitude of commercial vessels. Given the speed and vulnerability of commercial vessels, this is a strategic capability that is appropriate to deploy in the vicinity of key chokepoints or known submarine transit lanes such as the Luzon Strait. However, it is not a tactical capability to be deployed and pre-positioned in the hunt to locate a submarine. It is on this hunt that a system of systems is required to locate and then continue to track a threatening submarine. Such a system of systems will need to be underpinned by an effective theatre ASW concept with a strong backbone of C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance). So, what is the system of systems required to locate and track a submarine? As every ASW practitioner knows, the best way to combat a submarine is to destroy it while it’s alongside a wharf. However, significant practicalities get in the way of this—not least that, unless it’s during a declared conflict, this is an ardent breach of international law. So, short of striking a submarine alongside the wharf, effective ASW requires the ability to track a submarine from when it dives throughout its transit. This requires an enmeshing of satellite capabilities, strategic towed arrays, seabed arrays, tactical towed arrays, maritime patrol aircraft, ASW helicopters, submarines and information sharing with like-minded partners. That is the system. Of course, connecting these dots requires effective communication and picture compilation. But the key point is that every element of this system is needed. It is in this light that the DSR’s recommendation that a surface combatant fleet review is needed to ‘ensure its size, structure and composition complement the capabilities provided by the forthcoming conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines’ raises some concerns. As highlighted in my recent article ‘National defence and the navy’, the assertion that acquiring nuclear-powered submarines warrants a rethink of the surface combatant fleet structure seems tenuous. Nuclear submarines provide the same effects as conventional submarines; they just do it faster and with greater endurance—two elements that are important given Australia’s geographical location. However, to assume that the existence of nuclear-powered submarines from the 2030s in the RAN’s order of battle changes the foundational structure of the fleet, if in fact that is the assumption, is concerning. A structural review may be needed for many reasons, including the continuing cost blowouts of the Hunter-class frigates, the vulnerability of the lightly armed planned Arafura-class offshore patrol vessels and the RAN’s limited maritime strike capability. Conventional submarines can have an average dived speed of 16–17 knots on a sprint, more than likely reduced to 10 knots on patrol, give or take a few knots. While the numbers may differ, the point is that employment of conventional submarines in an ASW role requires specific positioning to place them in a position to intercept a threatening submarine. It’s a kind of one-shot thing. Nuclear-powered submarines, with an average dived speed of 30 knots, are not so constrained by a requirement for perfect positioning to be effective. However, even with the advantage of speed, under the rule of three, even if nuclear-powered submarines are the best submarine hunters, a fleet of eight (once fully acquired in the 2040s) will give the RAN the ability to have two to three operational at any one time—assuming that three will be in refit and two or three will be at various stages of force generation, leaving two or three for operational deployments. Deployments will need to span the full spectrum of submarine taskings. With over 75% of the world’s non-US submarines operating in our region, the numbers speak for themselves. Even if submarines are the best submarine hunters, the proposition that eight nuclear-powered submarines could meet the ADF’s required tactical ASW capability is a fallacy. We will need much more than that. This is partially mitigated by the Air Force’s fleet of 12 P-8 Poseidon ASW aircraft, but only partially. Effective ASW is achieved through a system-of-systems approach. And in that system of systems, the RAN requires strategically placed seabed arrays and a tactical towed array system similar to that offered by the Hunter-class frigate (although this isn’t unique to the Hunter). A view that nuclear-powered submarines replace this need denies the maths and the practicalities of the situation. For too long the RAN has been without this capability, and with a luxury of distance has been able to underestimate the ASW threat. That luxury is no longer available. In considering the fleet structure under the surface combatant fleet review, the ADF must not be captured by the view that nuclear-powered submarines can, by themselves, effectively address the ASW challenges in the region. It must remember that effective ASW requires more than just one exquisite capability. It requires a system of systems underpinned by concepts and C4ISR. In that system of systems, the RAN needs an effective tactical towed array system. Whatever the future of the Hunter class, the surface combatant fleet review must not be blinded by the notion that to deliver an effective ASW capability for the ADF all we need is eight nuclear-powered submarines.